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The Belo Monte Dam is being built in Amazonia, Northern Brazil, and once completed, 
it will be one of the four largest hydroelectric power plants in the world. The power plant 
is a major infrastructure project in Brazil that should contribute to the country’s energy 
security and benefit the economy. As any large construction, it also has potential draw-
backs. Due to its location, Belo Monte already have and will continue to disrupt ecos-
systems and human lives. The negative impacts of the dam have created polemic discus-
sions among different interest groups. This controversy is investigated in this paper in its 
various aspects: political, ecological, cultural, social, and economic. The findings of this 
research are presented in the form of scenarios of alternative future possibilities for the 
region. This Master’s Thesis aims at helping different interest groups to envision alterna-
tive futures with these scenarios, and to provide tools to create change towards their pre-
ferred futures. 
RESUMO 
Complexo Belo Monte é o nome que se dá para a usina hidroelétrica que está sendo 
construída na Volta Grande do Xingu, no estado do Pará, Norte do Brasil. Ao ser 
concluída, será uma das quatro maiores usinas hidroelétricas do mundo. Belo Monte é o 
atual principal projeto de infraestrutura do Brasil, e propõe contribuir para segurança 
energética do país, e para o crescimento de sua economia. Como qualquer grande obra, 
ela carregada de desvantagens. Os impactos socioambientais de Belo Monte são 
amplamente discutidos na sociedade brasileira, e geraram uma grande controvérsia no 
país. Esta tese de mestrado investiga a controvérsia que é Belo Monte em seus diversos 
aspectos: politico, ecológico, social, econômico e cultural. Como resultado, quatro 
cenários de possíveis futuros para a região são apresentados. A partir desses cenários, 
essa pesquisa tem como objetivo ajudar os diferentes grupos envolvidos com Belo Monte 
a visualizar alternativas de futuros possíveis, fornecendo-lhes ferramentas que viabilizem 




Belo Monte -patokompleksia rakennetaan parhaillaan Amazonin sademetsäalueella, 
Pohjois-Brasiliassa. Valmistuessaan siitä tulee yksi maailman neljästä suurimmasta 
vesivoimalaitoksesta. Belo Monte on laajamittainen ja -alainen hanke, jonka tarkoitus on 
vahvistaa Brasilian energiavarmuutta ja valtion taloutta. Kuten kaikkiin suuriin 
rakennushankkeisiin, Belo Monteen liittyy etujen lisäksi lukuisia mahdollisia haittoja. 
Pato vaikuttaa jo eläinten, kasvien ja ihmisten elämään ja nämä vaikutukset ovat 
herättäneet keskustelua ja käynnistäneet kiistoja eri osapuolten välille. 
Tässä tutkielmassa käsitellään Belo Monten vaikutuksia ja siihen liittyvää keskustelua 
politiikan, kulttuurin, talouden, ympäristön ja yhteiskunnan näkökulmista. Tutkimuksen 
perusteella hahmotellaan alueelle mahdollisia tulevaisuuksia, jotka esitetään 
skenaarioiden muodossa. Skenaarioiden tarkoitus on auttaa Belo Monten eri sidosryhmiä 






Energy security is a global challenge. It is defined as “the uninterrupted availability of 
energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA 2017). Energy security is closely linked to 
population growth, to the rise of living standards (Partainen and Korhonen, 2016:15), and 
to the advancement of societal structures. As societies reach a higher level of organiza-
tion, the demand for energy also grows. (Heinonen 2017: 8). 
Historically, energy security is associated with oil supply (IEA 2017) as the global 
energy system is founded primarily on fossil fuels and other non-renewable energy 
sources (see for example Floyd 2012:24, Roser 2016, IEA 2016:6). The process of burn-
ing fossil fuels, however, emits GHG (greenhouse gases), which affect global climate 
change and the environment.  
To prevent the negative effects of climate change, there is a growing demand to expand 
the production of clean and renewable energy systems (United Nations 2015:3). In 2005, 
the Kyoto Protocol established emissions reduction targets for industrialised countries 
(Whittington 2007:54) and more recently in 2016, the Paris Agreement called signatory 
parties to undertake rapid GHG emission reductions “in accordance with best available 
science” and to provide support to developing countries (United Nations 2015:6). 
Brazil occupies a unique position among the major GHG emitting countries . Its emis-
sions per capita are at around 2.4 tons CO2, which according to Lèbre La Rovere et al. 
(2017:242), is considerably low. It is argued that the reason for the Brazilian low per 
capita energy-related GHG emissions is the country’s abundant 'clean energy resources' 
(Lèbre La Rovere et al. 2017:242). About 80% of Brazil's total energy comes from hy-
dropower plants, and hydroelectricity is the main electric power source in the country 
(Norte Energia 2011b). Hydroelectric power is thought to be low on GHG emissions. 
Hydro power plants are perceived as means to cheap and reliable energy supply, and are 
promoted as important contributors for the societal wellbeing. (Ministry of Mines and 
Energy 2011, Norte Energia 2011b:1, Ministry of Planning 2014). The expansion of hy-
dropower is part of the Brazilian strategy for acceleration of growth (Ministry of Planning 
2014). The decision for this specific source of energy is guided by the country's commit-
ment to reduce GHG emissions, and by the idea that the technology is environmentally 
feasible. However, this might prove to be a misconception.  
Recent findings suggest that hydroelectricity should not be considered a source of 
'clean energy' as it does in fact produce GHG emissions, mainly on the reservoirs and 
spillways (Fearnside 2002, 2015b and 2017). Moreover, scholars have shown strong in-
dications that negative impacts on ecosystems surpass economic benefits, especially 
when considering power plants being built on rivers in tropical forests, as is the case of 
several hydroelectric power plants in Brazil. (see for example Magalhães and Hernandez, 
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2009:2, Sousa Júnior and Reid 2010, Fearnside 2016). This paper investigates one hydro-
electric power project in particular, the Belo Monte Dam Complex1.  
Belo Monte is currently the largest hydroelectricity project in Brazil. It is being built 
in a region called Volta Grande do Xingu, in Amazonia, in the state of Pará, Northern 
Brazil. Belo Monte is to become the third largest hydroelectric power plant in the world 
(ANEEL 2011:57-59). Its 11 turbines combined will have an installed capacity of 
11,233.1 MW (Norte Energia 2013:8).  
Social and environmental impacts caused by the implementation of Belo Monte stirred 
polemic discussions among different interest groups. Proponents of Belo Monte perceive 
the dam as fundamental to the economic growth of Brazil. Expanding hydroelectric power 
is part of the national strategy, as it is a renewable source of energy that arguably produces 
low GHG emission. Hydroelectricity is seen by government officials as a path to sustain-
ability. (Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management 2013, Lobão in Planalto 
2011, Rousseff 2014). Opponents, on the other hand, claim that the project should be 
considered unfeasible because the negative impacts surpass economic benefits. The re-
gion where Belo Monte is being built is home to a paradoxical ecosystem, both supera-
bundant and fragile at the same time (Loureiro 2017:62). Moreover, the region is popu-
lated by diverse traditional peoples, including indigenous tribes of various ethnic and lan-
guage groups. The construction and operation of the dam has already caused negative 
impacts to the ecosystem and to the traditional communities living in the region. These 
impacts include rise on illegal logging (Socioambiental 2014a), disappearance of animal 
species (Magalhães and Hernandez 2009:7-8, Prang 2007:13), rise on criminality (Costa 
2011), and even indigenous ethnocide (Thais Santi 2014). Taking into consideration the 
low resilience of the Amazonian ecosystem, some of these impacts may be irreversible.  
In this paper, this controversy2 is investigated in its various aspects: political, ecolog-
ical, cultural, social, and economic. The findings are presented in the form of scenarios 
of alternative future possibilities for the region. This Master’s Thesis aims at helping dif-
ferent interest groups to envision alternative futures with these scenarios, and to provide 
tools to create change towards their preferred futures.  
                                                 
1 From now on, referred to “Belo Monte Dam” or simply “Belo Monte”, interchangeably.  
2 Further referred to “the Belo Monte controversy” 
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The main question this research attempts to answer is: 
o What will become of the Belo Monte region after the construction of the dam com-
plex?  
In order to explore futures with Belo Monte, other issues should be understood first: 
o How did Belo Monte come to be? What are the justifications for building the dam, 
and why are these justifications being questioned? 
o What are the most important issues that proponents and opponents of the dam 
argue about? 
o What are the most significant impacts (positive or negative) that Belo Monte has 
already brought to the region? 
Naturally, the main research question is not answered in this paper. Reasoning behind 
that is that the future (definitive and singular) is not graspable or knowable. The answer 
to “what will become of the Belo Monte region after the construction of the dam complex” 
can only be answered retrospectively in the future. Instead, this thesis explores alternative 
future possibilities, which are presented in the form of four scenarios, describing how 
futures in the region could look like. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: First, the study area in question is described. 
Then, the theoretical and methodological frameworks are provided, where the main con-
cepts and methods used, as well as ethical considerations and a personal motivation to the 
study are presented. The frameworks are followed by a description of the research mate-
rial. Next, the Belo Monte controversy is presented. Several aspects are taken into con-
sideration and explained. The political, ecological, cultural, social, and economic aspects 
are presented in depth. Once the controversy is covered, the scenario-building process is 
explained, and long tables sketching each scenario are presented. Finally, the scenarios 
are written out in the form of a narrative. The paper ends with a small discussion on how 
these scenarios can be useful, and dialogues with what other authors have said about the 
topic. A list of works cited and appendices are available at the end of this document. 
Understanding the Belo Monte controversy is the core objective of this research. It 
explores the Belo Monte polemic investigating the political processes leading up to the 
construction and operation of the dam, the economic considerations of the project, socio 
and environmental impacts, as well as the cultural implications that the dam’s implemen-
tation has caused to the local population. I hope to inspire decision makers of Belo Monte 




2. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Futures Studies 
Futures Studies is an interdisciplinary field that aims at forecasting alternative futures for 
study and evaluation (Dator 2011:32). Scholars of this field, known as Futurists, use the 
verb to forecast when presenting their work. The verb to predict is avoided, because it is 
impossible to predict what will happen for sure because there is no one single future ahead 
of us. For that reason, although the word “future” is commonly used in the single form, 
the word “futures” in plural form is commonly used among futurists. 
When studying alternative future possibilities, we can assess possible, probable and 
preferable futures. By identifying the components of these alternative futures, individuals 
and organisations can set actions for the present that may guide them towards their pre-
ferred futures (Dator 2011:32). Understanding that there are several paths to preferred 
futures, and that the actions taken today can guide us towards these futures can be a pow-
erful tool for social change.  
The Brazilian futurist Rosa Alegria (2011) says that understanding the future is pur-
poseful, because the future is the remaining time we have ahead of us. According to her, 
futures research is a tool to impulse change, and in order to understand the future, re-
searchers should infuse scientific methods with passion, curiosity, and intuition. 
Although Futures Studies are offered as major subjects for masters and doctoral studies 
is some universities (for example the University of Turku, for which this master’s thesis 
is being written, the University of Houston, and the University of Hawaii), it is not yet 
universally recognized as an academically established field. There is no consensus on the 
definition of the activity of a futurist, or even if Futures Studies belong to the sciences. 
(See for example Niiniluoto 2001:371, Dator 2011:32, Glenn 2009a:4, Bell 1997:188). 
Some Futures Studies terminology are here distinguished. 
The term Futures Studies refers to the field of studies that assess possible, probable 
and preferable futures through systematic futures research (Bell 1997:73). I refer to Fu-
tures Research as the product of Futures Studies within academia. Futures Research are 
presented in the form of theses and dissertations, academic journal articles conference 
presentations, books, and other academic publishing. Futures Research is subject to aca-
demic rigor and the methodology can be qualitative or quantitative. There are several 
peer-reviewed academic journals that publish futures research. Some of these journals 
are: European Journal of Futures Research (under SpringerOpen); Foresight: The Journal 
of Future Studies, Strategic Thinking and Policy (Published by Emerald); Futures: The 
Journal of Policy, Planning and Futures Studies (Published by Elsevier); Futuribles (Pub-
lished by the Futuribles Centre), International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy 
(Published by Inderscience); Journal of Futures Studies: Epistemology, Methods, Applied 
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and Alternative Futures (Published by Tamkang University, Taiwan), The International 
Journal of Forecasting (Published by Elsevier). 
In the University of Turku, some of the methods used in Futures Studies are Backcast-
ing, Causal Layered Analysis (CLA), Cross-impact Analysis, Delphi, Environmental 
Scanning and Trend Analysis, Futures Wheel, Futures Workshops, Scenarios, Simulation 
and Games, among others.  
Despite the wide variety of methods, it is argued that Futures Studies cannot be recog-
nized as a science, because the results of this kind of research lack reproducibility, and 
that “the outcome of studies depends on the methods used and the skills of the practition-
ers.” (Glenn 2009a:2). The Finnish futurist Pentti Malaska (in Glenn 2009a:5) claimed 
that the empirical base of Futures Studies is as wide as "all sciences, whereas the empirical 
base of anyone science is only that science's domain”. He adds that the value of this field 
of studies is “not discovering new factual knowledge as in the sciences, but producing 
perceptions and insights to that body of knowledge”. (Malaska in Glenn 2009a:5) 
"The purpose of futures methodology is to systematically explore, create, 
and test both possible and desirable futures to improve decisions. It in-
cludes analysis of how those conditions might change as a result of the 
implementation of policies and actions, and the consequences of these pol-
icies and actions" (Glenn 2009a:1) 
The term futuring appears in this paper as a reference to the process of thinking about 
the future and producing materials related to that process. By adding the -ing suffix in the 
end of the word future, it is transformed into a verb in gerund, which gives the idea of a 
progressive aspect to the word. Futuring is a process for exercising the future (for example 
through scenarios or simulations). Futuring aims at producing statements about different 
classes of futures, and at figuring out ways to improve possible futures towards preferable 
ones (See for example Edward Cornish 2004). 
Different types of futures can be found in Futures Studies literature and some authors 
have distinguished five classes: potential, possible, plausible, probable, preferable futures 
(for example Masini 1993, Hancock Bezold 1994, Voros 2003, Jentl 2015), as illustrated 
in Figure 1.  
Jentl (2015:18) illustrates with the Futures Cone (Figure 1) that different futures “are 
not mutually exclusive but closely related and even partially overlapping”. Jentl’s Futures 
Cone is an adaptation from Hancock & Bezold (1994) and Voros (2003). The cone is 
three-dimensional, and varies in probability and size. The three-dimensionality feature of 
the cone arises because a longer time frame presents more opportunity for divergence 
from the present, so the set of possible futures for ten years from now is larger than the 





Figure 1 The Futures Cone (Jentl 2015) 
Potential Futures is the largest concept which includes everything that has the capacity 
to develop into being, including those which we cannot imagine (Voros 2003:16). Poten-
tial futures are inside and outside the cone represented in Figure 1. The boundary of the 
Futures Cone is our ability to imagine possible futures, thus events that are unknown, and 
unknowable to us today, are also included in the potential futures. It is important to rec-
ognize that there are possibilities of futures beyond our current knowledge and capacity 
of imagination. 
The outermost layer of the cone, possible futures, is a class of all kinds of futures that 
we can imagine (Voros 2003:16). This class of futures also includes science-fiction-like 
futures “that transgress presently accepted laws of science” (Hancock and Bezold 
1994:24). The concept contemplates the known systems we now have, and takes into 
consideration that new discoveries can be made in days or years to come. Possible futures 
embrace the knowledge which we do not yet possess, and the idea that with the advance-
ment of science we ought to gain knowledge and have answers for questions we now 
have. 
Plausible futures are possible futures that ‘could happen’ according to our current 
knowledge of how things work (Voros 2003:17). This class of futures excludes 
knowledge that we do not yet possess. Plausible futures are based on the knowledge we 
have today. Its foundations are the current scientific work, methodologies and processes 
(Voros 2003:17). 
Probable futures are possible futures that are considered likely to happen (Voros 
2003:17). Naturally, even among probable futures some are more likely than others. In 
general terms probable futures are based on the idea that the future is a linear extension 
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of the present, a continuation of what we have today (Voros 2003:17). The so-called 
“business-as-usual” futures are commonly seen as “the most probable futures” (Hancock 
and Bezold 1994:24), as in general they are not too different from the past. The drivers 
of change are known trends that can be studied and calculations of probabilities may 
sometimes be made. Although the business-as-usual might just as well be the future that 
lies ahead for us, present trends may change, and discontinuities may occur. 
Preferable futures (also known as desirable futures) is arguably the most subjective of 
all classes of alternative futures (Voros 2003:17). This class of futures can also be referred 
to ‘prescriptive futurism’ or ‘normative forecasting’ (Hancock and Bezold 1994:25). Ac-
cording to Jentl (2015:19) preferable futures is distinguished from other classes of futures 
for being always normative and thus, originating from value judgement. Thus, may vary 
from one individual to another. Additionally, Jentl (2015:19) explains that preferable fu-
tures are not always probable or even plausible futures. The issue on values and the un-
derstanding of preference are topics discussed further in chapter 2.5. Preferable futures 
permeate all imaginable (possible) futures. It may include probable and improbable 
events, as well as current and future knowledge about the universe. Thinking of preferable 
futures is perhaps the most empowering tool Futures Studies can offer. 
Finally, as an addition to the futures cone presented above, a sixth class of futures 
found in the literature: wildcards. Wildcards are possible-but-improbable events. Among 
wildcards, extreme events, or X-events, are unlikely but potentially significant events that 
might trigger a sequence of linked events creating conditions for a completely different 
set of futures. (Casti et.al. 2011:9-11). These events are conditional to the surrounding 
context, and if they do come to be, they may create possibilities for drastic changes. Ex-
treme events that have happened in the past are for example the tsunami that hit Thailand 
in 2004, the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, or, perhaps the most extreme of all, 
the asteroid that hit Earth about 66 million years ago (evidenced by the Chicxulub crater 
in Mexico) that have caused a mass extinction of numerous animal and plant groups, 
including dinosaurs.  
In the Futures Studies’ literature, wildcards are also referred to Black Swans (see for 
example Goodwin 2008 and Taleb 2007). Nicholas Taleb (2007: xviii) introduced Black 
Swans as events that rare, of extreme impact, and that have a retrospective predictability, 
meaning that they cannot be predicted beforehand, but signs that could have led to its 
prediction can be explained afterwards. 
Thinking of wildcards may be a complicated task, exactly because they are unexpected 
in its essence, even unpredictable. When thinking about futures, we have to take into 
consideration that there are things we do not know, and now now, and at the moment we 
do not have means to know about them. Speculating how wildcards could affect the fu-
ture, however, is an important part of futures thinking. 
Since 1996, a think tank composed of futurists called The Millennium Project has been 
annually updating what is perceived as the 15 Global Challenges Facing Humanity. 
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These challenges serve as a framework for this Master’s thesis. The Millennium Project’s 
publication 2013-14 State of the Future (Glenn et.al. 2014:19) presents the following 
challenges:  
 
Figure 2 Fifteen Global Challenges Facing Humanity (Millennium Project 2014) 
Figure 2 shows that all 15 Global Challenges Facing Humanity are interconnected. 
The image clarifies the understanding of holistic thinking, which is well present in Futures 
Studies. Holistic thinking aims at understanding systems as whole entities, interconnected 
and interdependent of its components. In order to gain full understanding of a system it 
has to be considered from a macro and micro perspectives. 
While holistic thinking is a strength of Futures Studies, it is also a weakness; especially 
in publications written by a single researcher like this master’s thesis. It is unfeasible, if 
not impossible to truly take all the components of reality affecting an issue into consider-
ation. The Belo Monte case is uniquely complex and controversial. In an attempt to cover 
as many aspects to the Belo Monte controversy without compromising depth, this mas-
ter’s thesis is exceptionally large. 
Nine of the 15 global challenges presented in Figure 2 are discussed in this thesis. As 
it is depicted in the image, all issues are interconnected. The Belo Monte controversy 
presented in the following chapters includes the government’s goals to reduce CO2 emis-
sions and mitigate climate change (challenge #1), while guaranteeing energy resources 
for future generations (challenge #13). Opponents argue that the construction of the dam 
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is polluting the rivers (challenge #2) which in effect hampers the aquatic life: the local 
population’s food and economic resources (challenge #3). Locals demonstrate, fighting 
for their rights to be heard and acknowledged (challenge #4). The issue of health (chal-
lenge #8) of the local population is also discussed, as well as conflicts between mining 
companies, urban population and the indigenous peoples (challenge #10). When consid-
ering problems created by speeding up “development” in the city of Altamira, issues like 
corruption, organized crime and violence (challenge #12) are also present. Additionally, 
the meaning of global ethics (challenge #15) is also discussed. 
2.2 Scenarios Development 
In this master’s thesis, scenario thinking is used as a method to look into futures possibil-
ities. The term scenario has its origin in dramaturgy (Glenn 2009b:1). Like the script of 
a play, scenarios are stories of what a future could look like. They “can be used as subject 
of analysis (e.g., analysis of personal futures images), as a tool for strategic planning (e.g., 
for companies or organisations), or as a way to organize and present findings (e.g., alter-
native futures for a certain topic)” (Jentl 2015:51). The scenarios presented at the end of 
this thesis fall in the latter category. 
The last chapters of this thesis convey stories of plausible futures for the Belo Monte 
Dam and the peoples affected by it. Written in the form of narratives, scenarios illustrate 
key decisions, events, and consequences, connecting a future state with the present (Glenn 
2009b:1). Building scenarios involves thinking of multiple, equally plausible futures (Van 
Der Heijden 2009:1), yet not all scenarios are equally probable. Also, it is possible that 
none of these alternative futures resented come to be, and that the future that unfolds is 
quite different from the ones presented. Actions taken today affect the days to come, sce-
narios can help envision how different actions may affect alternative futures. By identi-
fying plausible futures, different scenario elements, and how each of these futures may 
come to be, we open an umbrella of opportunities. 
Several methods can be found in the Futures Studies literature for creating scenarios 
(Glenn 2009b:5). Although methods range from simplistic to complex, from individual 
to group work, the need to understand the system under study permeates most methods, 
as well as the identification of trends, issues, driving forces, and potential events that are 
critical to this system (Glenn 2009b:5). The scenarios written for this particular research 
are based on the futurist Peter Schwartz’s guide for developing scenarios. According to 





Step 1. Identify focal issue or a decision 
Step 2. List key factors in the local environment 
Step 3. Identify driving forces 
Step 4. Rank them by degree of importance and uncertainty 
Step 5. Select scenario logics 
Step 6. Flesh out the scenarios 
Step 7. Define implications of each scenario for the focal issue or decision 
Step 8. Select of leading indicators and signposts 
The scenarios in this master’s thesis are built following these steps. The focal issue 
identified for the Futures of Belo Monte is how the dam is coming to be. The focal deci-
sion is the choice for building Belo Monte the way it is being built. This is related to 
political decisions, to issuing licences and how the preconditions for these licenses are 
being handled. The Environmental Impact Assessement (EIA) is the first precondition for 
any licence, as will be described later, and it is considered an important concept in this 
paper. How the EIA is carried out can be considered a focal issue (or decision) for the 
development of scenarios, it has long-term impacts for the populations in question. 
Steps 2 and 3 of the development of scenarios are presented in chapter 3. The key 
factors in the local environment, and driving forces of the scenarios are presented chapter 
are presented as the Belo Monte controversy, divided in its several aspects, political, eco-
logical, cultural, social and economic. I look at the impacts that Belo Monte is causing to 
the region, and rather the impact mitigation measures carried out by the company building 
the dam are successful or not. 
PESTEC is used as a systematic way of organising chapter 3 in order to guarantee a 
holistic approach to the research. Originally PESTEC is a technique used in the form of 
a matrix to tackle different dimensions and multiple variants of a certain issue (Heinonen 
and Ruotsalainen 2013:22). Professor Sirkka Heinonen from the Finland Futures Re-
search Centre has often used the PESTEC table in her work, analysing issues from the 
following dimensions: (P) political, (E) economic, (S) social, (T) technological (E) eco-
logical, and (C) cultural, citizen and customer dimensions (Heinonen and Ruotsalainen 
2013). The model used by Heinonen has been modified for this research. I have altered 
the order of the PESTEC dimensions to “PECSE” (P) political, (E) ecological, (C) cul-
tural, (S) social and (E) economic. PECSE outlines the first part of the research results 
where the Belo Monte controversy is explained in depth in each of these dimensions. The 
dimensions are easily identified in the second level headings of chapter 3, and the key 
factors in the local environment are found in the third level headings of that chapter. 
The political aspect of the Belo Monte controversy deals the government rationale for 
choosing to build the Belo Monte dam. Chapter 3.4 explains the politically driven moti-
vations behind this choice, and the legal procedures and implications to begin the con-
struction of the dam. Moreover, the legitimacy of the dam’s licenses is questioned, and 
links to a large corruption scandal involving high-rank politicians is revealed. 
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The ecological aspect deals with the impacts to the environment caused by the Belo 
Monte Dam. Chapter 0 presents some of the environmental projects being conducted to 
mitigate the negative impacts, and questions the core premise for the choice of building 
the plant in the first place: Brazil’s commitment to reduce GHG emissions. 
The cultural aspect is focused on the traditional peoples that live in the region where 
Belo Monte is being built, and how their cultures and indigenous way-of-life are being 
affected by the dam’s construction. In chapter 3.6 I denounce an indigenous ethnocide 
(an intentional and systematic destruction of indigenous cultures). The chapter explains 
why and how this ethnocide has happened, and presents a description of one of these 
communities, the Muratu, whose leader kindly welcomed me to visit and enter his home. 
The social aspect deals mainly with the urban population being impacted by Belo 
Monte. Chapter 3.7 presents the services being offered to this population, the urban de-
velopment in the region, and how the process of resettlement and formalisation of land 
tenure was conducted. 
Finally, the economical aspect deals with the budget for Belo Monte. Chapter 3.8 de-
scribes how the budget for Belo Monte has grown over the years, and makes considera-
tions of costs unaccounted-for.  
The technological aspect was purposely removed from the analysis for two reasons, 
firstly, the technical characteristics of the dam have been specified and the technology 
used or building plans themselves are not the issue under discussion here, but instead, 
how these constructions affect its surroundings. Secondly, my field of expertize is within 
socio-environmental issues, and I thought that the engineering discussions should be left 
out of this paper. However, some technical characteristics of the dam have been presented 
in chapter 3.2. 
Steps 4 and 5 for developing scenarios are found in chapter 4, represented with long 
tables based on Heinonen’s PESTEC. The tables presented acknowledge the key factors 
studied, and identify the driving forces in the macro environment that influence the key 
factors in the local environment. These driving forces were transferred into a PECSE ma-
trix where the results were analysed as a part of the development of scenarios.  
It is important to understand which driving forces are predetermined elements (that do 
not depend on any particular chain of events) and are therefore present in all four scenar-
ios, and which are the uncertain key drivers that make the scenarios differ from each 
other. The fourth step is exactly to rank the driving forces by uncertainty as well as by 
importance (Schwartz 1991:243). Examples of predetermined events in the Belo Monte 
case are slowly changing phenomena like the already consummated population growth; 
constrained situations like a region far from urban centres; situations already in the pipe-
line, like the increased pressure on the natural environment and inevitable collisions like 
the disappearance of certain fish species in the region. Although these are inevitable (and 
the inevitability is further described in chapter 3) it is uncertain how the government and 
the local population will deal with these elements.  
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By questioning the predetermined events, and the assumptions upon them, it is possi-
ble to find critical uncertainties. According to Schwartz (1991:116) the relationship be-
tween predetermined elements and critical uncertainties is “like a choreography with a 
certain sequence of steps to take place, but each dancer may interpret them differently”. 
Once the driving forces have been identified, and ranked by importance and uncer-
tainty, the most important and more uncertain elements are used to compose the plot of 
the scenarios. For this step, a scenario table was developed. This table is exceptionally 
long and is a personal input (I have never seen a scenario table that detailed being used 
in Futures Research). Each line represents one uncertain element or driving force, and 
each column represented one future state for it. By filling in the table, the logics of the 
scenarios were created, and with that, the scenarios could be fleshed out, and the narra-
tives for each started to emerge. Step 6, 7 and 8 for developing scenarios are presented in 
chapter  5. The scenarios at the end of this paper are narratives unfolding how the driving 
forces identified through the research might plausibly behave in the futures described. By 
using the documentary analysis to identify the driving forces and the building blocks of 
the scenarios, and by using the knowledge learned during the research, the scenarios are 
based on the empirical world and how issues have proceeded in the past.Once the narra-
tives had been written and developed in some detail, the focal was reviewed. Also indi-
cators to monitor whether one of the scenarios could become more probable than others 
were identified, and are further discussed in the final chapters of this master’s thesis. 
There is no consensus on what a good number of scenarios is, although traditionally 
futurists tended to think of three alternative scenarios. This tendency was evident, for 
example, in the scenario classification used by Herman Kahn (in Glenn 2009b:1), as well 
as in Schwartz (1991:19) as follows: 
a. Surprise-free (or) business-as-usual (or) more of the same scenario 
b. Worst-case (or) worse scenario 
c. Best-case (or) different but better scenario 
Later this three-scenarios-approach was criticized by futurists (Glenn 2009b:1), espe-
cially for the inclusion of a business-as-usual scenario (see for example Dator 2009:7, 
and Van Der Heijden 2009:1). The contemporary Jim Dator (2009:8) has introduced four 
generic futures:  
1. Continued Growth (or the official future of all modern governments) 
2. Collapse (social or environmental) 
3. Discipline (or disciplined society, with deep changes in the values of a society) 
4. Transformation (or dream society) 
All of Dator’s futures include positive and negative aspects, and none of them are 
“best-case scenario” or “worst-case scenario”. Dator (2009:7) claims that even if people 
write about six or nine alternative futures, the scenarios usually fall within these four 
classifications. Based on the ideas of Dator’s four generic futures and on the traditional 
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classifications by Kahn and Schwartz, this master’s thesis brings the following: Continu-
ation & Amplification, Perfect Storm, Lucidity and Black Swan.  
The first, the Continuation & Amplification Scenario is based on Dator’s “continued 
growth”, which somewhat resonates with Schwartz’s “more of the same” scenario. It is 
based on the present-day official goals of the Brazilian government and the experiences 
from the past as explored in the documentary analysis.  
The second, the Perfect Storm Scenario, is based on the idea that a combination of 
events intensifies the problems that are visible today. This scenario presents a disastrous 
situation aroused from a set of failed circumstances (for more information on the concept 
of a perfect storm, see Killeen 2007). What if all the individual circumstances that poten-
tially could go wrong actually do go wrong? This scenario could be related to Kahn’s 
worst-case scenario, but not on Dator’s “collapse scenario”. No basic structures break on 
the perfect storm, and there are no extreme events that lead systems to collapse. This 
scenario is based on the results of the interviews conducted, and the fears that the inter-
viewees have presented. Although the perfect storm could be taken as a dystopia, this 
scenario could be used as a tool to understand how bad decisions taken today could affect 
the future. When taking into consideration the issues that could go wrong, decision mak-
ers can take action in the present in order to avoid these to happen. 
The third scenario, called Lucidity Scenario, is based on the idea that the decision 
making process is more inclusive, and that socioenvironmental issues are dealt with ex-
perts of various fields. Chapter 3 presents how socioenvironmental issues has deliberately 
and systematically been neglected by decision makers. As will be discussed, the licences 
for building the dam were issued without a proper consent from traditional peoples and 
communities living in the region, with an inconclusive EIA, and with warnings from the 
scientific community on several overlooked negative impacts of the Belo Monte Dam. 
This Lucidity Scenario is based on the idea that scientific evidence and social participa-
tion are key elements in the decision making processes. This scenario is an antonym of 
the Perfect Storm, because here, the impacts of Belo Monte are managed responsibly. 
This scenario can be related to Dator’s “transformation or dream society”, created based 
on the preferred future images collected during the interviews conducted. 
The fourth and last scenario is tailor-made for some of my interviewees. This question, 
from interviewee to interviewer was asked in multiple occasions. Interviewees asked me 
to write a scenario that would take into consideration the unlikely possibility that Belo 
Monte operations would be interrupted. This Black Swan Scenario presents an unlikely 




2.3 Description Of The Geographical Area 
Belo Monte is being built in Eastern Amazonia, on the Xingu River, in the state of Pará, 
in Northern Brazil. The white star in Figure 3 shows the location of the dam complex. 
The Xingu River has a total length of 1,979 km (International Rivers 2016). Its source is 
in the State of Mato Grosso in Brazil and from there it runs northward through the State 
of Pará, towards the Amazon River. The two rivers meet near the Atlantic coast. 
Besides the Amazon River, there are two other larger rivers near the Xingu, Tocantins 
(in the East) and Tapajós (in the West), both of which also have ongoing dam building 
projects. In the map below it is possible to locate the Tucuruí Dam water reservoir, which 
is the larger dark area in the Tocantins River, about 300 km Southeast from Belo Monte. 
Another dam complex has been proposed and is under study for the Tapajós River, and it 
is possible it will be implemented in the near future (see for example Guimarães 2015, 
Fonseca 2015, and Fearnside 2015a). 
 
Figure 3 Location Of The Belo Monte Dam (From Google Maps)  
Where the Xingu River reaches the city of Altamira, in Pará, it encounters a formation 
of hard soil, which forces the river to naturally divert its path forming a U-shaped diver-
sion known as Volta Grande do Xingu: The Big Bend of Xingu. It is in this U-shaped 




Figure 4 Belo Monte In Volta Grande Do Xingu (International Rivers 2012) 
The construction plans for Belo Monte in Volta Grande do Xingu is illustrated in 
Figure 4. The indigenous territories directly affected by Belo Monte are shown in light 
grey (the Juruna and the Arara indigenous territories). The Trans-Amazon Highway3 is 
highlighted, and crosses the Belo Monte Site. Figure 4 also indicates the two dams that 
are being built for Belo Monte: the main dam is being built in the Pimental Site, in the 
Southeast of the City of Altamira, and the second dam, the Main Powerhouse is being 
built in the Belo Monte Site. One canal is being built to derive the water flow from the 
Volta Grande do Xingu towards the main powerhouse in the Belo Monte Site. As a con-
sequence, parts of the City of Altamira and several small islands will be flooded once the 
dams are completed, while the Volta Grande do Xingu is expected to have a reduced 
outflow of water. The Juruna and the Arara indigenous territories highlighted are lands 
that will be directly affected by Belo Monte due to the proximity of the constructions. As 
shown in the map, these communities live in the area of the river that will experience a 
reduced water flow. 
                                                 
3 Rodovia Transamazonica (BR230) 
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2.4 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
One of the key concepts of this paper is the Environmental Impact Assessment4 (EIA), 
because it has been identified as a focal issue that scenarios of alternative futures derive 
from. EIAs are documents that “provide information on changes that may occur in the 
environment and on the likely effects that may arise from specific projects (or other pro-
posed activities) significantly affecting the environment” (Jay et.al. 2007:287; Cardenas 
and Halman 2016:24). Because EIAs deal with possible and probable changes that may 
occur in the environment, for all intents and purposes it is an exercise in futuring (Duinker 
and Greig 2007:207). 
EIAs are conducted prior to the start of a project and provide information to decision-
makers whether to approve the project or to reject it. EIAs have been institutionally em-
bedded by many countries as a mechanism of technical evaluation to prevent environ-
mental problems (Jay et al. 2007:288).  
According to Jay et al. (2007:294) EIAs raise environmental awareness amongst com-
munities and other stakeholders and contribute to sustainable patterns of development. 
Duinker and Greig (2007:207) suggest that EIA processes are dedicated to exploring op-
tions for more sustainable futures by forecasting environmental impacts, EIAs provide 
decision-makers with tools for environmental protection. Conversely, Cashmore et al. 
claim that the potential for EIAs to contribute to sustainable development is widely un-
derestimated. They conducted research on the effectiveness of EIAs, and their conclu-
sions are that although EIAs “typically exert a moderate influence on both consent and 
design decisions”, these influences are decision-oriented and many aspects of sustainable 
development are oversimplified to operational principals, making the outcomes of EIAs 
appear considerably more limited (Cashmore et al. 2004:308). Furthermore, literature on 
environmental impact assessments suggests that EIAs in general suffer from a gap be-
tween environmental procedures and an idealized, ‘state of the art’, EIA system (see for 
example Jay et al 2007:295; Cardenas and Halman 2016:24).  
In Brazil the EIA is a tool used by Ibama – the Brazilian Environmental Agency, 
branch of the Ministry of Environment – to determine impact mitigation measures and 
conditions for the implementation of an enterprise (Hanna et al. 2014: 61). The document 
describes the area where a given enterprise is to be implemented, and assesses possible 
positive and negative impacts to the local environment and to the local population (Funai 
2011:10). Each enterprise that applies for an environmental licence has its own EIA. Cus-
tomarily, the document is prepared by the proponents of the given project, and approved 
by a governing body. In the case of Belo Monte, this governing body is Ibama.  
Ibama determines the terms of reference for EIAs depending on the context of the 
project under consideration. Each project has its unique terms of reference. As Belo 
                                                 
4 Equivalent to the Brazilian Estudo de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) 
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Monte is being built near indigenous areas, its EIA must include an indigenous compo-
nent. Funai – Brazil’s National Indian Foundation– is consulted by Ibama on all pertinent 
matters related to indigenous populations (Hanna et al. 2014:61). In addition to Ibama, in 
the case of hydroelectric power plants, Conama –Brazilian National Council of Environ-
ment– also set requirements for EIAs. According to Conama (1986), studies required for 
the EIA are divided into three categories:  
- Physical environment (air, soil, water, etc.), 
- Biological environment and natural ecosystems (fauna & flora), 
- Socioeconomic environment (population dynamics; use and occupation of land; 
socioeconomic characteristics of affected communities; structure of the local 
economy; infrastructure and public services; historical, cultural, archaeological 
and palaeontological heritage; leisure; tourism and culture; and indigenous or tra-
ditional communities), 
Because studies on the socioeconomic environment are part of the Brazilian EIA re-
quirements, it is safe to assume that in this context, the EIA can be interpreted as an 
environmental impact assessment as well as a social impact assessment (SIA).  
In the case of Belo Monte, the company responsible for the dam (Norte Energia), pre-
pared a document called Projeto Básico Ambiental (PBA) – Basic Environmental Project, 
which was based on the EIA approved. The PBA is a detailed document that guides ac-
tions for Norte Energia, and also for the contractors hired by the company to provide 
services regarding the impact mitigation measures. The PBA for Belo Monte could be 
compared to ESMPs – Environmental and Social Impact Management Plans. ESMPs are 
internationally known because they are one of the required conditions to obtain funding 
from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a private lending arm of the World 
Bank. (Franks and Vanclay 2013:41) ESMPs are documents that summarize the findings 
of EIAs and outline the proposed measures for mitigation and community development 
(Franks and Vanclay 2013:42). Both ESMPs and the Belo Monte’s PBA include a 
planned timetable for the completion of the projects, an estimate of costs of management 
measures. They also guide monitoring and reporting procedures. Some of the topics in-
cluded in the PBA are constructions works, relocations of population, vocational train-




2.5 Ethical Considerations 
First, I would like to position myself as a Brazilian researcher based in Finland, or in other 
words, a researcher of the so-called Global South, in Europe. Undoubtedly, being a Bra-
zilian researcher doing research about Brazil gave me the benefit (in comparison to my 
colleagues in Finland) of not only being able to communicate with my interviewees in 
their native tongue, but also in understanding the society from within. On the other hand, 
as a researcher from Finland, I had difficulties into gaining access to the indigenous pop-
ulation. Leonardo Custódio, a researcher in the same position, has described in his doc-
tor’s dissertation (2016: 41) that using our position of a Brazilian researcher in Europe is 
a way to challenge different forms of Western-centrism in academia. 
I would also like to contextualize my values as a researcher, and a futurist. The human 
rights declared by UNESCO are the basis of the values that this research is based on. The 
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) recognizes all persons as 
equal members of the “human family”, which is founded by freedom, justice and peace. 
Freedom, in the declaration, includes freedom from slavery or servitude; freedom of 
speech and thought; freedom of movement, etc. Moreover, the declaration promotes re-
bellion against tyranny and oppression. As a futurist, my research “aims at helping indi-
viduals, corporations, governments and other groups to envision, and to move towards, 
their preferred futures” (Jim Dator 2011:32).  
But how can we assess what is a preferred future? Wendell Bell (1997:69) proposes 
that evaluating preferred futures should surpass opinions, expertise, or authority, but that 
objective methods should be used to justify an assentation of what ought to be and what 
we ought to do. Moreover, Bell suggests that values of propositions can be tested by using 
the critical realist theory of knowledge, together with human values and goals. However, 
what are the human values that Bell talks about? Can we define some values that all hu-
mans respect and take into consideration in their every action? Values are linked with the 
understanding of “good and bad”. They can be objective or subjective, they are deter-
mined by societies, cultures, and by individuals. Values can vary among different groups, 
and are aligned to belief systems. Therefore, Bell can be questioned on the very existence 
of “universal” human values.  
The search for human values leads to Jeffrey Sachs from The Earth Institute. Accord-
ing to Sachs (2013:93) there are certain values that could be considered universal. On his 
research on virtue ethics in the quest for happiness, Sachs concluded that although human 
society is plural, some basic ethical principles are shared by all major religions, which 
could be considered the principles of humanity. These principles presented are: 
“Non-violence and respect for life (including respect for human life and 
respect for the natural environment), justice and solidarity (including rule 
of law, fair competition, distributive justice, and solidarity), honesty and 
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tolerance (including truthfulness, honesty, reliability, toleration of diver-
sity, and rejection of discrimination because of sex, race, nationality, or 
beliefs), mutual esteem and partnership (including fairness and sincerity 
in relation to stakeholders and the rights to pursue personal and group 
interests through collective action)”. (Sachs 2013:93) 
Sachs adds in his conclusions that it is not possible to force ethical consensus, even if 
some studies can identify (potential) ethical consensus across society. “Universal” human 
values are therefore not easily identified. 
The principles presented by Sachs, and the rights presented by UNESCO are important 
values to look for, and a guideline for action. In this paper, preferred futures are futures 
where people enjoy human rights, in a more just and peaceful world.  
2.6 Motivation 
The motivation for researching this topic rouse in my first year as a student in the master’s 
degree programme of Futures Studies at the University of Turku, after watching the doc-
umentary film “Belo Monte: An Announcement of War”, directed by André D’Elia 
(2012). The documentary presents how Brazil’s main infrastructure project had been con-
ducted until that moment, from the point of view of the civil society. The documentary 
includes interviews with local communities and government workers, it presents issues 
such as human rights violations and ecological destruction, and calls for more discussion 
and awareness of the situation. In the same year of the publication of this documentary 
film, the International Energy Agency (IEA) released –in cooperation with the Brazilian 
Ministry of Mines and Energy– a publication called “Technology Roadmap: Hydro-
power”, where hydropower is praised as cost-competitive, clean, and a contributor for 
decarbonising the energy mix. (International Energy Agency 2013:9). At this point, I did-
n't know that the cards had already been dealt and the Belo Monte controversy had already 
begun long before.  
In a radio interview with the Ministry of Mines and Energy of the time, the minister 
(Lobão in Planalto 2011a) claimed that the dam was essential for the development of the 
nation, and that this was the cheapest and cleanest source of energy Brazil could have. 
Furthermore, it was advocated that Norte Energia has several environmental projects in 
their agenda, including projects in cooperation with local indigenous communities (Norte 
Energia 2011a). While the Brazilian Government and Norte Energia had the support of 
the International Energy Agency, the civil society was taking action against the dam and 
several movements to stop its construction began. Brazilian celebrities raged against Belo 
Monte and called citizens to sign a petition against the dam through a social movement 
called “Movimento Gota d’Água” (Drop of Water 2011). International celebrities like 
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James Cameron, director of the movie Avatar, visited the region and campaigned along-
side with indigenous leaders (Phillips 2010a). These campaigns were supported by sev-
eral international organisations like Amazon Watch (2010a), International Rivers (2016), 
and Greenpeace (2009). 
The discourses used by proponents and opponents of the dam held so many conflicting 
issues, that I became more and more interested in comprehending the controversy as a 
whole. It was these strong differences of opinion and discourse that got me motivated to 
begin an academic research about the topic and to explore alternative futures for the Belo 
Monte region. The material used for this research includes publications from proponents 
and opponents of the dam, as well as academic articles and material collected during 
fieldwork. 
2.7 Research Materials 
The data collected for this research includes official documents and academic articles, as 
well as articles from the news and from non-government organisations, documentary 
films, and other media. Furthermore, the research data also includes material from field 
work. 
The documentary film “Belo Monte: An Announcement of War” directed by André 
D’Elia was the starting point of the research and provided inspiration to find out more 
about the topic. The main news carriers consulted for this research were the Brazilian 
Folha de São Paulo, and Estadão, as well as the foreign El País, Amazonia Newsletter, 
and BBC. Articles written by non-governmental organisations and institutions were ana-
lysed. One significant source of that sort was the database of Instituto Socioambiental, a 
non-profit association that intends integrated solutions to social and environmental issues 
in Brazil. The organization acts on different projects, which include indigenous people's 
rights, monitoration of protected areas, monitoration of public policies and legislation 
decisions, as well as location-specific projects. (Socioambiental 2015). The organisation 
is financed by several institutions, including Rainforest Foundation Norway, Ford Foun-
dation, Horizont 3000/Climate Alliance, Petrobrás, and others. (Socioambiental 2015). 
Socioambiental conducts a solid work in Amazonia, cooperating with the academic com-
munity as well as with governmental bodies, and partnering with traditional peoples in 
the region and local activists.  
The books and academic articles used as sources for this paper are mainly from the 
fields of Futures Studies, Environmental Sciences, and Social Sciences. Among the schol-
arly articles, one author that was particularly influential for this research was Dr Philip 
Fearnside, an active scholar who advocates the preservation of Amazonia and writes crit-
ical articles about the impacts of dams to the environment.  
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The official documents used were all found in electronic format and are available for 
public access. They include documents published by the Brazilian Government such as 
licence documentations, public reports, action plans, federal decrees, public defenders’ 
actions and decisions given by the State, etc. Documentation issued by the company re-
sponsible for the construction of the dam has also been used as official documents, these 
include environmental and technical studies that were presented to the licencing bodies, 
and detailed descriptions of the impact mitigation measures to be completed (PBA). 
Moreover, official documents also include international treaties and conventions. 
Field work was conducted in two stages. The first stage was while sketching the doc-
umentary analysis between January 2014 and March 2014, in Sao Paulo, Brazil. At this 
stage, five semi-structured interviews were conducted. The second stage of the empirical 
research was a field trip to Amazonia conducted in September 2014, accompanied by a 
research assistant, Sergio Andrade, and financed by the Finnish Cultural Foundation5. 
During this second stage, another 10 semi-structured interviews were made. Also six 
Skype interviews were conducted throughout the research process.  
A semi-structured interview is a method commonly used in qualitative research, in 
which the main goal is to get to hear the interviewees’ opinions, experiences or expertise. 
(Bryman 2004:319-335) Unlike structured quantitative research, where identical ques-
tionnaires are given to a large sample, semi-structured interviews are partly tailor made 
for each interviewee. The semi-structured interview method was chosen due to its flexi-
bility. The interviewer is allowed to change the order of questions asked, can skip ques-
tions that might not be relevant after certain questions have been answered, and can even 
add additional unscripted questions as follow-up questions depending on the inter-
viewee’s answers. In sum, “interviewers can depart significantly from the original script, 
schedule or guide being used” (Bryman 2004:320). The aim of qualitative interviewing 
is to get rich detailed answers, and semi-structured interviews allow, open ended answers. 
Sometimes as the interview progresses, the intervieweess themselves raise complemen-
tary issues not prior considered by the interviewer.  
Each interview lasted between 40 minutes and two hours. The interview guides were 
tailor-made for each interviewee, and each interview had its own theme to be discussed 
according to the expertise of the interviewee. One question however was included in all. 
At the end of the interviews, I asked interviewees to describe their image of the future for 
Altamira in 2020, when the constructions of the dam are due to be finalized. I asked them 
to think about the city, the local economy, the urban, rural and indigenous population, 
and think about how they would contribute to that future coming true. Responses were 
                                                 
5 Suomen Kulttuurirahasto 
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usually restricted to the interviewee’s own area of expertise. While some saw future pos-
sibilities optimistically, others seemed distressed by the lack of opportunities and hope 
for the local population; at least for such a close-by future, 20206. 
I decided to take a neutral and sometimes a sympathetic role with the intention to get 
the interviewees comfortable to say what they found was important in their opinion. The 
sympathetic role was used as a method to give voice to the interviewees’ concerns. I 
acknowledge that if I had taken an argumentative role, some topics could have been dis-
cussed differently, and even more in depth. Nevertheless, due to the sensitivity of the 
issues discussed, I preferred not to take an argumentative role to avoid tension or even 
violence. Interviewees gave informed, prior consent for disclosing their information in 
this document. They were given options on level of disclosure, from complete anonymity 
to full disclosure of names, organisation and occupation. In general, experts and activists 
chose to have their names published, so that the publication of this thesis gives credit for 
their work. The local population however, preferred anonymity in order to preserve their 
privacy. A complete list of the interviewees, as well as the consent form is available (in 
Portuguese) in Appendix 1 at the end of this document.  
Gaining access to my subjects presented a challenge in itself. Every person interested 
in entering indigenous territory for the purpose of scientific research must apply for a 
permit. As part of the process of obtaining this permit, the researcher should present one-
self on site (Funai 1995: art.7). It was unfeasible to obtain the permit before leaving Fin-
land, and for that reason the field work had to be modified to entering indigenous land as 
part of an expedition organized by third parties.  
Between 7 and 11 September 2014, my research assistant and I participated in an ex-
pedition organized by the NGO Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) in cooperation with the 
Indigenous Association Miratu Yudjá Xingu7 (Aimyx). The expedition can be considered 
a 5-day ethnographic study. It consisted of a 112 km canoe trip of in four days, and one 
day for trainings and preparation. Twenty-one traditional canoes and three motorboats 
carried a group of 120 people who gathered to discuss the impacts of Belo Monte for the 
traditional peoples of the Volta Grande do Xingu. The group consisted of indigenous and 
riverine people, researchers from various institutes, activists, reporters, lawyers, doctors, 
social workers, and other people interested in the topic. 
Figure 5 is a snapshot depicting a scenery of the expedition: traditional indigenous 
canoes, participants, and the Xingu River in the background. This expedition gave me the 
opportunity to see Belo Monte from the eyes of the local population, from their perspec-
tive, from their boats on the river. During the trip, I met indigenous and riverine peoples, 
visited their homes and shared cultural experiences. We travelled together, ate together, 
                                                 
6 Fieldwork was conducted in 2014 and this paper was originally supposed to be published by the end of 
2015, but due to health issues combined with a maternity leave, the publication was postponed to mid-2017. 
7 Associação Indígena Miratu Yudjá Xingu 
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and camped by the river side at night. The expedition was an opportunity to get closer to 
the local population, gain their trust, and above all, comprehend issue at hand with a depth 
no documentary analysis could ever fulfil. 
 
Figure 5 Expedition Organized By ISA And Aimyx (Photo By Author) 
In addition to the expedition, on 12 September 2014, my research assistant and I par-
ticipated in a guided tour offered by Norte Energia to the Belo Monte construction sites. 
The guided bus tour, called “Conheça Belo Monte” (Get to Know Belo Monte), lasted for 
9 hours (7:00-16:00) and included seven stops: Belo Monte Visitor Support Centre8; Belo 
Monte Observation Point9; the workers’ cafeteria in the Pimental site, the Centre for En-
vironmental Studies10; and the three construction sites: the canal & levees site, the Belo 
Monte site, and the Pimental site. In each of the stops, visitors have access to construction 
plans and other information relevant to each the site, and the atmosphere is of a bus-tour 
in a famous touristic city. The guided tour is one of the actions taken by Norte Energia to 
promote Belo Monte to the local population, and it is intended to teachers, students above 
13 years-old, as well as other members of the civil society. In the tour that I participated 
in September 2014, visitors travelled in an air-conditioned bus equipped with multimedia 
devices, we watched promotional videos about Belo Monte and were quizzed about what 
we learnt in a playful manner. The tour was free of charge, and included lunch, snacks, 
and refreshments. The tour was operated by a tourism company hired by Norte Energia. 
Tourist guides were trained by Norte Energia to present the construction sites, but the 
company does not hold themselves accountable for the content of the information given 
by the guides. 
                                                 
8 Centro de Apoio ao Visitante - CAV 
9 Mirante Belo Monte 
10 Centro de Estudos Ambientais - CEA 
33 
 
3. THE BELO MONTE CONTROVERSY IN DEPTH 
3.1 The timeline Of The Administrative Processes 
According to Norte Energia (2011a:3) hydroelectricity in the Xingu basin was first 
thought of in the 1970s, but due to problems with studies on the viability of the construc-
tion, as well as strong opposition from local indigenous communities, the project was 
constantly pushed aside. A number of feasibility studies were made after that, and the 
plans for damming the Xingu were adapted accordingly (Norte Energia 2013:9). 
Analyses were first carried out by the power utility company Eletronorte, and later 
transferred to Eletrobrás, Brazil’s major electric utility company. These studies were con-
ducted in partnership with the construction companies Camargo Corrêa S/A, Andrade 
Gutierrez and Norberto Odebrecht. The first studies to assess the hydroelectric power 
possibilities in the Xingu River were conducted in 1975. In 1980 the inventory was con-
cluded and a proposal for the power plant was published. Nine years later, in 1989, studies 
on the viability of construction were concluded. At that time, the power plant was called 
Kararaô which is the name of one of the indigenous groups in the region. In 1994 a revi-
sion of the studies previously made was published. In the reviewed study, the flooding 
area was diminished, allowing the conservation of indigenous areas. 
In 2002 further studies on technical, economic and environmental feasibility were pre-
sented to ANEEL, the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency, and were rejected by the 
supreme federal court. The reasons for this rejection was that the project was to be located 
inside indigenous areas and would directly affect indigenous populations, and that the 
institution conducting the studies, Fadesp, was not chosen according to procedures regu-
lated by law. (Socioambiental 2002, Xingu Vivo 2016). 
In 2005 the national congress authorized Eletrobrás to continue further studies for the 
feasibility of Belo Monte constructions. The same group of construction companies that 
conducted the first studies in the 1970s was again responsible for the feasibility studies 
in 2005. (Norte Energia 2014a). 
In 2006, Ibama – the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Re-
sources – started to prepare their Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The document 
was concluded in 2007. Also in 2007 the first public hearings were conducted in the two 
most affected cities: Altamira and Vitória do Xingu. Finally, in 2010 Ibama granted Belo 
Monte a prior licence11, and ANEEL approved the feasibility studies. Following that, 
public auction was organized to decide which company would be responsible for the con-
struction of the dam. The consortium Norte Energia S.A. was constituted, won the auction 
and contracts were signed. The constructions started in 2011. (Norte Energia 2014a).  
                                                 
11 The licensing procedure will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.4.2  
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3.2 Technical Characteristics Of The Hydroelectric Power Plant 
According to the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency – ANEEL (2011:57-59), Belo 
Monte is to become the third largest hydroelectric power plant in the world: With an 
installed capacity of 11,233.1 MW, the power plant is only behind the Chinese Three 
Gorges Dam (of 22,500 MW installed capacity), and the Brazilian-Paraguayan Itaipú 
Dam (of 14,000 MW installed capacity).  
Belo Monte is to be connected to the Brazilian National Grid of Electricity12 through 
a transmission line of 2,092 km operated by the Chinese State Grid Brazil Holding. The 
transmission line allows the energy produced to flow from the State of Pará in the North 
of Brazil directly to the State of Rio de Janeiro in the South East (State Grid 2014). 
According to Norte Energia (2011a:5) Belo Monte is expected to produce 4,571 MW 
on average, which is about 40% of its capacity. The main powerhouse, the Belo Monte 
Site has an installed capacity of 11,000 MW and 4,418.9 MW of expected average, while 
the secondary powerhouse, the Pimental Site has an installed capacity of 233,1 MW and 
152,1 MW of expected average. (Norte Energia 2011a:5, MME 2011:3) Belo Monte is a 
run-of-the-river hydroelectric power plant, which means little water storage is provided 
in its reservoir and therefore the production of energy is subject to seasonal river flow 
variation. 
The efficiency of the power plant is questioned by the academic community (for ex-
ample Sevá 2005, Fearnside 2006 and 2011, BBC 2008, Sousa Júnior. et.al. 2010 and 
2006). Eletrobrás, a major State-owned electricity utility company, has been collecting 
data on the water flux of the Xingu River since 1931. Based on the data by Eletrobrás, 
the University of Campinas (Unicamp) conducted a simulation study on how much en-
ergy would have been produced between the years 1931 and 1996 if Belo Monte had 
already been constructed then. The conclusion of that study was that Belo Monte would 
have produced an average of little more than 1,356 MW not 4,571 MW as Norte Energia 
states. (Switkes and Sevá in Sevá 2005: 17-19, 69). Sousa Júnior. et.al. (2006:76) pre-
sented a study where 10,000 simulations were done with the Monte Carlo method, and 
their result shows that Belo Monte’s average capacity will not be 40% as Norte Energia 
states, but instead, less then 20%.  
Belo Monte would only be running at full capacity for about three months a year, and 
during the dry season, which lasts another three to four months a year, some of the tur-
bines would be shut down (Sevá 2005: 17-19). The inefficiency of Belo Monte is under-
stood due to a naturally extremely variable water flow that fluctuates between 450 and 
30,000 cubic meters of water per second (Sevá 2005). The river may have abundant water 
in the wet season, but it also has a long lasting dry season every year.  
                                                 
12 Sistema Interligado Nacional (SIN) 
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On that study conducted in Unicamp (in Sevá 2005), other simulations were conducted 
for Belo Monte’s productivity considering additional smaller dams used to regulate the 
flow of the river. The study showed a rise in the average of production from 1,356 MW 
to 7,950 MW by adding one additional dam. The authors suggest that only then Belo 
Monte could be considered economically viable. Nonetheless, the additional dam would 
have to be built where today is the centre of the City of Altamira, and that would have 
obvious additional implications. (Switkes and Sevá in Sevá 2005, 17-19).  
According to Raul Silva Telles do Valle (in Sevá 2005: 67) with an optimization of 
the water flow of the Xingu River, Belo Monte could reach optimum efficiency. This 
optimization could be possible if six dams would be built along the Xingu River. Indeed, 
this was the original plan for the dam complex elaborated in the 1970s, but the plan was 
rejected due to its substantial environmental impact (over 18,000km2 would have been 
flooded, including 12 indigenous reserves) as well as to strong indigenous opposition at 
the time. The project was adapted and only two, instead of six dams are being built. 
3.3 Consortium Norte Energia S.A. 
The company responsible for building and operating Belo Monte Hydroelectric Dam 
Complex is Norte Energia S.A. and it has the concession for Belo Monte for 35 years 
(Norte Energia 2016). Table 2  Shareholders Of Norte Energia S.A.Table 2 pre-
sents the shareholders of Norte Energia S.A. The company is a consortium that includes 
state and private companies. As shown in Table 2, of the shareholders, 49.98% are public 
corporations, 9.77% have mixed ownership, 20% are public workers’ pension funds, and 
20.25% are private companies. (Norte Energia 2016a). 
Table 2  Shareholders Of Norte Energia S.A. 
Name of the company Ownership  Shares in Norte Energia 
Chesf S.A. Public 15.00% 
Eletronorte S.A. Public 19.98% 
Petros Pension Fund 10.00% 
Funcef Pension Fund 10.00% 
Belo Monte Participações S.A. (Neoenergia S.A.) Private 10.00% 
Amazônia (Cemig S.A. and Light S.A.) Mixed 09.77% 
Vale S.A. Private 09.00% 
Sinobras S.A. Private 01.00% 
J. Malucelli Energia S.A. Private 00.25% 





3.4 Political Aspect: How The Dam Came To Be 
The political aspect of the Belo Monte controversy is perhaps the most complicated part 
of this thesis, as it discusses complex and disrupted legal issues that are difficult to sum-
marize. This is an important chapter that depicts the complexity of the controversy, and 
the other aspects discussed in the following chapters (Ecological, Social, Economic, Cul-
tural) are based on decisions exposed here; this is the reason the political aspect was cho-
sen to be the first aspect to be presented.  
3.4.1 The Brazilian Government’s Rationale For building Belo Monte 
The decision to expand hydroelectric power was guided by Brazil's commitment to reduce 
CO2 emissions (Ministry of Mines and Energy 2011). Norte Energia (2011b:1) claims 
that hydroelectricity is the most favourable energy source for Brazil due to its environ-
mental feasibility, low greenhouse gas emissions and reliable energy supply. The com-
pany labels its energy clean and efficient for the nation. Edison Lobão, the former minister 
of Mines and Energy13, explains why hydroelectric power is so important for Brazil. In a 
radio interview given in 2011 for the president’s office’s media channel, Lobão stated 
that hydroelectricity is “the cleanest, cheapest and most renewable energy in the world”. 
The minister added that “the whole world admires the Brazilian hydroelectric power” 
(Lobão in Planalto 2011a).14 
In 2007 the Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management implemented a 
major infrastructure programme called Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento – PAC 
– or “acceleration of growth programme”. PAC promotes the construction of large infra-
structure projects in several sectors, including urbanisation, logistics, and energy. By ex-
panding the infrastructure, the programme does not only contribute to the societal well-
being in Brazil but also to the economy. PAC contributed to the generation of jobs; over 
8.3 million jobs were created between 2007 and 2011. (Ministry of Planning 2014) 
Among of the largest projects promoted by PAC is Belo Monte. Belo Monte is promoted 
by state officials as a project that has generated thousands of jobs. Also, the state claims 
that the energy produced by the power plant will help the Brazilian economy grow, and 
it will further the nation’s competitiveness among developing countries. Furthermore, the 
energy produced will prevent energy blackouts, which are commonplace today. (Rousseff 
                                                 
13 Edison Lobão started his career as a journalist during Brazil’s dictatorship regime, he worked with the 
counterintelligence and has supported the prosecution on opponents to the dictatorship (Sevá 2011), and 
currently he is being investigated by the Brazilian Federal Police for his involvement in the Lava Jato 
money laundering scheme (Folha 2016). 
14 The radio interview mentioned was given in Portuguese. Free translation by the author. 
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2014) Hydroelectricity is the main electric power source in Brazil, producing about 80% 
of the total energy in the country (Norte Energia 2011b). The Brazilian Ministry of Plan-
ning, Budget and Management (2013), estimates that in 2021 about 86% of the Brazilian 
energy will come from renewable resources. Priority will be given to hydroelectricity, 
biomass and wind power, as these sources of energy are polluting less than other energy 
sources. The Ministry adds that their scenario for 2021 is only positive, as Brazil will be 
almost self-sufficient, producing 90% of the total energy use of the country. This self-
sufficiency, according to the government, can only be achieved by expanding the hydro-
power of the country. Lobão (in Planalto 2011b) claims that Belo Monte is absolutely 
essential for the development of the nation, and his justification is that with an installed 
capacity of 11,233.1 MW, Belo Monte has the capacity to supply 40% of the country’s 
residential consumption (Lobão in in Planalto 2011b, Norte Energia 2011b). 
This main justification given by Lobão, used by Norte Energia and the State’s official 
publications and campaigns is, however, questionable. Firstly, having the capacity to pro-
duce a certain amount of energy does now mean actually producing it. Secondly, neither 
Edison Lobão nor Norte Energia or the Ministry of Mines and Energy published how this 
number was estimated. Norte Energia’s annual report (2013:5) showed that this 40% re-
fers to the consumption of 2013, and they estimate that the energy produced by Belo 
Monte has the potential to reach the demands of 60 million people.  
From a futurist’s perspective, I would argue that this affirmation of number of people 
and percentage of the residences in the country is misleading, as the energy needs of the 
future, when Belo Monte is concluded, is likely to be different from the energy consumed 
in 2013. Consumption patterns might have changed, and decision makers seem to have 
overlooked the futures perspectives of the issue. Furthermore, the Ministry of Planning 
published only one scenario for 2021, and as mentioned above, it is a positive one, where 
all investments put in today are either in progress or complete. The scenario by the Min-
istry of Planning does not take into account possible disruptions on today’s projects, ma-
jor changes in the society, or the new needs that these changes might lead to. Also new 
technologies under development today, which could lead to important breakthroughs, are 
not taken into consideration. 
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3.4.2 Licencing Procedures 
In Brazil, the regular environmental licencing procedure consists of three stages: a prior 
licence, a construction licence, and finally an operation licence15. Environmental licens-
ing has been established in Brazil in 1981 through the law 6.938 art.9. (Vulcanis 2013) 
The Brazilian law states that an environmental licence is: 
“Administrative act by which the competent environmental authority es-
tablishes the conditions, restrictions, and environmental control measures 
that must be met by the proponent, physical or juridical person, to locate, 
install, operate or expand enterprises or activities which use environmen-
tal resources, are considered to be actual or potential polluters, or which 
in any way may cause environmental degradation.” 
(Brasil 1997:Art.1, in Hanna et al. 2014:61) 
The authority responsible for licencing Belo Monte is Ibama, a branch of the Ministry 
of the Environment. As mentioned in chapter 3.1, Ibama issued the prior licence in 2010, 
in the same year Norte Energia was consolidated and won the public auction to build and 
maintain Belo Monte. One of the preconditions for the prior licence is that the Environ-
mental Impact Assessment (EIA) is presented and accepted both by the governmental 
authority and the entrepreneur, in the Belo Monte case, Ibama and Norte Energia. The 
document determines conditions for the implementation of the project, as well as the im-
pact mitigation measures that need to be addressed before starting the actual construction 
process. According to the common licence procedure, the implementation of the dam 
should only start once all the conditions and impact mitigation measures imposed in the 
prior licence and EIA are completed. (Hanna et al. 2014:61) 
As shown in Figure 6, Belo Monte did not follow regular licencing procedures. On the 
left, the dashed boxes illustrate the Brazilian regular licencing procedure as described by 
Hanna et al. (2014). On the right, the solid balloons illustrate what has actually happened 
with Belo Monte’s licences. The diagram is based on the literature analysis in combina-
tion with results from a personal interview with lawyer Leonardo Amorim, from Instituto 
Socioambiental. The dark-grey filled balloons indicate the questionable processes that are 
explained further. 
                                                 




Figure 6 Summary Of The Licensing Procedure (Diagram By Author) 
Amorim (interview) explained what the problems related to the licence procedures for 
Belo Monte were. Before the prior licence was given, Ibama had determined that the 
construction of Belo Monte was not environmentally feasible, as studies previously con-
ducted had been inconclusive about the possible impacts of the construction on the local 
environment. In other words, there was no scientific proof that the environment would be 
sufficiently resilient to the changes caused by the construction of the dam. The Ministry 
of Planning and the Ministry of Mines and Energy pressured Ibama to issue the prior 
licence, as Belo Monte was a key project of PAC. Due to PAC being created during pres-
ident Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s second term and being essential for his mandate, the 
licence for Belo Monte was forced into being issued. The first licence was issued due to 
political pressure, despite the known environmental-related uncertainties. 
Amorim (interview) explained that instead of denying the licence due to inconclusive 
studies, Ibama issued the prior licence and added further studies as a precondition for the 
operation licence. The prior licence was given in 2010 accompanied with a series of pre-
conditions and actions to be taken before the construction licence could be given, includ-
ing a new version of the EIA. However, the government had already stipulated that the 
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construction licence would be issued by January 2011, and up until that date, few of the 
conditions given by the previous licence would have been met. Similarly to the issuing 
process of the prior licence, the construction licence was also forced into being issued 
through tough political and economic pressure.  
The pressure was so intense that a number of Ibama presidents resigned over the Belo 
Monte licencing process. One of the former presidents of Ibama, Abelardo Bayma 
Azevedo resigned on 13 January 2011 after having faced pressure to grant the construc-
tion licence for Belo Monte. (Hurwitz 2011) Azevedo’s predecessor was Roberto Mes-
sias, who resigned due to pressure to issue several environmental licences, including the 
one for Belo Monte. (Alves 2011) On 26 January 2011, Américo Ribeiro Tunes, 
Azevedo’s substitute, signed a Partial Construction Licence16. The final construction li-
cence was signed by the subsequent Ibama president, Curt Trennepohl, who also resigned 
the following year (Bragança 2012). It is worth pointing out that in Brazil, the president 
appoints the Ministers, and the Minister of Environment appoints Ibama’s presidency. 
Abelardo Bayma Azevedo and Roberto Messias were not the only people to resign due 
to environmental licences pressure. In 2008, the former Minister of Environment, Marina 
Silva, also resigned from office, and she claimed to have resigned because she had not 
agreed with Brazil’s weakening environmental licencing framework. (Hurwitz 2011) 
The high number of resignations prior to the licence being given, and clear instability 
of the licencing body leads to questionable legitimacy of the documents signed. If Ibama 
had followed the national licensing procedure to the letter, the construction licence could 
not have been issued in January 2011 due to the deficiency on preconditions and impact 
mitigation actions met. 
Moreover, the partial construction licence, signed by Américo Ribeiro Tunes is not a 
standard licence in the licencing procedure and poses a threat to the process as a whole.  
“That is when the fundamental problems began: Ibama issued the so-
called Partial Construction Licence, which is a stage in the licencing pro-
cedure that does not exist. The constructions of Belo Monte began with an 
invalid licence that is not recognized by law.”  
(Amorim 2014: personal interview) 
The Federal Public Prosecution Office brought an action against Norte Energia and 
Ibama regarding the illegal licence, but the action was stopped by a juridical spin called 
‘Security Suspension’17. The term is explained in the Brazilian law:  
“Security suspension is a juridical spin that can be made by any high-level 
judge to overrule any injunction (or stop order) on the basis of potential 
                                                 
16  Licença de instalação parcial: will be discussed below. 
17  Suspensão de segurança 
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‘serious harm to public order, health, safety or the national economy’.” 
(Brasil 1992:Art.15 in Hanna et al. 2014:63). 
Amorim (interview) adds that the security suspension can only be given upon request 
of an organ of state. He reveals that the action brought by the Public Prosecution Office 
is high in complexity, and the case will most likely only be judged in 10 or 15 years. By 
then, the construction of the dam will be completed and the power plant will already be 
operating. That means that the issues from the EIA that were supposed to be solved before 
giving the prior licence will only begin its legal negotiations after the construction of the 
dam is completed. Undoubtedly, it will be too late to discuss some of the issues included 
in the action. 
“One of the conditions that were supposed to be met before the licence 
was given was the construction of a new hospital in Altamira, so that the 
incoming population would not pressure the already pressured health sys-
tem of the region. The constructions of the dam have been going on for 
four years, but the hospital is still not ready. When this issue gets to be 
discussed in court, patients have already suffered from lack of service, 
people have already died.” (Amorim 2014: personal interview) 
Most of the conditions proposed in the prior licence were not completed by the time 
the construction licence was issued. In July 2015 Instituto Socioambiental published a 
dossier listing which conditions were met, and which were not. The dossier also exposed 
additional impacts that Belo Monte is causing to the local population that were not 
thought of or included in the EIA. The conclusions of the dossier were that the operation 
licence for Belo Monte is unviable and Instituto Socioambiental (2015) strongly recom-
mended for Ibama not to sign the operation licence. 
On 10 September 2015 Ibama indeed denied the operation licence, and published a 
technical report listing unresolved issues that not being solved would hinder the operation 
licence to be signed (Ibama 2015). Less than two months later, however, on 24 November 
2015, Ibama signed the operation licence even though the conditions listed in their report 
were not met. Two days later, a proposal to halt the licence was discussed in Brazilian 
National Congress, using the dossier by Instituto Socioambiental as a source for their 
decision-making (Chamber of Deputies 2015). On 14 January 2016 the Federal Court 
suspended the operation licence, after the publication of a document by the federal pros-
ecutor Thais Santi. (G1 2016) Nevertheless a few days later the suspension of the opera-
tion licence was revoked on the premises that too many jobs were at stake (MME 2016a) 
and in April 2016 Belo Monte began its commercial operations (MME 2016b). 
In sum, Belo Monte is now operational without proper studies regarding possible im-
pacts on the environment; Norte Energia continues its operations under inappropriate li-
cences and the situation is sustained by the State on the grounds that Brazil needs the 
energy produced by Belo Monte in order to grow economically. It can be argued that the 
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current administration deliberately disregards environmental issues, possibly due to being 
oblivious to them. The approvals of the licences were only possible due to the strong 
political and economic pressure. The reasons behind this questionable licencing process 
cannot be answered in this publication, but I believe that some of the answers ought to be 
revealed with the development of the Lava Jato money laundering investigations cur-
rently being conducted by the Federal Police. The investigations have already targeted 
President Dilma Rouseff, Minister of Mines and Energy Edison Lobão, and some of the 
contractors involved in the Belo Monte constructions. (See for example Folha 2016, 
Amora 2015, Barrucho 2015, Brum 2015, Carvalho 2015) 
3.4.3 Current Licencing Procedure At Risk 
President Dilma Rousseff was impeached18 early in 2016, and since then, the acting gov-
ernment has pulled proposals of bills and law amendments from the archives back into 
the senate’s table. The PEC 65/2012, the PLS 654/2015 and the PL 3.729/2004 are some 
of these bills, and these involve environmental law issues. The three proposals are cur-
rently under discussion and if passed, will alter the licencing procedure deeply and their 
consequences are unprecedented. 
The constitutional amendment PEC 65/2012 establishes that once the EIA is presented 
to the licencing bodies, no construction can be suspended or cancelled. In the amendment 
proposal, its writer Senator Acir Gurgacz claims that the reasoning behind it is to speed 
up a slow and inefficient process and to give city mayors the opportunity to conclude their 
projects before their mandates are over. (Senado Federal 2012). As seen in the previous 
chapter, the EIA is a precondition to the prior licence, so in effect, the bill PEC 65/2012 
puts an end on the environmental licencing as is, as constructions cannot be suspended 
once the EIA is presented, that is, before the EIA is approved or even before issuing the 
prior licence19. Taking into consideration that the EIA is a document produced by the 
proponents of a given project, and that the public sector may suffer from lack of resources 
for inspection and control, the PEC 65/2012 in effect increases the vulnerability of the 
environment, as it implies that constructions cannot be suspended even if problems arise. 
The PLS 654/2015 bill suggests that “strategic projects” such as large dams and roads 
should be subject to “speed licences” (up to eight months, without the three phases as 
described in the previous chapter), and if government agencies involved in the procedure 
                                                 
18 The reasoning Rousseff being taken out of office is somewhat linked to the Lava Jato money laundry 
investigations, but the premises of the impeachment (or coup?) are purposely not discussed in this paper. 
19 Note from author: Think of it as operating on a patient after applying to medical school, before studying 
medicine, and even before being admitted to the university. 
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do not act according to the timetable, it is automatically considered that they are in ac-
cordance with the licencing. In effect, if for some reason the regulatory agency cannot 
meet their deadlines due to lack of resources, for example, licences would be considered 
to be issued without proper considerations. 
Finally, the bill PL 3.729/2004 proposes that the licencing procedure should be self-
declaratory, done in electronic format. The bill restricts the power of government agen-
cies, and limits the opportunities of the civil society to participate in the licencing proce-
dure. (Brazilian Chamber of Deputies 2004). 
I contacted Telma Bartholomeu, an environmental lawyer specialist in this topic to 
explain what these bills mean to Brazilian environmental legislation. Bartholomeu ex-
plained to me in a Skype interview (2016) that despite an international effort to strengthen 
environmental laws to move forward with sustainable development, with these bills under 
discussion, Brazil seems to be moving in the opposite direction. The three proposals pre-
sented look at licencing from the perspective of the proponents of projects to cause an 
environmental impact, and seem not to consider the affected population. Bartholomeu 
argues that the bill PEC 65/2012 is dangerous because it wants to simplify a process that 
is complex for a reason. She says:  
“The EIA is just a study; it is not a decision. Once the EIA is presented, 
then the licencing process may begin. It is called a process, because there 
are phases to be followed and completed; there are conditions and impact 
mitigation measures for each of the three licences, and there should be 
supervision from the State that these are met.” 
(Bartholomeu 2016, Skype interview) 
Bartholomeu (2016, Skype interview) argues that in practice the environmental licenc-
ing suffers from a dichotomy: when the proponent of a given project is the private sector, 
licencing is commonly done according to the regular procedure, but when the proponent 
of the project is the State, the process is generally more indulgent, and there is a deliberate 
omission of inspections. Moreover, Bartholomeu complements that large constructions 
such as Belo Monte that demand infrastructure constructions like roads and resettlement 
of populations, should not be simplified as proposed by the bills presented. On the con-
trary, the process, in her opinion, should be longer and more complex, should involve an 
interdisciplinary committee composed of different interest groups that affect and are af-
fected by the project. While it is understandable that emergency infrastructure construc-
tions need to be done within a shorter period of time, they should not, nevertheless, the 
EIA should not lack rigor and decisions should be made based on evidence. 
The bill proposals are criticized by the civil society for being a throwback to the fun-
damental rights of the Brazilian society, ripping the current environmental laws and 
threatening Brazil to environmental disasters (Wons 2016, Borges 2016, Socioambiental 
2016, and Saraiva 2016). Instituto Socioambiental (2016) reinforces that environmental 
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licencing should be strengthened by improving social participation, reinforcing the con-
ditions and resources of the environmental institutions, and improving the quality of the 
EIA by including the participation of the scientific community and the civil society. 
3.4.4 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) For Belo Monte 
As discussed in chapter 0, Ibama – the Brazilian Environmental Agency – is the govern-
mental agency which determines the conditions for the implementation of an enterprise, 
as well as the impact mitigation measures to be implemented. Each project has its unique 
terms of reference, and decisions are made based on the project’s EIA. (Hanna et al. 
2014:61, Funai 2011:10). 
The first version of an EIA for Belo Monte was prepared by CNEC – National Con-
sortium of Consulting Engineers – and presented in 1980, but was rejected by Ibama as 
deficient, and was under judicial embargo because of fraud. (Federal Court of Justice 
2002) A second version of an EIA for Belo Monte was prepared by FADESP – Founda-
tion for the Support and Development Research – completed in 2002, and rejected due to 
inconsistent results. (Fearnside 2006:20-22). The version that was approved was prepared 
by Ibama themselves and concluded in 2007. (Norte Energia 2013, Rojas and Telles 
2013). 
The first EIA was problematic because it involved conflicts of interest of the consult-
ing firm, who had clear interests in pushing the project forward, while the second one was 
problematic because FADESP was hired for the studies without the normal bidding20 un-
der the claim of “technical excellence”. (Philip Fearnside 2006:21). The third EIA, which 
was produced and approved by Ibama, was subject to heavy criticism from the academic 
community.  
In 2009, a group of 42 independent researchers from Brazilian universities and abroad, 
formed an expert panel to analyse the EIA produced, and the result was an Experts Panel 
Report, which was sent to the Federal Attorney’s office in Altamira (Magalhães and Her-
nandez, 2009:2). The report presents a critical analysis of the EIA’s estimations of eco-
nomic viability and socioenvironmental impacts, it exposed mistakes, critical omission 
of data, and human rights violations. Despite the warnings given by the group of scholars 
through the Experts Panel Report, the concession of Belo Monte was given to Norte En-
ergia in 2010. 
Once Norte Energia gained the concession for Belo Monte, the company became re-
sponsible for frequently updating the existing EIA, as well as to complement the previous 
document with supplementary studies, and for adapting the EIA according to the con-
struction plans of the company. These actions have not been done according to timetable, 




and the Brazilian Federal Court21 has issued warnings and resolutions that caused the 
paralysation of the construction work as well as substantial fines to be paid by Norte 
Energia (Poder Judiciário 2014, Amazonia 2014). 
To sum up, the conditions for the implementation of an enterprise, as well as the impact 
mitigation measures to be conducted are determined by the government based on a doc-
ument prepared by the enterprise itself. 
It would be naïve to think that any EIA would be prepared free from conflict of inter-
ests. The document is prepared by those who are causing the impacts. Given that impact 
mitigation measures may be costly time consuming, it is in their interest that risks are 
ignored or underestimated. 
I have raised some questions while analysing the licencing procedure of Belo Monte 
and the creation and maintenance of the EIA that are were left unanswered during the 
process of this research: Is there a chance that some impacts have been purposely ignored 
so that licences would be approved? Is there a chance that individuals preparing the doc-
ument would be pressured or incentivised by the enterprise to alter their results to mask 
risks? Do government officials responsible for evaluating the EIAs have the resources to 
find errors or omissions of data from these documents? In the case of Belo Monte, why 
the expert’s report was not taken into consideration when issuing the licences? How could 
this issue be solved?  
These questions go beyond the scope of this thesis, but my intuition is that many of 
these are probably going to be answered in the future with findings by the Lava Jato 
money laundering investigations mentioned in the previous chapter, or some other police 
investigation. The Lava Jato investigations conducted by the Brazilian Federal Police in 
cooperation with the Brazilian Public Prosecution Office have proven that large contrac-
tors and consulting firms are strong lobbyists who have made substantial contributions to 
individual members of the Brazilian parliament, as well as to the latest presidential elec-
tion campaigns. (Ministério Público Federal 2016) 
  
                                                 
21 Tribunal Regional Federal da Primeira Região 
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3.5 Ecological Aspect: Impact Mitigation Measures To The Environ-
ment 
In the introduction of this master’s thesis, I presented an overview on energy security as 
a global challenge, and how the idea of hydropower being a clean and cheap energy sup-
ply stirred governments to promote hydropower as a substitute for non-renewables. As 
previously discussed, in Brazil, hydropower is said be low on GHG emissions, and to 
promote economic growth and societal wellbeing. This agenda has been pushed so far, 
that it has become an accepted paradigm.  
The preceding chapter discussed how this paradigm was and still is used to promote 
large hydroelectric projects, including the Belo Monte dam. On the face of it, the decision 
to invest in hydroelectricity is done based on ecologic and economic reasoning. However, 
as was explained, in the case of Belo Monte, it is evident that other incentives are in play 
as well; including individual aspirations for political power, and possibly corruption, 
which have overshadowed the ecological objectives. The licencing procedure, for exam-
ple, was not done conforming to legislation.  
In this chapter, I argue that the impacts to the ecosystem were purposely underesti-
mated. Although the Environmental Impact Assessment was done as required by law, and 
approved by the governing authorities, the measures to mitigate the impacts on ecosys-
tems proposed in the Basic Environmental Project (PBA) for Belo Monte are insufficient. 
I go on to claim that Norte Energia uses their environmental projects as a means of green-
washing and disinformation.22 
3.5.1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
As discussed, the Brazilian Government claims to invest on hydro power due to its low 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Although hydropower is a renewable source of energy, 
there is no consensus on whether hydroelectric dams are emitters or net sinks of GHG 
(IPCC 2012 in Arvizu et al. 2012:84). According to Fearnside (2015b:226) emissions 
from tropical dams are largely underestimated. Fearnside argues that in the case of Bra-
zilian dams, official numbers of GHG estimates not only have mathematical errors, but 
also omit emissions, for example, from turbines. 
Hydroelectric power plants can emit GHG through several processes: decaying plants 
under water, emissions from turbines, emissions from spillway, and from deforestation 
(Fearnside 2002:77-88). In order to build hydroelectric dams in tropical forests, a large 
                                                 
22 The term greenwashing is used to describe an activity by corporate groups that gives a positive public 
image to practices that are environmentally unsound, and the term disinformation is used to describe false 
information which is given deliberately to mislead. 
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area is deforested and it is common that these areas are flooded without properly being 
cleaned. The flooded reservoir contains trees and small plants that decompose in the wa-
ter, creating CH4 (methane) emissions (Fearnside 2002:83). Methane is a gas with high 
global warming potential, much higher than CO2. One of the indicators for methane flux 
is the presence of floating weeds in the water, which in 1986 covered 39% of the Tucuruí 
Dam’s water reservoir (Fearnside 2002:75)23. When the water from the reservoir passes 
through the turbines of the power plant, some of the CH4 dissolved in the water is released 
to the air. Spillways also release methane into the atmosphere, even more efficiently then 
turbines. Spillways are channel-like structures built to control water flow. The combina-
tion of a reservoir with decomposing trees and spillways is an efficient mechanism to 
emit GHG to the atmosphere.  
There are indications that the GHG emissions of the Tucuruí Dam are very high. Ac-
cording to Fearnside, in 1990 the dam’s emission was 7.0–10.1×106 tons of CO2-equiva-
lent carbon, an annual emission significantly higher than the fossil fuel based GHG emis-
sions of São Paulo, Brazil’s largest city and biggest contributor to greenhouse gas emis-
sions (Fearnside 2002:69). Another example is of a hydroelectric powerplant emitting 
high GHG is the Balbina Dam, also built in Amazonia. The forest near Balbina was also 
not cleared properly for the reservoir, and like Tucuruí, the power plant emitted a large 
amount of GHG, particularly carbon dioxide (CO2), hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and me-
thane (CH4). (Fearnside 1989:409) Study shows that the GHG emissions by Balbina are 
significantly higher than that of coal-fired power plants (Tagore 2007). Furthermore, the 
Balbina dam is criticized for wasting valuable timber (Fearnside 1989:412). 
Similar problems may occur in Altamira when the Belo Monte Dam begins its opera-
tions. As submerged vegetation decomposes, the Xingu River will also be subject to the 
production of greenhouse gases. Although vegetation and residue has thoroughly been 
cleared for the construction of the canal, the main reservoir will be only partially cleared. 
Norte Energia (2014b:25) claims that Belo Monte will emit “almost no greenhouse gases 
whatsoever”. The company explains that the main reservoir will have 50% of its vegeta-
tion cleaned, and the area not planned to be cleared is an area that naturally floods every 
year. According to the company, the vegetation in the area is adapted to seasonal flooding, 
therefore methane gas should not be a product of the Belo Monte reservoir. 
The Ministry of Mines and Energy (2011) states that the potential harm to the envi-
ronment is minimal, because the “flooded reservoir is estimated to be only 515 km2”. The 
size of the water reservoir is a fundamental element in the Brazilian Government’s ra-
tionale for building Belo Monte, because it uses a much smaller area in comparison with 
                                                 
23 The Tucuruí Dam is also located in Pará, see Figure 3 in page 24. Although the two dams have very 
different engineering, their surrounding environment is quite similar. Learn more about the Tucuruí Dam 
in chapter 3.9. 
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the water reservoirs of other dams built in Brazil. However, it is arguable that this ra-
tionale is invalid. For once, less area affected does not necessarily mean less impact. Sec-
ondly, this rationale disregards the problems faced in other regions of Brazil, as well as 
the environmental disasters that some of these dams have caused. More about lessons 
learned from other dams in Brazil will be discussed in chapter 3.9. 
3.5.2 Environmental Projects for Belo Monte 
The PBA (Projeto Básico Ambiental) was prepared by Norte Energia in cooperation with 
the contractors CNEC, Worley Parsons, and Leme. The document is based on Belo 
Monte’s EIA; it summarises the findings of the EIA and outlines the proposed measures 
for impact mitigation and community development. The PBA describes the work to be 
conducted, a timetable to be followed, and lists possible partners for each project. As 
mentioned in chapter 2.4, the PBA is perhaps the Brazilian equivalent to ESMPs – Envi-
ronmental and Social Impact Management Plans. The topics addressed in the PBA (Norte 
Energia 2011d) are: 
 Action plans for environmental management,  
 Geological and mineral resource management,  
 Water management, conservation and use of the water reservoir,  
 Terrestrial ecosystem conservation,  
 Aquatic ecosystem conservation,  
 Care for the affected population,  
 Urban requalification,  
 Public health,  
 Interaction with different institutions, and  
 Cultural heritage assessment.  
Because the PBA is so large, and covers so many issues, analysing the document point 
by point would be both unfeasible and a completely different work then what is proposed 
in this Master’s thesis. Instead of analysing all the projects included in the PBA, I hereby 
present an analysis of the projects that I was able to witness with my own eyes while in 
fieldwork. The projects were witnessed in two moments of the fieldwork: during a guided 
tour organized by Norte Energia, and during a canoe expedition organized by Instituto 
Socioambiental in partnership with indigenous communities (the two are described in 





Belo Monte has been blamed for provoking deforestation in the region. Leite et.al 
(2013:ch.2) argues that although the government puts pressure on Norte Energia to use 
the wood that they cut for the constructions, there are not enough sawmills with the ca-
pacity to process all this wood. Instead, Norte Energia buys processed wood from other 
companies. These large purchases of legal processed wood put pressure on the local tim-
ber market, encouraging however indirectly, the illegal market of timber in the region. 
“A report from Imazon, a research NGO, showed that from 2011 to 2012, 
the non-authorized cutting of wood increased by 151% in the state of Pará. 
Pará accounted for most of the Amazon’s deforestation during the 2012-
2013, with 2,379 km² cut-clear: 41% of the total amount of deforestation 
in Brazil.” (Leite et.al 2013:ch2). 
 
Figure 7 Deforestation On Belo Monte’s Construction Site. (Photo By Lalo De 
Almeida/Folhapress In Leite et.al 2013) 
Figure 7 shows some timber from an area cut down to make space for Belo Monte’s 
construction. Leite et.al (2013) claim that in Belo Monte, timber is being wasted similarly 
to what was done when the Tucuruí Dam was built, as reported by Fearnside (2002). It is 
estimated that about 3 million trees are being cut.  
During a personal visit to Belo Monte’s construction site, while on tour with the 
“Conheça Belo Monte” I witnessed fallen timber on the sides of the roads surrounding 
the dam. I asked my guides about the fallen timber, and they said these were protected 
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species, and Norte Energia was not able to use them for the constructions without author-
isation from authorities. The response was given with a shrug, followed by “you know 
how slow the public sector can be”. This phenomena was also described by Leite et.al: 
“There are two types of piles: discarded waste, both large and small 
(branches and trunks of no value to sawmills) and stockpiles of logs, some 
of them blackened from one or two years of being outdoors. Norte Energia 
claims that most of the timber is ‘white wood’ (not dense enough for use 
in civil construction) or from species, like Brazil Nut trees24, whose pro-
cessing requires Ibama authorisation.” (Leite et.al 2013:ch.2) 
According to the expert panel report (presented in chapter 3.4.4), one of the problems 
related to deforestation is that the environmental impact assessment (EIA) conducted for 
Belo Monte presented models of deforestation in the past, without taking into considera-
tion the estimations of deforestation for the future. Panelists claim that today there are 
tools for simulating deforestation, and analysing its impacts to the environment. The ex-
perts’ panel report suggests that future scenarios of deforestation should be analysed in 
order to plan impact mitigation actions in the present. (Magalhães and Hernandez, 
2009:2). The critique against Belo Monte presented leads to conclude that the deforesta-
tion caused by the dam constructions cannot be restricted only to the area to be flooded 
by the water reservoir. Non-authorized logging has risen in the region since the beginning 
of Belo Monte constructions and from an environmental point of view the situation is 
alarming. 
In the Centre of Environmental Studies, visitors on Norte Energia’s guided tour get to 
learn about the reforestation programme conducted there. It was explained to our group 
that before doing any work on deforestation, Norte Energia rescued plants and seedlings. 
According to them 88,000 plants and seedlings have been rescued, from which 96% were 
re-planted in the surrounding areas. (Norte Energia 2014c:5). Tour guides also said that 
Norte Energia has a reforestation project of 26,000 ha and that they have donated seeds 
for local communities and for universities for research. 
 
                                                 




Figure 8 Norte Energia’s Centre Of Environmental Studies: Seedling Nursery 
(Photo By Regina Santos, Norte Energia 2014c) 
Figure 8 provided by Norte Energia, illustrate the seedling nursery of the company’s 
Centre of Environmental Studies. The centre has collected 370 species of plants and has 
produced 48,452 seedlings for scientific use (Norte Energia 2014c). 
Rescue And Release Programme 
While visiting Belo Monte’s construction sites with Norte Energia’s guided tour in Sep-
tember 2014, I got to know the company’s Rescue and Release programme, which is 
included in Belo Monte’s PBA (in Norte Energia 2011d, Vol.5:194-211). During our 
group’s visit, we got to see caged animals who were said to be rescued and were to be 
released back to the wild after being examined by biologists, who would identify their 
species and log them. We saw frogs, snails, monkeys and capybara pups. It was explained 
that the least common animals to be found on the construction site are fast and large 
animals (such as adult mammals), who naturally run away from the area due to noise 
pollution and high movement of construction workers. Slower and smaller animals, in the 
other hand, need to be rescued and returned to the wild. On a booklet provided during the 
tour, Norte Energia (2014b:5) said to have rescued over 117,000 animals between 2011 
and 2014, and to have returned about 94.5% of these animals to the wild. Tour guides 
also said that in some cases, samples are collected for scientific analysis, and when ani-
mals are injured or diagnosed with diseases, they are treated before being reintroduced to 
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the environment. Rare or threatened species found are reported to Ibama and, when suit-
able, are sent to research institutes. 
To the less informed, this projects can be impressing. The rescue and release pro-
gramme is presented in the guided tour as meaningful and important for the preservation 
of the ecosystems in the region. Exotic species are displayed and visitors are excited to 
take pictures with the animals, some of which, they are seeing for the very first time. 
Although wildlife rehabilitation programmes have their merits, I would argue that it is 
common sense that if the habitat where these animals lived are drastically being changed, 
or do not exist anymore, simply releasing the animals to the wild does not help the popu-
lation to survive. Depending on the degree of changes in that specie’s habitat, releasing 
these animals back to the wild can be a cruel act to that individual, which has no chance 
of survival. Moreover, releasing animals to different areas without proper management 
of the natural environment may cause stress or over population of certain species, may 
change the balance of ecosystems, and finally, cause a chain reaction of environmental 
impacts. 
Fish And Other Aquatic Animals 
The PBA for Belo Monte includes projects to investigate the taxonomy of fish species, 
monitor the fish fauna, capturing and releasing fish, running a project of ornamental fish 
aquiculture, and incentive programmes for sustainable fishery. Additionally, there are two 
projects specifically for research and management of river turtles. (Norte Energia 2011c 
Vol.6:14-503). When presenting the work being conducted for aquatic animals in Norte 
Energia’s tour, our guides maintain a discourse that the impact mitigation measures taken 
by Norte Energia are vast, and the work conducted in the area is very important for the 
preservation of the remaining ecosystems in the region.  
Despite Norte Energia’s positive views on their impact mitigation actions, scholars 
have strong arguments against the importance of Norte Energia’s actions towards the en-
vironment. The experts’ panel report (Magalhães and Hernandez, 2009, 7-8.) for example, 
argue that the degree of environment destruction is so large, no mitigation measures could 
possibly compensate the impacts caused by the construction of the dam. The foundation 
of this argument is that the studies upon which the PBA actions are based (the EIA) are 
incorrect and underestimates the ecosystem losses of the future. According to the panel-
lists, from the point of view of the ichthyofauna (fish fauna), Belo Monte is technically 
unviable, and that the changes in the aquatic environment could cause the extinction of 
hundreds of fish species.  
According to Eduardo Pegurier (2013), from the non-governmental organisation O 
Eco, the survival of migratory fish is improbable after the construction of Belo Monte. 
Pegurier argues that the dam prevents fish to go upstream and downstream freely, which 
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disturbs the animal’s breeding possibilities. With no chances for breeding, migratory spe-
cies are likely to disappear from the Xingu River. Some examples of such species are the 
tambaqui (Colossoma macropomum), the surubim (Steindachneridion doceanum), and 
the piraiba (Brachyplatystoma). Along with the species mentioned in Pegurier’s study, 
D’Elia (2012), mentions two other endangered fish species: the plant-eating parana and 
zebra pleco fish (Hypancistrus zebra), also known as acari-zebra (Roman, 2011). More-
over, small animals living in the river basin are likely to become endangered with the 
power plant construction. One example of such species is the Xingu-poison-dart-frog 
(Dendrobates). (D’Elia, 2012)  
As explained in chapter 3.2, the water flow of the Xingu River varies extremely be-
tween wet and dry seasons. The changes in the river flux through wet and dry seasons 
occur naturally in the Xingu River, and animals living in the region are adapted to those 
changes. While animals living in the Xingu River basin are adapted to survive in the 
natural wet and dry seasons; some species depend on these variations to survive. As the 
Belo Monte Dam directly affects the river flow, it consequently affects the lives of these 
animals. While wet and dry seasons will still exist to some extent, damming the river will 
allow a certain degree of control of the water flux around the year. This controlled river 
flow throughout the year will have an impact on the natural habitat of several species.  
 
Figure 9 Gelson Juruna Displays Two Hypancistrus Zebra. (Photo By Lalo De 
Almeida/Folhapress In Leite et.al 2013) 
Figure 9 shows Gelson Juruna, a man from the Paquiçamba indigenous reserve. Juruna 
displays two acari zebra fish (Hypancistrus zebra) in the Xingu River. The acari zebra is 
considered one of the most valuable aquarium species. It is illegal to capture this species, 
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but the fish can fetch up to 40 BRL25 per unit in the black market. (Folhapress, 2013) 
According biologist Ana Paula Roman (2011:20-23), the species is endangered because 
its only natural habitat is the Xingu River. The fish species has not only been suffering 
from illegal catch, but now its natural habitat is changing due to the constructions of the 
dam. Ornamental fishery for aquariums is an important economic activity for riverine 
communities, as the average value of Brazilian amazonian ornamental fish exports is 
about U$ 11.5 million/year (Prang 2007:13)  
A four-day canoe trip with indigenous and riverine people was part of the field work 
for this thesis. While canoeing and discussing about possible futures for their communi-
ties, our hosts hunted several adult individuals and eggs of a river turtle named tracajá 
(Podocnemis unifilis). Figure 10 shows the tracajá eggs captured by one of our hosts dur-
ing the fieldwork. The riverine man (identity preserved) explained that tracajá is a pro-
tected species, but they have the right to hunt them because it is part of their traditions for 
generations. He showed me his hunt with glowing eyes and it soon become clear this is 
something he is very proud of. The man wanted to show me and my research assistant a 
token of his traditional customs. 
 
Figure 10 Riverine Man Shows Captured Tracajá Eggs (Photo By Author) 
  
                                                 
25 12.5 EUR and 16.8 USD according to the conversion of the date of the publication, and 11.6 EUR and 
12.9 USD as per 17 May 2017. 
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While showing us the hunt of the day (Figure 10), our host explained: 
“The tracajá will disappear from the Xingu after Belo Monte. They need 
wet and dry seasons for their reproduction, but that will not happen the 
way it does now. Their survival is unfeasible. Before, we would only hunt 
a few tracajás, and leave most of the eggs on the ground for reproduction. 
But now that we know they will disappear anyways, there is no reason to 
spare them. We eat all that we find, they are delicious.” 
(Riverine man 2014: during fieldwork) 
Later that day, I sat with the chief of the Muratu indigenous community (one of the 
organizers of the field trip) and we talked about tracajá eggs. I asked him what he thought 
about hunting turtles and eggs. The chief answered that he was apprehensive towards this 
kind of attitude from the riverine men, though some indigenous people had a similar way 
of thinking. The chief argued that the local population did not comprehend sustainability 
or basics of species preservation, and that a serious environmental awareness programme 
should be conducted with members of traditional communities. 
“Both the river turtles and the fish in the Xingu River are disappearing by 
over-exploitation. People have to understand that Belo Monte is already 
pressuring the environment, and it is our job to preserve the few individu-
als that do survive.” 
(Giliarde Pixan Juruna 2014: personal interview) 
The issue of species preservation is both complex and manifold. There is indeed sci-
entific evidence that the Belo Monte dam poses a threat to some species, and pressures 
the ecosystem as a whole (see for example Fearnside 2011, Leite 2013, Magalhães & 
Hernandez 2009, Sevá & Glenn 2005. Sousa Júnior et. al 2010). However, also the local 
population’s attitude towards the issue seems to be increasing the threat by limiting the 




3.6 Cultural Aspect: The Traditional Peoples Of Volta Grande Do 
Xingu 
The previous chapter exposed the many impacts that the dam has is causing to the natural 
environment. The water flow of the Xingu River will change dramatically, the aquatic 
fauna has already suffered intensely, deforestation in the region has risen, roads have 
facilitated access to and from indigenous lands, the population growth in the region has 
put a pressure in the natural resources, and so on and so forth. 
This chapter discuss some of the cultural implications of these impacts towards the 
local population, particularly the traditional peoples. First, I will define who the tradi-
tional peoples of Volta Grande do Xingu are, and will describe some of their characteris-
tics. Then, I discuss legal issues related to the indigenous populations, particularly the 
right for free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and how these rights are ensured to be 
respected by the national government. I go on to present some of the impact mitigation 
measures conducted by Norte Energia, and how these have affected the daily lives of 
indigenous peoples. Finally, I will describe what I have seen when visiting one of these 
communities in person, during fieldwork.  
3.6.1 Defining The Traditional Peoples Of The Volta Grande do Xingu 
In the Brazilian context, traditional peoples26 refers to communities which use natural 
resources as a condition to preserve their cultural, social, religious traditions. The use of 
the natural resources is done based on practices and knowledge transmitted by tradition, 
and these peoples have been protected by the Brazilian government under the Federal 
Decree 6040 since February 2007 (Brazil 2007). 
Instituto Socioambiental (2014b) defines traditional peoples as: 
“Groups or communities who, living in areas that are peripheral to our 
society, in a situation of relative isolation from the western capitalist 
world, have formed their own ways of relating to one another and to other 
beings or things: ways that are very different from what is considered 
mainstream in our society . . . each of these peoples we term traditional 
has its own identity, shared history, memory and territory”.  
(Instituto Socioambiental 2014b) 
In the context of this research, when writing about traditional peoples of the Volta 
Grande do Xingu, I refer to communities and individuals part of cultural minorities, such 
as indigenous and riverine people, both from rural and urban areas. They are people from 
                                                 
26 População Tradicional 
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different ethnic and cultural groups, each of which has their own identity, history, shared 
memory and territory, as the definition by Socioambiental proposes. The umbrella term 
refers not only to the indigenous communities present in the region, but also refers to 
small-scale farming communities that plant cocoa trees and other plants typical to the 
region; to riverine communities who fish with traditional fishing nets; to agricultural 
workers and extractivists; to small-scale-miners; and to an urban minority that lives from 
natural resources (e.g. ornamental fish).  
During fieldwork it became clear that some of the riverine peoples have two homes, 
one in a rural area, and another in an urban area. They are constantly moving from one to 
the other in order to take care of their crops, sell their products, and run their errands. The 
fact that traditional peoples constantly move from rural to urban areas, makes it difficult 
to define them. In some cases, individuals may have a traditional farm, but also a job in 
the city to complement the family’s income. This phenomenon has been defined by Pa-
doch et. al (2008:1) as multi-sited households, where members participate in rural–urban 
networks as well as in rural land-use decisions. Multi-sited rural–urban populations are 
common in Brazilian and Peruvian Amazonia, but official classifications restrict house-
holds to either rural or urban (Padoch et. al 2008:4). And then there is also the urban-
indigenous families. 
The indigenous component of Belo Monte’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
is severely criticized by NGOs and environmental activists. The websites of Greenpeace, 
Socioambiental, Amazon Watch, and International Rivers for example have published 
several articles criticising Norte Energia for its wrongdoings towards the local indigenous 
groups. (See for example Amazon Watch 2010, Borges 2012, Guimarães 2015, Socioam-
biental 2014) Despite the accusations by these groups, Norte Energia affirms in their press 
release (Nidecker 2011:1) that “Belo Monte will not impact the lands of any indigenous 
group” and that indigenous lands “will be left untouched by the dam and by other engi-
neering structures of the Belo Monte power plant,” furthermore “no indigenous commu-
nity will be relocated as a result of the project”. 
Even if there are no dam structures or machines operating in indigenous lands, the 
changes on the environment next to indigenous lands affect these areas intensely. It would 
be naïve to think that indigenous lands have a protecting seal against any impacts coming 
from outside its borders.  
Figure 11, from Norte Energia´s PBA – Basic Environmental Project, illustrates the 
indigenous lands recognized by the enterprise in the region. While only two are recog-
nized as areas of direct influence (Paquiçamba and AVGX, as shown in the zoomed 
square on the top left of the image), all these other areas are perceived by Norte Energia 
as indigenous areas of indirect influence by the Belo Monte Dam Complex. The indige-
nous groups from the Xingu basin, among them the groups Apyterewa, Arara, Araweté, 
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Bacajá, Baú, Iriri, Jarina (or Juruna), Kararaô, Kayapó, Koatinemo, Kuruáya, Menkrag-
noti, Panará, Xikrin do Cateté, Xipaya, belong to different language groups and have dis-
tinct cultures, values, and traditions. (Fearnside 2006:16 & Sevá 2005)  
 
Figure 11 Indigenous Lands Of The Region (Norte Energia 2016b:7) 
Several documents from Norte Energia from 2011 to 2016 were analysed and are listed 
at the end of this thesis. It can be argued that indigenous communities are in general 
treated as nuisance. Their protests cause the paralysation of construction work, and the 
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completion of the impact mitigation measures are an obstacle to obtain the dam’s opera-
tion licence. One of the basic conditions for Belo Monte’s licences to be issued is consent 
from the indigenous peoples affected by the dam. 
3.6.2 Free, Prior And Informed Consent (FPIC) 
In 2007, Brazil signed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples (UNDRIP) and ratified the International Labour Organization Convention 169 (ILO 
C169). Consequently, the country committed to apply ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ 
(FPIC) procedures. (Hanna et al. 2014:58) ILO promotes the participation of the popula-
tion in the decision-making processes, and proposes that consultations should be carried 
out with the “objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures”. 
(ILO 1989:art.16) 
Although FPIC is understood as an indigenous right within international law (Ward 
2011:54), the concept of FPIC is a complex one, as the UNDRIP does not offer clear 
guidelines of action, leaving room for interpretation by different states and governmental 
organs. UNDRIP refers to FPIC in 4 articles: 10, 19, 29, and 32 (UN General Assembly 
2007). The four articles are available as Appendix 2 at the end of this document. Based 
on the documents by the United Nations, Tara Ward (2011:54) defined FPIC as: 
“The right of indigenous peoples to make free and informed choices about 
the development of their lands and resources. The basic principles of FPIC 
are to ensure that indigenous peoples are not coerced or intimidated, that 
their consent is sought and freely given prior to the authorisation or start 
of any activities, that they have full information about the scope and im-
pacts of any proposed developments, and that ultimately their choices to 
give or withhold consent are respected”. (Tara Ward 2011:54) 
The definition from Tara Ward is, nevertheless, subject to contestation. The ILO C169 
only mentions the term consent in two articles: 6 and 16. The full text of the articles are 
available in the end of this paper as Appendix 2. Article 16 (ILO 1989) proposes that free 
and informed consent shall be given “whenever the relocation of peoples is considered 
necessary”.27 Article 6 (ILO 1989) suggests that indigenous peoples should be consulted 
“whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which 
may affect them directly”. 
Both UNDRIP and ILO C169 give room for interpretation, and there appears to be 
some confusion towards the meanings of “right of participation”, “right to be consulted” 
and the “right to give or withhold consent”. The licensing process in Brazil seem to embed 
                                                 
27 This is not considered the case in Belo Monte, as no indigenous lands are planned to be flooded.  
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the rational that consultation and consent are the same thing. No official document by 
Ibama, Funai, or Norte Energia appears to address the term informed consent. The only 
official document that somewhat refers to the subject is the Federal Decree 6040 – Na-
tional Policy for the Sustainable Development of Traditional Populations and Communi-
ties (Brazil 2007). The Federal Decree (article 1.10) states that there should be a promo-
tion for the inclusion of traditional populations and communities into the decision-making 
process that involves these peoples’ rights and interests. Moreover, the document states 
(in article 3.4) that the traditional populations and communities who are affected by pro-
jects, constructions and enterprises must have their rights guaranteed. 
Belo Monte’s Environmental Impact Report (RIMA)28 published by Norte Energia 
(2009:10) explain that one of the preconditions for the prior licence is to listen to the local 
population in public hearings29. By analysing the text written in the RIMA, I conclude 
that Ibama and Norte Energia interpret that running public hearings is a manner to obtain 
consent from the local population. However, in a document published by Funai (2011:12), 
the organ described the public hearings as mere informative meetings where environmen-
tal impacts listed in EIA are presented, and the local population has the opportunity to 
ask questions about these impacts. As much as informative public events have their mer-
its, having the opportunity to ask questions about the impacts is not the same as giving 
consent. Neither Norte Energia nor Funai mention anything about intentions of granting 
consent from the local population in these meetings. 
Photographs taken during a public hearing organized in Altamira in 2009, indicate that 
FPIC rights were not respected: In Figure 12, for example, we can see an elder indigenous 
man sitting on the floor, while armed men dressed in police and army uniforms stand 
behind him. We cannot talk about free consent, if the armed forces are there to insure the 
consent is given.  
Figure 13 is a snapshot of the public who turned up to the public hearing. The room is 
clearly over-crowded, and people resort to seating in the floor in order to listen to Norte 
Energia’s presentation. On the left, banners say “no to Belo Monte’s constructions”30 
                                                 
28 Relatório de Impacto Ambiental 
29 Audiência Pública. 





Figure 12 Indigenous Man In A Public Hearing In Altamira In 2009  
(Photo By Lalo De Almeida/Folhapress In Leite et.al 2013) 
 
Figure 13 Public Hearing In Altamira In 2009  






Amazon Watch (2010b) criticized the Brazilian government for not providing the in-
digenous peoples their right for FPIC, although Ibama claimed that these communities 
were appropriately consulted. The NGO states that: 
“Only four public hearings were held in the cities of Altamira and Vitória 
do Xingu, where security forces obstructed the entrance of civil society 
representatives. The few public queries that were made were dismissed, 
ridiculed, and answered evasively. For the Brazilian government, consul-
tation was never about obtaining consent from indigenous peoples through 
public hearings; it was only about the clarification of impacts”.  
(Amazon Watch 2010b) 
In support of the indigenous peoples, Amazon Watch (2010a), International Rivers 
(2016), BBC (2008), D’Elia (2012), Greenpeace (2009), and several others accuse the 
Brazilian Government of abandoning their commitment to Environmental and Human 
Rights legislature by supporting the dam's creation. 
“At the public hearings security forces impeded the entrance of civil soci-
ety representatives, and the few public queries that were asked were dis-
missed, ridiculed, and answered evasively by Eletrobrás representatives”. 
(Amazon Watch 2010a) 
D’Elia’s documentary “Belo Monte: An Announcement of War” (2012) shows the 
indigenous dissatisfaction towards Belo Monte. To the cameras, they threaten to go to 
war, if necessary. Indigenous groups and other traditional peoples of the Volta Grande do 
Xingu constantly remind the State that they have not given FPIC to Belo Monte’s con-
structions. In 2013 for example, when the constructions were already ongoing, indigenous 
peoples became more active in demanding to be asked for their consent. (Cimat 2013) In 
April 2013 the Munduruku people published an open letter inviting government officials 
to their land for a public hearing, with the condition that the lawyer representing the tribe 
would be present, and with the condition of not bringing the armed forces to the public 
hearing in order to avoid intimidation. In the letter the Munduruku explained: 
“We are available for a dialogue with members of the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office31 without the pressure from the organs of national security (Army, 
Federal Police, Federal Highway Police, and National Public Security 
Force). It is impossible to have a negotiation with the presence of these 
organs. They cause intimidation and humiliation. The presence of these 
organs is not necessary for the negotiations between the government and 
the Munduruku people”. (Cimat 2013)32 
                                                 
31 Ministério Público Federal 
32 Letter written originally in Portuguese. Translation by the author. 
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It is clear from the Munduruku letter that they feel unheard, and coerced into giving 
consent by having the organs of national security present on their lands. Desperate to get 
their voices heard, and eager to participate in public hearings, the local population pro-
tested by invading Belo Monte’s construction site. The protest was a reminder that their 
rights have not been taken into consideration. An open letter explaining the actions of the 
protesters was written:  
“We are the people that live by the rivers where you want to build dams. 
We are the Munduruku, Juruna, Kayapó, Xipaya, Kuruaya, Asurini, Para-
kanã, and Arara peoples, fishermen and riverine communities. We are 
from Amazonia, and we want it to live. We are Brazilians. The river is our 
supermarket. Our ancestors are older than Jesus Christ.  
You are pointing guns at our heads. You travel our lands with war tanks. 
You make the fish disappear. You steal the bones and remains of our an-
cestors from the ground. 
You do that, because you are afraid of listening to us. You are afraid of 
hearing that we do not want the dam to be built. You do not want to un-
derstand why we do not want the dam.  
You create this image that we are violent and that we want war. But who 
kills our relatives? How many white33 people have died and how many 
indigenous people have died in this conflict? You are the ones who kill, 
little by little or even at once34. We are dying and with every dam you build, 
more people are dying. When we try to communicate with you, you bring 
tanks, helicopters, soldiers, machine guns, and tasers.  
What we want is very simple: The law that regulates our rights for free, 
informed consent needs to be adjusted. Meanwhile, you must stop all con-
structions and studies35 on the Xingu, Tapajós and Teles Pires rivers. And 
you have to come talk to us, ask for our consent.  
                                                 
33 Note from the author: during my empirical research, I concluded that the indigenous peoples of the Volta 
Grande consider all non-indigenous as “white people”. The term “white” is given to anyone not pertaining 
to the indigenous community independently on that person’s skin colour.  
34 Note from the author: I believe they refer to a massacre of indigenous peoples that supposedly happened 
between 1940s and 1980s during the Brazilian military dictatorship. The government is investigating the 
case up to the date of writing this text, but evidence leads to believe that a population of 300,000 indigenous 
people dropped to 20,000 during that period (see for example Milena 2012, Harari and Wrobleski 2016). 
35 Note from the author: I believe they refer to EIA 
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We would like to open a dialogue, but you are not allowing us to talk. This 
is the reason we have invaded your construction site. You simply have to 
stop everything and listen to us first.” 
Vitória do Xingu (PA) 2 May 201336 (in Sposati 2013) 
The protests and construction site invasion persisted for several months, and the Na-
tional Public Security Force intervened in order to assure the continuity of the construc-
tion. According to the Government Gazette37(DOU 2013), the Ministry of Justice pro-
vided the security force services upon request from the former Minister of Mines and 
Energy Edison Lobão. The services were requested by Lobão on the premises of “main-
taining public order, ensuring the safety of people and giving continuity of the services 
pertaining to the Ministry of Mines and Energy” (DOU 2013). Overpowered by the Na-
tional Public Security Force, the local population retreated and the constructions of Belo 
Monte continued normally. 
Concluding, issues related to the indigenous peoples’ rights are seen as obstacles to 
the development of Brazil and to the country’s economic growth. Indigenous communi-
ties are in general treated as a costly nuisance: issues related to the indigenous peoples’ 
rights lead to a temporary suspension of Belo Monte’s operation licence, their protests 
caused the paralysation of construction work in several instances, consequently delaying 
the conclusion of the construction of the power plant. 
3.6.3 Disruptive Impact Mitigation Measures 
According to Norte Energia (2013:38) the company has invested 260 million BRL38 in 
impact mitigation measures for indigenous communities, including benefits in healthcare, 
infrastructure, mobility, and cultural heritage preservation. The document adds that 756 
houses were built in 12 indigenous communities, 21 airstrips were built, schools, as well 
as 42 radio stations and an “indigenous house” in the city of Altamira, where indigenous 
people can stay when visiting the city. Additionally, 34 healthcare centres are planned to 
be built in indigenous communities, although only one was completed up to the date of 
my empirical research (September 2014). As much as Norte Energia has invested on im-
pact mitigation measures for indigenous communities, after analysing the PBA I conclude 
that these measures are aggressive towards the indigenous cultures. Instead of helping the 
indigenous communities to preserve their cultural heritage, the actions taken manipulates 
the culture of these groups, offering material goods to replace immaterial losses.  
                                                 
36 Translation by the author 
37 Diário Oficial da União 
38 About 75.4 million EUR (exchange rate 17 May 2017) 
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The federal prosecutor Thais Santi (2014) argues that even before the conclusion of 
the constructions, Belo Monte has already caused an indigenous ethnocide. Through Belo 
Monte’s defaulting measures taken thus far, the Brazilian government caused an inten-
tional and systematic destruction of indigenous cultures as a means to silence the indige-
nous groups, who were historically the only agents who still had a voice and visibility in 
the scope of resistance towards the development of hydroelectric power in Amazonia. 
This ethnocide, according to Santi, was done mainly thought the impact mitigation meas-
ure called Emergency Plan.39 
Established by FUNAI and operated by Norte Energia, the Emergency Plan was taken 
into action in order to start urgent mitigation processes in favour of the indigenous peoples 
affected directly or indirectly by the Belo Monte constructions even before the PBA 
would be completed. An informational bulletin written for indigenous groups (Norte En-
ergia 2011:2) described the main actions of the Emergency Plan: to protect indigenous 
lands, to develop the local FUNAI infrastructure in Altamira, to guarantee food security 
of the tribes, and to promote cultural awareness. 
Thais Santi (2014) explains that the Emergency Plan had at first the objective to create 
specific projects for each of the affected ethnicities, with the intention of empowering the 
indigenous peoples and decreasing their vulnerability. Although in theory the Emergency 
Plan could assist the indigenous groups in a positive way, in practice the measures taken 
caused impacts with unprecedented results. In effect, the Emergency Plan consisted basi-
cally of “an allowance” of material goods given from Norte Energia to indigenous groups. 
Between 2010 and 2012, each of 12 indigenous communities received a total of 30 thou-
sand BRL40 in goods such as food, clothing, boats, trucks, fuel, machinery, etc. The goods 
were provided based on a list given monthly by the communities to the company. (Borges 
and Chiaretti 2012) Santi (2014) reveals that there is clear evidence of diversion of re-
sources from the Emergency Plan, and that the project was not conducted as originally 
planned.  
One of my interviewees, an anthropologist conducting research in the region, con-
firmed that a diversion of resources has happened. When I asked how the allowances were 
provided, the interviewee reported that there was no proper documentation.  
In the community where I am conducting my research, the chief would dic-
tate to the assistant-nurse a list of goods that they wanted. After a couple 
of weeks, they would receive the goods. As simple as that. Most of the com-
munity members are illiterate. Once I accompanied the chief to the city 
and we double-checked the list of goods. They showed us an Excel file with 
the goods asked for and the estimated prices of each good. Among the 
                                                 
39 Plano Emergencial 
40 12,000 EUR and 17,100 USD according to the currency conversion of 2010, and 8,700 EUR and 9,600 
USD as per 17 May 2017 
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items there was 1,000 lunch vouchers in the city of Altamira à 10 BRL41. 
That community does not have 1,000 members. Even if the entire commu-
nity and their relatives would go to the city at the same time, this expense 
could not be justified. I ask myself how many of these ghost lunches were 
added to the lists of the communities… How many more ghost items were 
added (identity preserved 2014: Skype interview)42 
The Emergency Plan has been heavily criticized in the media for being a form of bribe 
that silenced indigenous communities and opposition movements. (See for example Bor-
ges and Chiaretti 2012, Thuswohl 2012, Rojas 2014, Castilho 2014, Santi 2014, Pereira 
2015). FUNAI and Norte Energia were accused of creating an environment of domination 
of the company over the indigenous people. Indigenous communities are described as 
people becoming dependent on the company’s allowances, as communities stopped pro-
ducing food, quit working, and became inactive in their own societies (Rojas 2014, Cas-
tilho 2014, Santi 2014). 
As discussed previously (chapter 3.4.2), when Belo Monte’s viability was under study, 
the dam was declared unfeasible by Ibama. The expert panels report (Magalhães and Her-
nandez, 2009:2) warned policy makers about the high risks for the indigenous populations 
in the region, and suggestions of possible impact mitigation measures were made. Envi-
ronmental impact studies (EIA) included the work of several anthropologists. But despite 
all of these, the Emergency Plan was a policy that encouraged consumerism and contempt 
for tradition. 
But how do the indigenous people themselves feel about all of this? How do they live 
today? The answer is plural and complex, as many of the issues presented in this thesis 
are. While some communities, or some individuals within a community, may benefit from 
the impact mitigation measures, others may not, but suffer deeply from the changes being 
brought directly and indirectly by the enterprise. For the purpose of this thesis, it would 
be unfeasible to describe each community and the reality they live in. Nonetheless, one 
community can be described, as during fieldwork, I had the opportunity to get to know 
some of its members in person. 
                                                 
41 3.3 EUR and 4.3 USD according to the currency conversion of the date of the interview, and 2.9 EUR 
and 3.2 USD as per 17 May 2017 
42 Interview given in Portuguese. Translation by author. 
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3.6.4 The Muratu Indigenous Community 
During the canoe expedition organized by Instituto Socio Ambiental in September 2014, 
which was part of my empirical research, I was invited by Giliarde Pixan Juruna, chief of 
the Muratu community, to visit his village. Juruna also granted me a personal interview. 
The Muratu are part of the Juruna Yudjá peoples and live on the Paquiçamba indigenous 
land area, an area recognized as directly affected by the dam, as illustrated in the intro-
ductory chapters of this thesis. 
 
Figure 14 Giliarde Pixan Juruna, Chief Of The Muratu Community, And His Son 
(Photo By Zé Gabriel 2014) 
In a personal interview in 2014, Giliarde (photographed with his son in Figure 14) 
explained that their community is very young and have separated from the Paquiçamba 
community three years back due to conflict of interests between community members. 
Giliarde wanted the community to accept Norte Energia’s schools, healthcare centre and 
other material goods. He saw the situation as an opportunity for the community to develop 
and receive assistance. He understood that there are several projects being offered to in-
digenous communities both by Norte Energia and by the Brazilian Government. He states 
that his community is interested in incorporating outside projects in their own. 
68 
 
The Muratu community consists of 60 members, of which 30 are children43. They 
speak Portuguese as a first language and only a few understand Yudjá, their relative’s 
tongue. The Muratu village consists of several wooden houses built in a semi-circle facing 
the river. In the centre of the semi-circle there are two round structures, the “community 
meeting place” and the “party place”, and in between the two round structures, at the 
epicentre of the village, there is a football field. When Giliarde, my research assistant and 
I were standing in the middle of the football field, the community chief began to point at 
each of the houses: 
“This first house is my brother’s house, the second is my sister’s, that one 
is my cousin’s, that one is my other cousin’s, that one is my brother’s 
mother-in-law’s, that one is for the construction-boy who moved here a 
year ago and does not want to go back to the city, that one is my house, 
and the last one is the healthcare centre.” 
(Giliarde Pixan Juruna 2014: personal interview)44 
Giliarde told us how Norte Energia came to their community, demolished all the ex-
isting houses they had and built new ones nearly identical to the ones they had before. 
The community chose to have wooden houses built by Norte Energia because the com-
munity members are used to dealing with wood and in case the houses need maintenance, 
they can fix them by themselves. My research assistant and I were invited to enter two of 
the houses. They were both equipped with a large plasma TV on the entrance, rooms had 
beds as well as hammocks, the kitchen had a gas stove, and the living room had toys for 
the kids and some artisanal indigenous goods. 
Up the hill, further from the semi-circle of houses, the community also has a water 
tank, a school, a flourmill, and a field where they grow food. All these structures were 
recently built by Norte Energia. The school is used not only by their own community 
members, but also by members of other communities, including that one that they have 
detached from. The school has two classrooms, one for the children and another one for 
adult education. It also has a computer room fully equipped, except that the community 
does not have internet connection. The flourmill was still under construction at the time 
of our visit, and it contained equipment that no one in the community knew how to use. 
There is a discussion whether they should throw the equipment away, or sell to someone 
who would use it. I ask if they are not receiving any training on how to use the flourmill 
equipment. He answers that they should, but either way, they have their own traditional 
way to make flour different from that one. The field for food growing is large but seems 
                                                 
43 The population demographics of the Muratu community are consistent with the general pattern within 
Brazilian indigenous groups. According to the population census 1991-2000 (Pereira et al. 2002:8) among 
those living in indigenous areas, about 20% are under four years old and about 70% are under 24 years old. 
44 Interview given in Portuguese. Translation by author. 
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abandoned and overgrown with weed. Giliarde explains that they were promised that they 
[Norte Energia] would come with tractors to work on the soil, and therefore they [com-
munity members] did not remove the weed or work on the soil. But the tractors did not 
come at the right time of the year; they missed the seeding season and therefore lost an 
entire year’s worth of crop. By the time they [community members] realized no one was 
coming to work on the soil with tractors, it was too late to start removing weed and plant-
ing with their artisanal tools. 
The scenery encountered in the Muratu village was surprising. My first impression 
was that this was not an indigenous community at all. After all, there were wooden 
houses, electricity, and a football field in the core of the community. “Could not get more 
Brazilian than that”- I thought. But as we go deep in the little village we see that although 
there is a strong influence of the Brazilian cultural hegemony, the community also has 
strong influences of the indigenous values and traditions, for example the round patterns, 
the meeting room, etc. I ask Giliarde how he sees all these influences of the Brazilian 
society on his community, he answers: 
“I am an indigenous man, but I am also Brazilian. Our community also 
wants to advance; we also want to live comfortably. We can be Brazilian 
and indigenous at the same time, the same way as you45 are Brazilian but 
you live abroad. We want to be able to continue living according to our 
traditions, but we also want to learn, to go to school and develop ourselves 
just like anybody else.” (Giliarde Pixan Juruna 2014: personal interview)46 
Giliarde has a clear understanding of education being key to empowering the commu-
nity and therefore decreasing their vulnerability. Although his community lives on indig-
enous land, which in theory is an area protected by the State, the constant contact with 
the Brazilian civil society has had an evident influence on the community’s culture, their 
needs and interests.   
                                                 
45 Referring to me, the author. 
46 Interview given in Portuguese. Translation by author. 
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3.7 Social Aspect: Development Based On The PBA 
The social aspect of the Belo Monte is perhaps the most complex and controversial of all. 
As explained in the introductory chapters of the thesis, Volta Grande is not only a rich 
area when it comes to the natural environment, but it is also a rich area in socio-cultural 
diversity. As earlier presented, the population of the Volta Grande includes a rural popu-
lation from large cattle farmers to small-scale farmers as well as riverine fishing commu-
nities, traditional extractivist communities; small- and large-scale miners, indigenous 
groups of various ethnicities, etc. Furthermore, the Volta Grande also incorporates an 
urban population as well as a considerable number of migrant workers from various re-
gions of Brazil and from abroad. The Belo Monte dam affects all these different social 
groups, directly or indirectly. Some are positively affected, as the dam construction has 
brought new work opportunities and social services are more easily accessible. Other 
groups on the other hand, are affected negatively.  
As discussed in earlier (chapter 3.4.4), Norte Energia and their contractors have pre-
pared a document called Projeto Básico Ambiental (PBA) published in 2011 that serves 
as a guide for the companies’ action plans. The PBA includes several social impact miti-
gation actions, divided into six parts, or six plans of action:  
 services for the affected population,  
 urban development,  
 cooperation with local public institutions,  
 relations with the local population,  
 public health, and revitalisation of local heritage47.  
Each of these plans includes several programmes to be followed by Norte Energia and 
contracted companies. The following subchapters analyse some of the actions proposed 
in the PBA, and how they are being conducted de facto, many of which were witnessed 
during field work for this research. 
3.7.1 Services For The Affected Population 
According to the PBA the affected population includes “all social groups, families and 
individuals that are negatively affected by the enterprise”. (Norte Energia 2011 Vol. 
2:14). It is explained that by “all”, the document refers to people who are reliant on (or 
closely tied) to the affected territories or resources affected by the enterprise due to the 
following reasons: 
                                                 
47 Plano de atendimento à população atingida, plano de requalificação urbana, plano de articulação 
institucional, plano de relacionamento com a população, plano de saúde pública, plano de valorização do 
patrimônio. (translation by author) 
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 Involuntary displacement 
 Economic loss through disruption of economic activities 
 Disruptions of social ties (community, family, neighbourhood, crony) 
 Losses of facilities or infrastructure available before Belo Monte 
According to this definition of affected population, there is a wide variety of reasons 
for a person or a group to be considered a part of this group. The PBA does not specify 
the precise groups to receive compensation for the impacts of the dam, which may lead 
to differences of interpretation from the various parties. The “disruption of social ties” is 
especially vague, as these ties may be subjective. Norte Energia proposed to monitor the 
affected population in order to identify persons in need of social assistance and psycho-
logical support. This monitoring by Norte Energia is mainly aimed at risk groups (women, 
children, adolescents). According to the PBA, the aim is “to meet the needs of 100% of 
the socio-psychological needs of the affected population” (Norte Energia 2011 Vol 2:392) 
by monitoring risk groups and referring people in need to public social services. Although 
the PBA claims to give support to the local government and communities, they also claim 
that services will be performed by local institutions (Norte Energia 2011 Vol 2:391). 
Norte Energia’s aim of meeting 100% of the socio-psychological needs of the affected 
population is unrealistic. Taking into consideration the population growth and lack of 
resources in the public sector, the quality of the services provided to the population is 
questionable. Moreover, the PBA is unclear on how the support will actually be given to 
the local community, and it seems that not only the services, but the responsibility upon 
the social work users is forwarded to the public administration. 
The compensation programme for economic losses began with a study of the economic 
activities conducted up until then. Once the study had been completed, vocational 
courses, workshops and other training aimed at developing various economic activities 
were organized in order to support the local commerce and production. The programme 
has had partnerships with various educational institutions and local associations. (Norte 
Energia 2011 Vol 2, 311-315) In Altamira, the extraction of sand, gravel and clay has 
traditionally been an important economic activity for the city. Therefore, these economic 
sectors received a special programme in the PBA in order to guarantee the production of 
these raw materials. (Norte Energia 2011 Vol.2:321-330) The PBA also guaranteed a 
programme in favour of Vitória do Xingu, neighbour-city of Altamira, where a boatyard 
is planned to be built in order to satisfy the needs of production and maintenance of boats 
in the region. 
3.7.2 Urban Development 
The constructions of the Belo Monte dam will mainly affect four municipalities: Alta-
mira, Brasil Novo, Senador José Porfirio and Vitória do Xingu. (Defensoria Pública 
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2014:15) Altamira is the city most affected by the dam, as parts of the city will be flooded 
for Belo Monte’s reservoir. Official statistics from IBGE, the Brazilian Institute of Ge-
ography and Statistics shows that the number of inhabitants in Altamira is 99,000. (IBGE 
2015) The Secretary of planning of the city of Altamira, Dr. Rainério Meireles da Silva 
(2014, personal interview) points out that this number is outdated, and the last population 
census was carried out in 2010 and the population has grown since then. The city does 
not have official statistics on the current population size. Leite et.al (2013:3) published a 
special report on Altamira, where according to her, the urban population of Altamira 
jumped from 100,000 to 140,000 between 2011 and 2013. While the exact number of 
people is unknown, the outcomes of the inflow in population clearly bring problems to 
the local environment. Although the city of Altamira is not large in terms of population, 
it is immense in area. Its territorial area is 159,533 km2 (IBGE 2015)48. 
The PBA prepared by Norte Energia and its partners imply that the urban development 
plan cannot be done solely by the private sector; cooperation between public and private 
sectors should happen as the urban development plan also affects the local government’s 
plans of action. (Norte Energia 2011 Vol.3:10-12) The document includes a detailed list 
of improvements to be done in Altamira and in the neighbouring cities alongside with the 
construction of the dam. The improvements listed include: 
- As Belo Monte’s reservoir is being built very close to the core of the city, some 
areas are at risk to flooding. Residents living next to the river should be allocated 
to safer zones, and river banks should endure environmental recovery. 
- Improve the housing and sanitation conditions of the resettled population 
- Build new residential areas in the city capable of accommodating the migrant 
workers and the resettled urban population 
- Build a residential area for the incoming workers, to be integrated to the urban 
area of the city of Vitória do Xingu 
- Facilitate the interaction between local and incoming population 
- Provide adequate urban infrastructure to accommodate the population influx into 
the urban centres of Altamira, Vitória do Xingu, Belo Monte, and Belo Monte do 
Pontal 
- Restructure the existing road system in urban areas and road connections to the 
construction sites. 
A personal interview was conducted with an urban architect49 working for one of the 
contractors hired by Norte Energia. The interviewee is responsible for many of the con-
struction projects undergoing in Altamira, Vitória do Xingu, and to some extent also the 
                                                 
48 Note from author: for a comparison to my readers, this is equivalent to about half the area of Finland. 




neighbouring city Anapú. Projects include the implementation of a sewage system, con-
struction of a new neighbourhood allowing the relocation of the population, construction 
of bridges, harbour, public transportation system, and a promenade replacing the palafitte 
houses that are currently being removed. The interviewee acknowledges that Belo Monte 
brings some negative impacts to the surrounding areas, and that there is a great debate 
whether the presence of the power plant is good or bad for the region. Nonetheless, as an 
urban architect, s/he sees the development of the city as a great opportunity for the local 
population because without the dam, the city would not have such heavy investment in 
infrastructure, and these betterments would not happen at the pace they are happening 
now. S/he describes the entire city going through renovations, as plumbing work is being 
done to all houses that had been registered by 2008 when the PBA was being prepared. 
“The construction of the sewage system is very important for the city. So 
far the residues of the entire town have been going directly to the river. 
The sewage system will greatly affect the quality of life of the population; 
will provide positive effects to the health of the people, and the quality of 
the water...” (urban architect 2014: personal interview)50 
From an urban development point of view, the undergoing infrastructure developments 
in the city of Altamira have a positive effect indeed. Roads and bridges are being built, 
as well as schools, hospitals, houses, squares, promenades, etc. There is heavy investment 
in civil engineering in the cities directly affected by Belo Monte.  
Since the Belo Monte constructions started, several thousand people moved to the city 
in search for jobs and new opportunities. “There are newcomers from all different social 
classes, from construction workers with no education to high class engineers”, says the 
urban architect interviewed.  
Leite et.al (2013:3) describes Altamira as a city turned into “a chaos of traffic, violence 
and rising prices”. Several interviewees commented on the local traffic. The urban archi-
tect interviewed (2014)51 compared the local traffic with that of the city s/he grew-up, and 
said that un-written traffic rules in Altamira are very different from those of larger met-
ropolitan cities. Although metropolitan cities have more vehicles on the streets, Alta-
mira’s signs are insufficient. The interviewee claimed that pedestrians are highly vulner-
able in the city, and warned me to be double-careful when walking on the streets of Alta-
mira. Dr. Rainério Meireles da Silva, secretary of planning of the city of Altamira, 
claimed in a personal interview (2014) that street signs and traffic planning are the city’s 
                                                 
50 Interview given in Portuguese. Free translation by author. 
51 Identity preserved 
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top priorities52. Also in a personal interview (2014), Luciane Madruga one of the directors 
of the Regional Hospital, said that a large portion of the patients in that hospital are there 
due to traffic accidents. Madruga adds that, in her opinion, the main problem generated 
by the population inflow is the chaotic traffic.  
“Although Altamira is the largest municipality in the country, an immense 
area of 159.533,730 km2 (IBGE 2015), the city never had public transport 
before. Nowadays there are buses to and from Belo Monte construction 
sites and the city centre. There are also boat transportation systems, as 
well as taxis, moto-taxis, and carts pulled by donkeys. Bus lines between 
the city centre and the newly built urban areas are also part of the city 
planning.” (Urban architect 2014)53 
  
                                                 
52 Note from author: During my empirical research, I also witnessed problems in traffic in the city of Alta-
mira. Cars and motorcycles often did not respect the indicated speed limits of the streets, many streets 
lacked traffic signs and adequate lighting. One incident was particularly curious: the empirical research was 
conducted one month before the local elections. The hotel I stayed was in the same street at the Regional 
Hospital and had a low speed limit. While walking to get some dinner, I was surprised (and nearly ran over) 
by several pickup trucks with about nine women on the back screaming and waving flags with the picture 
of the mayor in it. I don’t know what was more surprising: the high speed that the trucks were going, or the 
sexist and unsafe electoral campaign. This incident got me thinking that if traffic accidents are a major 
problem in the city, and traffic planning is one of the city’s top priorities, why did the local administration 
choose to use unsafe over-speeding in their electoral campaign? 
53 Interview given in Portuguese. Translation by the author 
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3.7.3 Formalisation Of Land Tenure 
Arguably the costliest, most time consuming, and problematic service for the affected 
population is the formalisation of land tenure. The PBA plans include resettlement of a 
large number of urban and rural residents, a reorganisation of remnant land areas, and the 
formalisation of land tenure for informal settlements, including public, private, and com-
munal land areas. In paper, both land owners and land users have the right to receive 
compensation. The EIA prepared by Ibama in 2007 served as a preliminary population 
census that would define the number of land owners, and the number of properties to be 
compensated for. Additionally, the PBA from 2011 included new socio-demographical 
studies of the affected population (Norte Energia 2011 Vol.2:311). 
Around 52% of the real estate properties on the land area directly affected by Belo 
Monte constructions are not formalised (Norte Energia 2011 Vol.2:19). In a personal in-
terview, the secretary of planning of the city of Altamira, Rainério Meireles da Silva 
(2014), warned that the number of informal land and real estate properties might be even 
higher than the reported numbers by Norte Energia. Meireles da Silva explained that the 
land tenure situation in the region is very complicated, as a large portion of the population 
live on lots with no documentation. The process of formalisation of land tenure, both in 
rural and urban areas is slow and difficult, as it involves conflicts of interest. Meireles da 
Silva argued that this is one of Altamira’s immediate needs, but due to its complexity, it 
is a long-term process that is being pursued jointly with land-use planning of the city. 
The pace of the dam constructions and the company’s immediate need of land does 
not coincide with the slow public process of formalisation of land tenure. Norte Energia 
cannot afford to wait for slow bureaucratic processes. As a result, people are being dis-
placed by force before formal resolutions.  
I was told about one such irregular displacement. An interviewee of mine was an ag-
ricultural worker who had two homes: one in the city, and another one in a small island 
in the Xingu River, none of which are their primary or secondary homes. Her case is a 
prime example of that multi-sited household phenomena described by Padoch et. al 
(2008:1) as mentioned earlier in chapter 3.6.  
My interviewee’s family’s income relied on fishing and agricultural goods produced 
in the island, which would be sold in the city. Recently one of her sons started working 
for the dam construction, and he now lives permanently in the city. When the preliminary 
population census was conducted by Ibama in 2007, the family happened to be on the 
island working on their land and their house in the city was closed. According to my 
interviewee, the company regarded her house an abandoned shack, and therefore the fam-
ily was not included in the original list of affected urban population. Her family has no 
documentation for the lot of lands they live and work in. They are illiterate. They don’t 
know if they will ever receive any compensation from Norte Energia, or to where they 
will be displaced to. The family was forcedly removed from the island a couple of months 
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before our interview, and now they are being removed from the house in the city as well. 
The interviewee explained that traditionally, the riverine people like her usually have two 
homes: one in the city and one in the rural area. She considers both places are her family’s 
home, and she wishes to be compensated for both. She looked at the ground and said: 
“They said I can only live in one place, but I have two homes, how could I choose? Now 
soon I have none.” 
My interviewee is not the only one with problems in the land tenure formalisation 
process. In September 2015, El País published the story of Raimunda, a riverine woman 
that had her rights brutally violated. According to the article, Raimunda’s rural land area 
was properly accounted for, and when she was about to be displaced, the woman received 
a call from Norte Energia asking when she could remove ‘her family’s residues from the 
island’, as they needed to start the construction works in that region. The woman agreed 
upon a date with Norte Energia, and the day before that, she went from the city to the 
island to pack her things. Her house was on fire. The article by El País states that the 
incident has been reported to the police, and that Raimunda was informed that Ibama had 





Norte Energia emphasises that the residents in Altamira are only to gain from their relo-
cation, as they will move to a more developed area, with improved social services. 
“Construction plans include moving hundreds of people from rural areas 
and around two thousand Altamira families who nowadays live under pre-
carious conditions.” (Norte Energia 2011) 
Figure 15 is an example of a palafitte house (also known as stilt house) from Rua da 
Peixaria. The notice board with the logo of Norte Energia on the left reads “Do not occupy 
or build. Protected area for public use. Authorized resolution by Aneel number 3,293”54. 
 
Figure 15 Example Of A Palafitte House In Altamira. (Photograph By Author) 
During my fieldwork in 2014, I visited a neighbourhood of palafitte houses, and had 
the opportunity to interview some of the residents. The palafitte houses that I got to know 
during my visit to Altamira, on Rua da Peixaria, were mainly built with wood. As the 
houses were built on the Xingu river bank, in an area of the city that floods annually, the 
houses were raised on pylons over the surface of the soil. Most houses were connected to 
their neighbour’s houses, although there were some empty areas as well, with what re-
mained from the homes of people who had already been resettled. One of my interviewees 
allowed me to enter her home. “As you can see, my house breathes air” she explained, 
showing me the holes between one and another piece of wood on the wall and on the 
floor.  
                                                 
54 Translation by the author 
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“They say my house is precarious. You can see it is not. It is a beautiful 
house. My family has built it with our own hands. These holes here are on 
purpose: we don’t need air conditioning. The breeze comes in and we have 
fresh air day and night. The houses that they are offering are all closed 
and hot.” (Resident of a palafitte house 2014: personal interview)55 
I asked her about the rain and also about the water of the river. “Well if it rains too 
much we need to leave the house. Our neighbour lost everything last year, because her 
house flooded”- She responded. By the end of this interview, I had understood that the 
conception of precarious and unsafe, or decent and secure, can be very different according 
to context. 
I also visited Jatobá, one of the resettlement areas. I was taken there by the urban ar-
chitect interviewed, who showed me the facade of the houses. As seen in Figure 16, the 
streets on the resettlement are paved. The streets have all been levelled, and trees are 
being planted next to the sidewalks. The sidewalks are level, are adapted for the visually 
impaired, and are wheelchair accessible. All the houses have the same size and shape. 
 
Figure 16 Jatobá Settlement Area, Altamira. (Photograph By Author)  
“The relocation of the people is also very important, although it is a really 
complex issue. It involves so many things... But the conditions these people 
lived in were unacceptable. The palafitte houses were poorly built; the re-
location settlement has proper houses, sewage system, streets, legal docu-
mentation, etc.” (urban architect 2014: personal interview) 
According to Norte Energia (2012), after conducting a preliminary population study, 
the company has made a decision to resettle 7,637 families, around 20,000 people. The 
study revealed that 54% of the houses catalogued were equal or smaller than 60 m2, 23% 
of the houses were between 60 m2 to 100 m2 and the remaining 27% of the houses cata-
logued were larger than 100 m2. Based on that information Norte Energia announced that 
                                                 
55 Interview given in Portuguese. Translation by the author 
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they would build houses of three sizes: 60 m2, 69 m2 and 78 m2, each in a land area of 
300 m2, independently of the size of the house. The houses are all one storey high and 
have two to three bedrooms. Although Norte Energia had promised houses of three dif-
ferent sizes, the Public Defender’s Office of Altamira (2013) published a note that only 
62 m2 houses were built, the material used for the construction were not the same as 
promised, and the changes were not communicated to the population affected.  
Even though the houses delivered by Norte Energia to the population are newly built, 
they have already presented problems. In practice the resettlement areas are already fall-
ing apart. In September 2013 the Public Defensor’s office of the state of Pará fined Norte 
Energia for building inappropriate houses that have not received prior approval from the 
city. The housing plans do not follow the municipality construction codes: internal walls 
are too thin, kitchen coating height is too low, toilets are only accessible from kitchens, 
bathrooms are too small, bathrooms for the disabled are too small and do not follow 
norms, electrical installations are done inadequately and are potentially unsafe. (Defen-
soria Pública do Estado do Pará 2013). 
 
Figure 17 Water Damage In The Toilet Of A House In The Resettlement  
(Photo By MAB 2014) 
There have been reports from MAB – Movement of People Affected by Dams (2014) 
that residents of these new houses already suffer from broken pipes, mould, cracking 
walls and lack of water. Figure 17, from MAB, shows a toilet in one of the houses of the 
resettlement. The case of water damage is evident. According to MAB, in 2014, when 
only 200 families had moved to the urban settlement, Norte Energia received at least 10 
complaints per day for problems related to the houses received. 
As everything in the Belo Monte controversy, there are several sides to the same story. 
While palafitte houses are seen as beautiful and functional homes for many of the people 
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living there, they are seen as precarious and unacceptable to the government, architects 
and engineers. The resettlement is, as many other aspects discussed, complex and deli-
cate. It is essential that the palafitte houses are removed because that area is to be flooded. 
Moreover, the houses shouldn’t have been built there in the first place because this is 
supposed to be a protected area. However, even if the local population built their homes 
in an illegal land area, they still have the right for proper housing and shelter, free from 
infiltration, and with the an architecture that follows accepted norms. 
3.8 Economic Aspect: Costs Unaccounted For 
3.8.1 Growing Budget 
When Norte Energia won the public auction in 2010 for the concession of the Belo Monte 
Dam Complex, the company offered that the price of the energy produced by the dam 
would be 77,97 BRL56 per MWh (Megawatt-hour), which was 6% lower than the initial 
bid (Aneel 2010). Eletrobrás, the State-owned electricity utility company signed a con-
tract with Norte Energia that they would buy all excess energy produced for 130 BRL57 
per MWh (Leite et. al 2013). 
According to Norte Energia’s website, the company “will sign a contract for commer-
cialising the electrical energy within a regulated environment, with the distribution con-
cessionaires, at the sum of 62 billion BRL58, relating to the supply of 795 million MWh.” 
Additionally, the company is to pay 16.6 million BRL59 annually to the Federal Govern-
ment of Brazil for the use of public property and is also to pay a sum of 200 million 
annually for the Federal Government of Brazil, for the State of Pará and for the munici-
palities in the areas affected by the plant as a compensation for the use of hydro resources. 
(Norte Energia 2016a) 
                                                 
56 31.18 EUR and 44.44 USD according to the currency conversion on the date of the public auction, and 
22.51 EUR and 25 USD as per 17 May 2017 
57 52 EUR and 74 USD according to the currency conversion on the date of the public auction, and 37 EUR 
and 41 USD as per 17 May 2017 
58 18 billion EUR and 19,84 billion USD according to the currency conversion on the date of the public 
auction, and 24.8 billion EUR and 35.34 billion USD as per 17 May 2017 
59 6.64 million EUR and 9,45 million USD according to the currency conversion on the date of the public 
auction, and 4.8 million EUR and 5.3 million USD as per 17 May 2017 
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When Aneel, the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency announced a public auction 
for the concession over Belo Monte in 2010, the dam’s budget laid on the ball park figure 
of 16 to 19 billion BRL60 (Aneel 2010).  
The company won an auction in 2010 by offering an initial budget of 16 billion BRL. 
In 2011 the budget jumped to 23 billion BRL, and in 2013 was corrected to 28.9 BRL 
billion, due to inflation restatement of contracts signed back in 2010. (Norte Energia 
2016a) The sum was revised again and has grown to over 30 billion BRL61 (see for ex-
ample Pereira 2013, Veja 2013, Monteiro 2015). Belo Monte’s constructions are financed 
by BNDS, the Brazilian Development Bank. According to the bank’s charts (BNDS 2016) 
Norte Energia S/A has received thus far a total of 28,740,665,307 BRL62 for the construc-
tions of the Belo Monte dam.  
When reviewing Brazil’s historic inflation rates to compare nominal prices with real 
prices (inflation.eu), it is possible to note that since 2010 Brazil’s annual inflation has 
been of about 6%, and 10% in 2005. Taking the inflation into consideration, the corrected 
budget to Belo Monte should have been around BRL 23.5 billion in 2016, but it is over 
BRL 30 billion. How can such large difference be explained? 
According to Pereira (2013), one significant factor for Belo Monte’s budget increase 
is the work delay due to worker’s strikes and indigenous protests. It is estimated that the 
dam’s constructions are one year late due to such paralysations. Furthermore, costs related 
to the worker’s accommodation, logistics, and environmental impact mitigation projects 
were underestimated. (Monteiro 2015). It is suggested that there is more to it than work 
paralysations and underestimation of costs. Monteiro (2015) recommends that a thorough 
revision of Belo Monte’s budget should be investigated by Lava Jato. The contractors 
working on Belo Monte are the same companies involved in the Lava Jato corruption 
scandals in Brazil (see for example Amora 2015, Barrucho 2015, Brum 2015, Carvalho 
2015).  
Despite possible links to corruption scandals, Belo Monte’s ever growing budget is 
not an exception among dam constructions. Fearnside (2016:48-49) argues that there are 
hundreds of unprofitable dams worldwide, that in general terms dams cost more and take 
longer to build than originally assumed. Ansar et al. (2014: 43-56) made multi-level re-
gression analysis of costs and cost overrun, as well as implementation schedule and 
schedule slippage of of 245 large dams. The aim of this analysis was to discover inaccu-
racies between actual outcomes versus planned forecasts. The study concluded that 75% 
of large dams worldwide have suffered a cost overrun, and that costs are on average 96% 
higher than estimated costs. Also, 80% of large dams have suffered a schedule overrun, 
on average 44% (or 2.3 years) higher than the estimate. (Ansar et al. 2014: 48). According 
                                                 
60 6.4 to 7.6 billion EUR according to the currency conversion on the date of the public auction 
61 8.7 billion EUR and 9.6 billion USD according to the currency conversion in 17 May 2017 
62 8,334,792,939 EUR and 9,197,012,898 USD according to the currency conversion in 17 May 2017. 
82 
 
to that study, this poses an overwhelming evidence that budgets of dams are systemati-
cally biased below actual costs, and the authors suggest that there are two explanations 
for this: the first is a psychological delusion, or a “planning fallacy” of too optimistic 
plans, and the second a political deception from proponents of the dam, possibly due to 
misplaced political incentives (Ansar et al. 2014:44). 
3.8.2 External Costs 
One of the reasons for dams’ budgets to grow are that initial environmental impact as-
sessments are not capable to take all non-dam infrastructure costs into account. Fearnside 
(2016:49) claims that the non-monetary socio-environmental costs of hydropower are not 
weighed critically enough when making decisions on energy options. Sousa Júnior and 
Reid (2010:250-258) conducted analysis on risk scenarios for Belo Monte taking into 
account those external costs. Their conclusion is that the costs of Belo Monte are likely 
to be greater than its benefits. The scholars identified non-dam infrastructure required for 
the construction of the plant (transmission lines, sub-stations, maintenance areas, roads, 
etc.), as well as social, economic and environmental feasibility costs.  
The external costs that could be quantified, according to the authors, are losses in fish-
ing, losses in ornamental fish collection, losses in water quality, loss of agricultural and 
livestock activities, losses in water through evaporation, losses for tourism, and costs re-
lated to GHG emissions. External costs that could not be quantified are for example the 
value of non-commercial fauna and flora, the value of recreation, loss of commercial and 
aquatic species, archaeological and cultural sites associated with the traditional commu-
nities, direct economic losses for these communities, access to clean water, farmable land, 
etc. (Sousa Júnior and Reid 2010:250-258).  
The authors argue that when taking external costs into consideration, the cost benefit 
ratio of Belo Monte is not viable. According to them, the risks and uncertainties related 
to these externalities make the construction of the dam economically unfeasible, but the 
key elements for decision making of Belo Monte were not the true costs of the dam, but 
the government’s strong emphasis on energy-economic production correlation, as energy 
availability is commonly associated with gross domestic product (GDP). (Sousa Júnior 




3.8.3 Lobbying From The Private Sector 
There are suggestions that the mining sector and construction companies have lobbied in 
favour of the dam. (Barbosa 2015:136) Both sectors have a lot to gain from Belo Monte. 
The interests of construction companies are obvious: as seen in previous chapters, the 
construction companies are directly involved with producing the EIA and PBA, and are 
co-responsible for the urbanisation projects of the region. 
The mining industry is interested in Belo Monte because the Xingu River is rich in 
gold and other rare natural resources as diamonds, niobium and copper (Poirier 2012). 
Prior to the construction of the dam, these resources are difficult to extract due to the 
intensive river flow. The construction of Belo Monte Dam can potentially facilitate the 
extraction of the resources as the river levels are maintained at the "low-level" point con-
sistently throughout the year (Belo Sun 2012). 
The Canadian company Belo Sun Mining Corporation is currently in the process of 
obtaining licences to operate a goldmine in the region (Barbosa 2015:135) and the process 
has already shown irregularities (Poirier 2012). Belo Sun’s EIA was published in 2009, 
before Belo Monte’s constructions begun (Leite 2016) and the cumulative environmental 
impacts were not taken into consideration. As Belo Monte’s impacts on the river flow 
makes mining easier in the region, it is plausible that the mining industry may gain boost 
in the region, and the resulting social and environmental impacts of the mining industry 
cumulated with the dam’s impacts are unprecedented and unknown. 
3.9 Lessons Learned From Other Dams In Brazil 
The issues presented until now about Belo Monte’s social and environmental impacts are 
not issues particular to this specific location. Traditional peoples of other regions of Brazil 
struggle with similar issues as the ones described previously, and the disregard for the 
environment, as well as for the warnings from academics are not unique to the Belo Monte 
case. Before moving to the analysis of the Belo Monte controversy and creating scenarios 
for the future, this last subchapter presents examples of experiences from the past lived 
in other regions of Brazil. Three Brazilian dams currently in operation were chosen to be 
used as a comparison and an inspiration for thinking about the future of Belo Monte. Two 
of them are also tropical dams located in Amazonia, and one of them is located in the 
South of Brazil in the border with Paraguay.  
The Tucuruí Dam completed in 1984, was built in a tributary river of the Amazon 
River, and also in Amazonia, in the state of Pará, the same state where Belo Monte is 
being built63. Although Tucuruí’s engineering is considerably different from Belo Monte, 
                                                 
63 Shown in the map in Figure 3, page 24 of this paper. 
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the surrounding ecosystems of the two dams are very similar. The region also has a cul-
turally diverse society like Altamira. The impacts caused by the construction of Tucuruí 
are still object of studies and debates (See for example Curtarelli 2016, Chen 2015). The 
construction plans of the Tucuruí Dam were imprecise and significant changes were made 
during the implementation phase. The location of the dam, for example, was moved 7 km 
away from its original plans due to geological conditions of the region, and the reservoir 
had a projected submerged area of 1,630 km2, but ended up with 2,850 km2 (La Rovere 
et.al. 2000:20). 
The Balbina Dam completed in 1989, is a classic example of how things can go wrong. 
Balbina is described by the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME 2016c) as “the 
worst environmental crime committed in the history of Brazilian engineering”. In order 
to redeem for the proven environmental crimes committed by the construction of the dam, 
and to improve the cost-benefit of the plant, floating solar panels are currently being in-
stalled on Balbina’s reservoir. The panels are to be connected to the power plant and this 
hybrid solar-hydropower is a pilot project described as an innovative solution to improve 
the efficiency of the plant. (Logiuratto 2016, Cooke 2016)  
The Itaipú Dam, completed in 1984, is located in the South of Brazil, on the border 
with Paraguay. It is currently the largest working hydroelectric power plant in the world 
(Itaipu Binational 2010). According to the federal prosecutor Andrea Vulcanis (2013:3), 
Itaipu’s constructions would never have been accepted had it gone through an environ-
mental licensing process, which was only established in Brazil in 1981.  
Table 3 Comparison Between Dams 
 Belo Monte Tucuruí Balbina Itaipú 
Installed Capacity 11,233.1 MW 4,125 MW 250 MW 14,000 MW 
Size of Reservoir 503 km2 2,850 km2 2,360 km2 >1,400 km². 
Population displaced ~20,000 ~23,000 ~1,400 ~30,000 
Table 3 above compares Belo Monte with the other dams described above. The table 
is based on Norte Energia (2016), La Rovere et.al. (2000:20), Fearnside (1989:401), 
Itaipu Binacional (2010), and Terminski (2013:53). The table illustrates the generator ca-
pacity of each dam, the size of their reservoirs, and the estimated number of people dis-
placed due to the dam constructions.  
Similarly to what is happening in Altamira with the construction of Belo Monte, the 
construction of Tucuruí also drew a large inflow of migrants. According to a report pre-
pared for the World Commission on Dams (La Rovere et.al. 2000:82), the local popula-
tion increased six fold. The region continues to experience population growth and up to 
the publication of that report the city of Jacundá, one of the affected municipalities, has 
had around 20.9% annual growth. The rapid population growth in Tucuruí also resulted 
in higher complexity of social problems alike these of Belo Monte, peasants and small 
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farmers were also removed from their lands, and resettlement homes were also insuffi-
cient for the families displaced. (La Rovere et.al. 2000:83) The majority of the population 
in the region is composed by migrants, spread throughout the lower social strata: workers 
in the informal sector, poorly-paid wage-earners, unemployed people, and house maids 
(La Rovere et.al. 2000:83). The report suggests that the relocation process in Tucuruí was 
inadequate and a number of cases referred to the courts are still open (La Rovere et.al. 
2000:xiv). 23,000 people were displaced by Tucuruí’s reservoir and the settlement areas 
are reported to experience “dramatic problems related to agriculture, health, and lack of 
infrastructure”. (Fearnside 2016:57) 
The problems that the indigenous peoples of the Xingu are facing now can be associ-
ated to past experiences by indigenous peoples in other regions of Brazil and the impacts 
they have had with constructions of hydroelectric power plants. The issues discussed ear-
lier, like the disrespect for indigenous rights of informed consent, disruptive impact mit-
igation measures and problematic compensations are not singular to Belo Monte.  
In Tucuruí, the Parakanã people suffered from an inadequate resettlement process. The 
indigenous group was split up and relocated several times. However, on the bright side, 
long-term medical care programmes and border surveillance of the indigenous reserve 
contributed to the expansion the Parakanã people, and with that expansion they have even 
established new villages. (La Rovere et.al. 2000:xvi)  
In Balbina, the Waimiri-Atroari people, who lived in the region, had 10 villages 
flooded by the reservoir. In November 1980 the Fourth Bertrand Russel Tribunal in Rot-
terdam accused the Brazilian government for genocide of the Waimiri-Atroari peoples. 
(Fearnside 1989:411) According to recent publications, the Waimiri-Atroari were killed 
by the Brazilian military, both in land combat and through air force. (Reis 2014) These 
indigenous peoples were known to be particularly violent when defending their territory 
and the federal administration of that time believed that they could pacify the indigenous 
people with missiles. (Albuquerque Rodrigues and Fearnside 2014:56) The Waimiri-
Atroari had an estimated population of 6,000 in the beginning of the 1900’s (Fearnside 
1989:411), in 1972 the population had declined to 3,000 and in 1982 the population 
dropped further to 571, later in 2014 the Waimiri-Atroari population had grown to around 
1,670. (Reis 2014) 
The Itaipú Dam also affected indigenous peoples, particularly the Guarani, the Ocoy, 
and the Tekohá Añetete. (Itaipú Binacional 2010). It is estimated that 100 indigenous 
communities have been impacted by the dam, and some have not yet received appropriate 
compensation (Pyl 2010).  
The companies behind the dams described all have projects aimed at providing support 
to the indigenous populations affected by the dam (Norte Energia 2016b, Itaipu Bi-
nacional 2010, Eletronorte 2016). The projects include healthcare services, education, 
demarcations and surveillance of lands. 
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4. CREATING THE SCENARIOS 
The process of building the scenarios for this master’s thesis was based on the eight steps 
to develop scenarios by Schwartz (1991:241–248), as described in chapter 2.2. In this 
chapter I present scenario logics and how I fleshed out each future state through a very 
large table originally based on the PESTEC table (Heinonen and Ruotsalainen 2013:22). 
4.1 PESTEC Table 
Table 4, the Table 4 PESTEC Table is as a systematic way of summarizing the Belo 
Monte controversy and organising issues in different aspects. The table can be perceived 
as a summary of the findings broken down into six aspects: political, economic, social, 
technological, ecological and cultural. The issues presented in this table are the driving 
forces identified for the scenario building process.  
The numbers in parenthesis are the page numbers of the headers of chapters or sub-
chapters where the issue has been discussed earlier in this thesis. The cells with a white 
background indicate predetermined elements that are already consummated events. The 
cells with a dark-grey background are uncertain elements that may change in different 
scenarios and are examined further in The, the Scenario Table. 
See for example, on the first line (P) and fourth column (Technological Aspect), I have 
the text “Efficiency of the power plant (34)” on a white background. This means that the 
issue on the efficiency of the Belo Monte Dam is a technological issue with political 
implications, and that this topic has been discussed in a chapter starting from page 34, 
which is the subchapter “3.2 Technical Characteristics Of The Hydroelectric Power 
Plant” where I present the installed capacity and average energy production of the dam. 
Some predetermined elements deserve further explanation, because depending on the 
context, they can also be considered uncertain elements: 
- Brazil’s growing needs for electricity. The reason this is a predetermined aspect is 
that this is a slow-changing phenomena that is already in the pipeline, and also be-
cause it goes in agreement with the Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Budget and 
Management (2013) scenarios for 2021.  
- Technical capacity of the Dam. The technical capacity to generate energy from the 
stream is considered a predetermined element because the construction of the plant 
was done based on certain engineering specifications and these are not questioned 
for the purpose of this thesis. Nevertheless, if new dams are built in the future in 
order to regulate the water flow of the river, the efficiency of the power plant may 
increase. (See more in chapter 3.2.) 
87 
 
- Population growth, ecological stress and high prices in the City of Altamira. These 
are predetermined issues because they are already consummated events and inevi-
table, also because Altamira is a city that is geographically isolated and constrained. 
- Income inequality. Although this issue was not deeply discussed, it permeates both 
economic considerations and social development chapters. Additionally, the Gini 
Index (2012) suggests that this is a slow-changing phenomena in the Brazilian con-
text. 
- Biodiversity loss. It is a predetermined issue for being an already consummated fact. 
The level of loss, however, is uncertain. 
- Complex definition of the traditional peoples in the region and the conflicting val-
ues of different interest groups. The conflict of interest is an inevitable collision that 
permeates the daily lives of the traditional peoples as discussed in the introductory 
chapters of this thesis, as well as in the political aspect chapters and also on the 
chapter on indigenous peoples.  
- Ethnocide. This is a predetermined issue because it is also an already consummated 
event. This issue was discussed in chapter 3.6.3. this is a term used by the Federal 
Prosecutor Thais Santi (2014) when describing the disruptive impact mitigation 
measures conducted to the indigenous populations, particularly the Emergency 
Plan. 
- Corruption. Although there is no single chapter dealing with the topic in depth, 
issues related to corruption are present throughout the documentary analysis. The 
Lava Jato corruption investigations were briefly mentioned in the chapter on eco-
nomic considerations. Although the level of corruption and how corruption will be 
dealt with is uncertain, the presence of corruption is certain. Therefore, it can be 




Table 4 PESTEC Table 




Growth Programme PAC 
(36) 
Interests of the pri-
vate sector (e.g. mining 
industry) (83) 
Brazil’s growing 
needs for electricity (36) 
Efficiency of the 
power plant (34) 
Damming more riv-
ers in Amazonia (34) 
Questionable  
FPIC (56) 
E Creation of jobs (36) 
Return over investment 
(80) 
Rise of prices in Altamira 
(71) 
78 or 130 BRL/ MWh? 
(80) 
Losses for fishing and 
other traditional living 
(48) 
Conflicting values be-
tween interest groups 
(44, 56, 64) 
S 
Electricity to supply 40% 
of Brazil’s residential 
consumption (36) 
Income inequality (88) Urbanisation (70) 
Housing conditions 
(75,77) 




Investment in  
Renewable energy (36) 
Risks and external costs 
(82) 
IT and vocational train-
ing to population (70) 




Decisions taken only by 
cultural hegemony (56) 
E Licencing procedure (38) Deforestation (48) 
Population growth:  
ecological stress (56) 
GHG Emmissions(46) Biodiversity loss (46) 
Over-exploitation of nat-
ural resources (48) 
C 
Priorities of the national 
government to cultural 
hegemony (36) 
Emergency Plan (64) 
complex definition for 
“traditional peoples” (56) 
Traditional peoples also 
want hi-tech devices (67) 
Indigenous reserves are 
“green islands” 
Cultural preservation or 
destruction? (64) 
The cells with a light background indicate predetermined elements that are already consummated events. The cells with a dark background are uncertain 
elements that may change in different scenarios. Numbers in bracket refer to the pages where these issues have been previously discussed in this paper. 
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4.2 Fleshing Out The Scenarios 
The Scenario Table was constructed to flesh out the scenarios that will be presented in 
the next chapter. This very long table is based on the uncertain elements or driving forces 
identified in Table 4 PESTEC Table.  
4.2.1 Some Considerations About The Scenario Table 
As mentioned in the introductory chapters, this thesis is an exercise of holistic thinking, 
but there are so many issues that can be included in the research. Although the The Sce-
nario Table is mainly based on the issues presented in chapter 3, the table also includes 
some aspects that have were not selected as main topics of discussion earlier, but should 
be mentioned before constructing the scenarios. These are significant issues and could be 
further investigated for example in a doctor’s dissertation. The topics not previously ex-
amined that are included in the scenario table are: 
- Demarcation of indigenous lands: this is a very complex issue and several changes 
related to it are currently occurring in Brazilian politics. This issue would deserve 
an entire chapter, if not a completely new thesis. 
- Corruption: As already said before, this is a predetermined element, which carries 
critical uncertainties. The Lava Jato investigations are ongoing and new findings 
are constantly being published. These findings by the federal police may play an 
important role on the futures of Belo Monte and the affected population. 
- Global climate change: some common knowledge of the subject was taken into 
consideration for the construction of the tables and scenarios. 
- Livestock: The issue was raised during a personal interview with the secretary of 
planning of the city of Altamira. The and the scenarios take into consideration a 
growing trend of livestock production in Amazonia (for more about this issue, see 
for example Aguiar et.al 2015 and Latawiec et. al. 2014) 
- Tourism: although the topic was discussed in personal interviews, the results were 
not explicitly written down in the final version of this thesis. It could have made 
part of the economic considerations chapter, for example. 
- Drugs and prostitution: These are growing elements in the subculture in urban 
Altamira, and deserve to be researched in depth. Due to lack of expertize in this 
field, to the sensitivity of the topic, and to strive for personal security, I have made 
the decision of not researching this aspect further. Even though I have not included 
any questions related to drugs and prostitution on my interview scripts, interview-
ees often brought the subject up with concern. “Looking at the future of Altamira 
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without considering the future of drugs and prostitution here, is like studying im-
migration in USA and not considering illegals.” - one of my interviewees warned. 
- Social movements: Although some social movements were briefly mentioned 
thorough the research, this aspect was not closely examined. 
Dengue, Zika and Malaria: Norte Energia has conducted a programme in Altamira and 
the region affected by Belo Monte to fight malaria, and the results of this project has been 
successful. This is an important positive contribution to the health of the local population 
(Norte Energia 2015). However, when the water flow of the Volta Grande do Xingu be-
comes lower, the region may be more prominent to mosquitoes, flies, and other insects, 
as stagnant pools of water ought to become more common. With the rise of number of 
such insects, the region may also suffer from a rise on arthropod-borne diseases like as 
dengue, zika and malaria. The fight against malaria was an important contribution of 
Norte Energia to the health of the local population. 
4.2.2 How To Read The Scenario Table 
Each line represents one uncertain element, and each column represents one future state 
for it. By reading the table top to bottom, it is possible to understand the scenario logics 
and see how each of these elements come to be in that particular alternative future. By 
reading the table from left to right, it is possible to see how each scenario differs from 
one another in each of the aspects. The numbers in parenthesis refer to the page number 
of the beginning of the chapter where a certain topic was discussed in this paper. The cells 
with a white background refer to results originated from the literature, the cells in light 
grey refer to results from interviews, and the cells with a darker background highlight 
personal creative input to the scenarios. The table also includes the following symbols 
that are indications of how issues change in the different futures states compared to the 
present. The arrows are a visual representation of the text written in each cell:  
=  For issues that might remain very similar 
↓ For issues that might decline (less of something) 
↓↓ For issues that might decline strongly (much less of something) 
↑ For issues that might increase (more of something) 
↑↑ For issues that might increase strongly (much more of something) 
 ≠  For issues that might be very different to today, and therefore cannot exactly be 






Figure 18 Screenshot Of A Piece Of Table 5 As An Illustration How To Read The 
Table 
Figure 18 is a screenshot of a piece of the Scenario Table, and is used here as a visual 
representation to better explain how the table can be read. When reading the table from 
left to right, we can observe how the driving force “Damming the Xingu River” differs in 
each future state represented by each scenario. This driving force is a topic within the 
Ecological Aspect of the Belo Monte controversy. Number 34 suggests that this topic has 
been discussed in page 36, which is chapter 3.2 “Technical Characteristics Of The Hy-
droelectric Power Plant”. In the Continuation scenario, we expect that a few small dams 
are built (or at least are being proposed to be built) to control the water flux of the Xingu. 
This is based on results from the literature (note that the background of the cell is white). 
On the Perfect Storm scenario, the Xingu River is massively dammed, as the old project 
for damming the Xingu is taken back to the table of decision makers. Note that the back-
ground is dark, so it means this is my own idea of a stormy future and nowhere in the 
literature there is a suggestion that this could happen.  The cell that belongs to the Lucidity 
scenario is based on the results of interviews (light grey background) and suggests that 
the damming of the Xingu River remains the same, that is, no new dams are built, while 
in the Black Swan (my own input, dark background) the river is undergoing a process of 
restauration, and the dams are being removed.  
If we read the table from top to bottom, we can notice cells in the Continuation scenario 
are mostly white (based on the literature), cells in the Perfect Storm are mostly dark (my 
own input), the Lucidity scenario is mainly light grey (resulted from interviews) and the 




4.2.3 The Scenario Table 




















Procedure is simplified. 
Three-stage licencing is no 
longer in effect. 
↓↓ 
Failure of procedure due to 
approval of PEC 65/2012, 
PLS 654/2015 and PL 
3.729/2004. 
≠ 
Procedure is revised to be-
come more democratic, in-
cluding participation of civil 
society and the scientific 
community. 
↑ 
Procedure is revised, be-
comes more complex and 
full of loopholes 
Focus of licencing 
in political  
discussions (38)  
= 
Economic potential of pro-
jects for the region and for 
the nation state 
↓ 
Economic benefits for the 
proponents of projects 
≠ 
Focus on the impacts 
themselves and the im-
posed risks to the affected 
population 




Written by the proponents 
of the project in accord-
ance to a common set of 
requirements 
↓↓ 
Written by the proponents 
of the project using an 
electronic template 
↑↑ 
Requirements for EIA are 
revised, well defined and 
publicly assessable. Public 
participation is required 
and guaranteed. 
= 
Revised, but in effect, no 





Projects defined hitherto 
continue with no significant 
changes or adaptations 
↓↓ 
Unfinished  
projects are abandoned af-
ter Operation Licence is 
granted 
↑↑ 
Revised: projects are ex-
panded in quality and 
quantity. 
≠ 
New EIA and new PBA un-
der study. New impact miti-







tions because Belo Monte 
is a question of “energy 
security”. 
↑ 
Endures regardless of the 
confirmation to involve-
ment with corruption car-
tel(s). 
↓↓ 




Annulled due to public 
pressure. 
FPIC (56) = 
Public Hearings are mere 
informative meetings with 
no intention of consent. 
↓ 
The local population is not 
consulted for changes in 
the project, including new 
dams. 
↑↑ 
The model of consultations 
with traditional peoples is 
revised and new legislation 
is done on the matter  
↑ 
FPIC is done in the form of 






Lines of demarcation for 
indigenous lands do not 
expand. 
↓↓ 
Further constriction  
of indigenous lands. 
↑↑ 
Indigenous lands are well 
demarcated and further 
expanded. 
↑ 
Indigenous lands and de-
























Rise on the number of 
dams under construction. 
↑↑ 
Intensify:  
Several new are built and 




Stricter environmental laws 
pose a barrier on construc-
tion licences of large pro-
portions, decelerating the 
pace of these construc-
tions. 
↓ 
Some new dams are ongo-
ing, but it is harder to ob-
tain licences due to im-
proved FPIC procedures. 
Damming the 
Xingu River (34) 
↑ 
Small dams in the Xingu 
River and its affluent have 
been proposed to control 
the water flux of the Belo 
Monte Dam. 
↑↑ 
Old project that planned to 
dam the Xingu in several 
parts is reconsidered. 
= 
No new dams are planned 
for the Xingu River. 
↓ 
Restauration of the river: 
dam is on the process of 
being removed 





Several species disappear 
from the region. 
↑↑ 
Very high:  
Several species disappear 
from the region. Some 




Few species disappear 
from the region 
↑ 
Low: 
Several projects to revital-





Pressure on legal logging 




estation instigates acts of 
violence. Environment pro-




cially inside new indige-
nous lands. 
↓ 
Illegal logging is over-





Same as planned  
(503 km2). 
↑ 
Larger than predicted. 
Floods in the plant occur in 
the wet season causing 
operation malfunction 
= 
Same as planned  
(503 km2). 
↓ 
Xingu waters not deviated 
to the reservoir as plant is 
abandoned. Some spillage 
is present on wet season. 
Global  
climate change  
(10,89) 
↑ 
More intensive dry & wet 
seasons cause droughts 
and floods. 
Desertification of soil of 
deforested areas. 
↑↑ 
Amazon biome is close to 
reaching its tipping point 
with unlikely return: ex-
treme forest lost allows 




eration on environment 
preservation of Amazonia, 
the region is anyway af-
fected by climate change 
↑ 
Prolonged droughts in-
crease forest fires, Amazo-






















Large national and interna-
tional companies get in-
stalled in the region. Large 
amount of workers em-
ployed by mining industry 
↑ 
One international company 
gets installed and controls 
the entire region. Only a 
fraction of the revenue 
benefit locals. 
↓ 
Mining is highly controlled 
and therefore only done 
small-scaled. 
↑ 
Growth on illegal mines, as 
confiscation is uncommon 
Work ↑ 
Slight movement towards 
formalization of work, alt-
hough informal work is still 
commonplace. 
↓↓ 
Work is mostly irregular: 
significant raise on “Gold 
rush” migrant-workers; ille-
gal logging, drug cartels, 
black market; prostitution 
↑ 
Mainly formal, regulated 
work. 
Trained professionals do 
high quality work, are effi-
cient and happy. Irregular 
work still present. 
↓ 
Slight growth of informal 
work 
Employment rate = 
High number of unem-
ployed and homeless peo-
ple in the region. 
↑ 
Low unemployment, but 
workers suffer from lack on 
conditions and from hu-
man rights violation. 
 
↑ 
Although a high number of 
the working age population 
is out of employment, 
there is heavy investment 
in adult education and vo-
cational training which in-
cludes paid internships 




New businesses open due 
to new needs: cars, motor-
cycles, better housing, IT 
goods, etc. 
↓ 
Big chains get installed in 
the region. Small local 
business cannot compete 




port for the promotion of 
small-scale farming. New 
businesses are small. 
↓ 
Recession: Lack of con-
sumers induce many local 




Small commercial flights 
open opportunities for tour-
ists to visit Altamira. The 
Belo Monte Dam site is the 
favourite attraction 
≠ Growth on sex tourism. ↑↑ 
Rise on ecotourism:  
national and international 
tourists come to get to 
know the infamous Xingu 
River and its small islands 
and rapids. The river bank 
offers a beautiful water-
front 
↑ 
As the Belo Monte region 
became known worldwide 
due to the dam, tourism 
has slightly grown. But lack 
on investment on this area 
does not attract too many 
tourists. 
Technology = 
Due to miss-usage, lack of 
training and to the tropical 
weather, electronic appli-
ances have low endurance 
in the region. 
↓ 
Belo Monte is forced to 
buy new equipment due to 




know how to fix and main-
tain electronic appliances. 
New technology from sub-
sidized research makes 
energy production more ef-
fective 
≠ 
Expensive machinery from 
Belo Monte being sold to 
other dam projects 
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Slight population growth:  
Constant influx and outflow 
of national migrants. 
Lower-class-migrant-work-
ers settling permanently, 
higher-class migrant work-
ers moved away. 
↓ 
High population growth: 
Most workers that arrived 
in Altamira in 2010 stay in 
the region, and influx is 
constant. 
↑ 
Slight population decline:  
As development project 
are more organized in a 
national level, migrant 
workers leave Altamira 
with secured contracts in 
other regions 
↑↑ 
High Population decline:  
Qualified workforce mi-






Development of the re-
gion’s urbanisation con-
tinue according to PBA  
↓↓ 
Irregular urbanisation. New 
palafitte houses resurge 
on the river bank. 
↑ 
New neighbourhoods, bus 




Irregular urbanisation is 






More hospitals and 
healthcare centres are 
slowly being opened in the 
region. Even though they 
still lack from personnel, 
the situation is better than 
before. Equipment break 
and they are not repaired 
frequently enough. 
Decline on malaria cases, 
constant control on den-
gue and zika cases 
↓↓ 
Hospital still not ready by 
2020. Overcrowded 
healthcare centres force 
patients to travel to other 
cities to get treatment. But 
for some, it is too late. 
More cases of dengue, 
zika and malaria. Increas-
ing number of diabetes pa-
tients; increasing obesity in 
children, especially from 
indigenous origin. 
↑↑ 
As the hospital gets ready, 
Altamira becomes a cen-
tral city in the region for 
healthcare treatment. Tribe 
members and citizens from 
small towns travel to Alta-
mira to get treated. More 
hospitals and healthcare 
centres are being built in 
the region. 
= 
As funding for the con-
struction of hospitals and 
healthcare centres are cut, 
constructions are para-
lyzed. Existing facilities 
continue to function, but 
the conditions are the 





















Minority groups organize 
themselves to fight for their 
rights, but little result is 
achieved 
↓ 
Strong censorship. Strikes 
and protests are violently 
terminated. Activists pro-
duce creative solutions. 
↑ 
≠ 
Protests are uncommon 
due to the growing dia-
logue between civil society 
and the State. Unions of all 
kinds are strengthened. 
= 
Rise on strikes and pro-






As the media coverage for 
Belo Monte grows, NGOs 
of various kinds get in-
stalled in the region in sup-
port of the local population. 
↓ 
NGOs suffer from lack of 
funding as well as censor-
ship. Recess on number of 
volunteers due to fear. 
Nevertheless, NGOs are 




Unions, NGOs, and educa-
tional institutes work hand-
in-hand with the State 
providing independent ex-
pertize work, support, and 
creative solutions. 
= 
Some NGOs that have 
been working in the region 
for decades are still pre-
sent and do important in-
vestigative journalism with 
meaningful publications. 
Bus as region is aban-
doned from public interest, 






tinue to strive for their 
rights, social activism ends 
up bringing them closer to 
urban population. Tribal 
languages and traditions 
dying with the older popu-
lation 
↓↓ 
Indigenous groups are dis-
solved almost completely. 
Indigenous goods are con-
sidered artefacts for muse-
ums. 
Researchers are discour-
aged to publish findings 
with to violent threats from 
an authoritarian state 
↑ 
Indigenous children go to 
bilingual school; are edu-
cated, self-aware and 
know their rights. While 
some choose to leave the 
tribes to universities and 
city life, others stay and 
maintain a rustic lifestyle. 
= 
Considered “lower culture” 
indigenous peoples con-
tinue to fight for their 
rights. While some groups 
become “more conserva-
tive”, others “forget” tradi-
tions and live lives closer 
to the Brazilian cultural he-
gemony 
Appreciation of  
local food goods 
↓ 
Main local production is 
livestock, although few tra-
ditional small scale farm-
ers still produce other agri-
cultural goods.  
↓↓ 
Local agriculture produce 
is almost inexistent due to 
droughts, forest fires and 
water pollution. Oppor-
tunity to expand livestock 
↑↑ 
Appreciation for locally 
grown products promotes 
small-scale farming. Only 




duce. Most food goods im-






5.1 Continuation & Amplification Scenario 
A future not much different from today. Governmental actions are driven by eco-
nomic growth heedless of its socio-environmental impacts. 
It is 2020 and the Belo Monte has been operational since 2016, although the constructions 
were only finished in 2019. The dam complex has been generating energy and feeding 
the national grid of electricity. Hydroelectricity is the main source of renewable energy 
in Brazil, and the construction of the Jatobá Dam and São Luiz do Tapajós Dam in the 
Tapajós River are just about to be completed. Between 2016 and now, 43 other dams have 
been built around Brazil. The Brazilian governmental plan to expand hydroelectric set at 
the beginning of the century has been successful. 
The expansion of hydroelectricity in Brazil is successful due to a simplification of the 
licencing procedure for PAC projects, where new dams are no longer subject to three-
phase licencing as Belo Monte was. The implementation of hydropower is a priority in 
the Brazilian acceleration of growth project, as it is considered a clean, cheap and sus-
tainable source of energy with great economic potential for local and national levels. Hav-
ing said that, it is enough that the licencing body approves the project’s EIA and PBA. 
“Public hearings” to inform the local population on what is being done are conducted. 
Although it was promised that Belo Monte’s yearly efficiency would be about 40% of 
its total capacity, this has not been the case in practice. The Xingu River water flow is not 
as abundant in 2020 as it was when the studies to assess the hydroelectric power possi-
bilities were made in 1970s and 1980s. In the past, low flow levels of water remained for 
about four months per year, but recent studies have registered that the low flow has a 
longer period, and it is also dryer than before. 
One of the conditions for Belo Monte licences was that the river is guaranteed a min-
imum monthly water flow of 700 m3 per second. (MME 2011:4) Norte Energia’s reports 
say that these are being complied, but NGOs and local activists have reported levels of 
water flow lower than that minimum promised in the least favourable months. The Volta 
Grande do Xingu is dry. The water flow has stagnated to about a monthly 700m3/s (or 
less) during most of the year, except for the most favourable months of the wet season. 
As the water flow of Volta Grande is low during most of the year, the river and the sur-
rounding nature have adapted to this new condition: some streams dried, while others 
became larger. Some small islands became part of the main land, and the geography of 
the Volta Grande has modified. The water and sand temperature have risen. Fish, frogs, 
turtles, and other water-dependent animals suffer from the rise on water temperature, and 
from the lack of a proper wet season.  
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While several species have completely disappeared from the region, other better-
adapted species are thriving. Norte Energia continues operating environmental pro-
grammes in order to protect the local fauna. The company provides, for example, fish 
seeds for the region at regular intervals. One of the most popular eco-programmes offered 
is ornamental fish aquiculture, as well as the incentive programmes for sustainable fish-
ery. According to the latest newsletter by Norte Energia, these programmes are a success 
and the local riverine population is satisfied. 
Norte Energia’s sustainable fishery programme also involves some indigenous com-
munities. The indigenous communities have also been provided with basic infrastructure, 
including schools, healthcare centres, access to electricity, roads, runways (for aircrafts), 
as dictated by the PBA. The communication between Norte Energia and the indigenous 
communities is direct, without intervention of Funai, the National Indian Foundation.  
Juçara64 is an indigenous woman in her 20s. She is the person in charge of communi-
cations between Norte Energia and her community. She was chosen for the job due to her 
outspoken character, and because she is used to visiting the City of Altamira. Juçara’s 
community is small and young.  
The community leader, Moacir65, is Juçara’s brother-in-law. Moacir is a defender of 
the forest. Although his community is located inside an indigenous land territory recog-
nized by the state, the land has been invaded several times by illegal loggers. The area 
has several sign posts indicating where the indigenous lands start and end, but illegal 
loggers ignore the demarcation of land, because they know that within the indigenous 
areas they can find larger trees which are more valuable than the ones found in the over-
exploited non-indigenous territory. 
Moacir’s community is small, and they are struggling to maintain their indigenous 
identity. The community has, in general, more infrastructure than the communities of 
their more conservative relatives. They are equipped with a school, a healthcare centre, 
toilets, etc. Every week they receive visitors of various kinds in the community: teachers 
for the local school, social workers, nurses, doctors, construction men that come to fix 
something every now and then, researchers, documentarists, etc. These people often need 
a place to stay for the night when they visit, so the community also has a ‘white-men’s-
house’, where people can stay on temporary basis. Having outsiders in the indigenous 
territory on regular basis have evident disruptions on the daily lives of the community. In 
many ways, the indigenous community is undistinguished from other riverine communi-
ties in the region. They share the same language, the same clothing, the same architecture. 
Their economic activities are very similar, and as inter-ethnic relations become more 
common, they look very similar to non-indigenous people. 
                                                 
64 Fictitious character 
65 Also a fictional character 
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This indigenous group has recently separated from another bigger community because 
of differences of opinions, mainly related to how much influence white people (non-in-
digenous) can have over the community. More conservative indigenous communities ar-
gue that if they want the benefits of city life, they should leave the forest and become 
“white persons”. Moacir and his community members reason that partial integration to 
the Brazilian society is unavoidable, and he defends that indigenous people have the right 
to visit cities for health treatments and studies. “Healthcare helps us live longer, and 
studies help us not to be taken as fools, give us possibilities to defend our rights” he says.  
A new member is about to be born in the community. Juçara is with child. The latest 
ultrasound showed that Juçara’s baby is sideways and it was recommended to her to go 
to the hospital in Altamira for a caesarean. The need for a caesarean created an extra 
tension between Juçara’s community, and other more conservative indigenous communi-
ties. Giving birth in the hospital and staying there overnight is not the natural way a child 
should be born, and Juçara should may longer be considered indigenous. Moacir, the 
young community leader, argues with his more conservative relatives that survival is 
more important than traditions. They come to an understanding that Juçara should go to 
the hospital and make sure the baby is born safe, even if that contradicts their common 
practice among indigenous peoples. 
But how safe is it in the hospitals in Altamira? Juçara’s only experience with the hos-
pital of Altamira is that it is always full and it is known for the lack of resources. On the 
other hand, it is one of the few hospitals in the country that has specialisation on indige-
nous care. She contemplates that she and her child have better chances in the hospital. If 
there are any complications on the birth at home, it would take several hours before she 
can get to the hospital and that might be too late. Juçara’s mother tells her she was born 
in the river, and so were all her siblings, as well as their parents and grandparents. Juçara 
has heard from her relatives about the benefits of water-birth. Although she finds the idea 
of giving birth in the river romantic, she does not want to take the risk. Even though a 
modern sewage system was built by Norte Energia as part of the impact mitigation 
measures of Belo Monte, the majority of the houses in Altamira are not linked to the 
system and the Xingu River is contaminated by the city’s waste. Today, Juçara cannot 
conceive the idea of giving birth in the waters of the Xingu. They opt to book the caesar-
ean. This was not an easy decision. She knows that giving birth in the hospital and later 
going back home will affect the relationship between her community and their relatives 
who live in more conservative indigenous communities. 
There are two ways to travel from the indigenous community to Altamira: by land, or 
by water. If she decides to go by water, she would have to use her brother-in-law’s motor 
boat. Moacir got a motor boat from Norte Energia when their community separated from 
the larger community. Although the motor boat is fast she would have to pass through 
Belo Monte and that means passing by the marine travel-lift, which depending on the day, 
may take several hours. If she decides to go to the city by land, she will use her brother’s 
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pickup truck. Her brother got this pickup truck from Norte Energia even before the road 
to their community was ready; it is a ten-year-old-car and has its flaws. Workers from a 
company contracted by Norte Energia opened the forest for this road when they started 
to build the school for the community about ten years ago. Road lights, pavement, and 
traffic signs were part of the plan too, but none of these things were implemented. There 
has not been any work on the road for over several years and due to weather conditions 
the road is constantly collecting holes and indentions. Accidents have already happened 
on that road, and their community has already lost members due to traffic accidents. 
Whatever route Juçara opts for, they have to leave early in advance to ensure the safety 
of both mother and child. 
5.2 Perfect Storm Scenario 
A future where many potential hazards come to be. 
It is 2020 and the constructions of Belo Monte are still incomplete. Belo Monte is only 
partially operational and is considered the most expensive hydroelectric power-plant ever 
built. The current administration shut down the Lava Jato money laundering investiga-
tions, and so the federal police no longer explores corruption frauds linked to the power 
plant. Despite the lack of resources from the federal police, the civil society -mainly 
NGOs and the academic community- have reported numerous irregularities related to 
Belo Monte. Allied with the environmental lawyers and prosecutors, opponents of the 
dam have filed several actions against Belo Monte, but the actions were all archived. 
None of the actions against the dam are taken forward to the Supreme Court, because 
Belo Monte is still protected by the Security Suspension. 
Belo Monte is a priority within PAC, the acceleration of growth programme by the 
Brazilian government. The discourse among government officials is that the dam is in-
trinsic for the country’s energy security. As the government is the main proponent of the 
dam, there is a deliberate omission of inspections, and irregularities are overlooked. 
While state officials omit themselves from regular inspections, the civil society pro-
duce creative solutions to make the inspections themselves. Reports prepared by the civil 
society are frequently published.  
Organized strikes and protests forced Belo Monte to stop its operations several times. 
However, the armed forces violently terminate protests, Norte Energia terminates work 
contracts with those workers that participate in the strikes, and social movements suffer 
from censorship and violent crimes. 
The Xingu River is a lot drier than in the 1970s and 80s when studies were made to 
assess the possibilities of hydroelectricity in the Xingu. As Belo Monte’s efficiency is not 
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as high as expected, new dams are being built to control the water flux of the river down-
stream. Opponents of the project claim that these new dams are unfeasible, because Belo 
Monte and Belo Sun mining cumulated impacts have already been too destructive. The 
region has suffered from deforestation at an unprecedented rate, illegal logging has insti-
gated acts of violence and several plant species have completely disappeared. Soil deser-
tification has intensified and the Amazon biome is close to reaching its tipping point with 
unlikely return. Fishery is almost exclusively a result from fish seeding, and several 
aquatic species are locally extinct from the natural environment. 
Despite the opposition, water-flux regulatory dams have received their construction 
licenses, and proponents argue that the new dams are much smaller than Belo Monte, and 
the impacts they will cause to the region are very small compared to the potential eco-
nomic benefits they may bring. Besides, the damage to the Xingu River has already been 
done. Water shortages in the South of Brazil are tough and proponents argue that dam-
ming Amazonia is especially beneficial for the country’s strategy for economic growth 
because the wet season in the North of Brazil coincides with the dry season in the South.  
New dams are being built not only in the Xingu River, but also in other rivers in Ama-
zonia. The expansion of hydropower is a priority strategy in the current administration, 
and therefore subject to “speed licences”. With the approval of the bills PEC 65/2012, 
PLS 654/2015 and PL 3.729/2004, obtaining licences for hydroelectric power plants are 
not as complicated as it was before. Once the EIAs produced by proponents of the project 
are presented, government agencies have eight months to evaluate the EIA, and in that 
timeframe, licencing bodies have the opportunity to reject the project. If government 
agencies involved in the procedure do not act within these eight months, it is considered 
that they are in accordance with the licencing, and the constructions of these projects may 
begin. Proponents of infrastructure projects use an electronic template to produce EIAs, 
and this new system allowed EIAs to be completed more efficiently and abundantly. Gov-
ernment agencies, on the other hand, lack resources to act according to timetable, and 
therefore licences are given to projects without proper evaluation. No construction can be 
suspended or cancelled after the project’s EIA is presented, so in practice some projects 
already start their constructions even before the construction licence is issued. 
As the power of proponents of dams and infrastructure projects grows with this new 
licencing procedure, the affected population loses their rights for intervening and the nat-
ural environment is being put at risk. The focus of the environmental licence procedure 
is not on the environment itself, but the economic benefits that the proponents of the 
project gain. Public hearings are organized, but as has been done in the past, they are 
actually only meetings where the local populations are informed about the projects. The 
affected population, in effect, is not consulted, and have no opportunity to give, or to deny 
consent. Public hearings are organized in strategic locations with difficult access for in-
digenous populations, and security is reinforced by the military. 
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While 70% of Belo Monte's energy produced is sold to public consumption, the other 
30% is sold directly to local industries in Pará. The State of Pará is now the most active 
mining state in Brazil, bringing a positive contribution to the country’s GDP. Belo Sun, 
the Canadian gold mining company is a prosperous company that have created many jobs 
in the region. Other important companies installed in Pará are aluminium smelters, and 
other electro-intensive industries. These industries are powered by Belo Monte’s energy 
and price deals are made directly from one company to another. 
A new group in the social strata of the region has experienced fast growth, as the min-
ing industry is now fully operational. Belo Sun acquired their Operation License, and the 
Volta Grande do Xingu experiences a “gold rush”. The population of Altamira and region 
has grown once again. As competition for unskilled work is high in the region, the average 
salary of a workingman is low. In order to be able to pay all the bills, many have opted to 
working two jobs. As a means to support income, irregular jobs are commonplace. Alt-
hough the city does not experience high unemployment due to various job opportunities, 
informal work has risen, and workers suffer from lack of conditions and from human 
rights violations.  
The infrastructure of the city is not adequate for its population size, but due to impact 
mitigation measures, Altamira and region continue to receive investment on infrastruc-
ture, and the city is constantly being renovated.  
Schools and hospitals are constantly overcrowded; violent crimes have escaped out of 
control.  
The use of narcotics has grown in Altamira, and the local government is unable to 
control the fast-growing illegal drug trade, nor the rise on violence associated with it. 
Drug cartels gain strength in the region, prostitution has risen and the violence against 
women is especially alarming. 
The traffic in Altamira continues to be chaotic, although the city centre now has more 
traffic signs. Belo Monte brought some public transportation to the city, as it was part of 
the impact mitigation measures. Some bus lines connect settlements to the city centre and 
the centre to some industries, but they do not bring significant relief to the city traffic. 
Public transportation is insufficient for the rapid growing population and the various areas 
of the city are not interconnected. Driving schools have flourished in the city, and the 
main means of transportation is the motorbike. Small budget cars are also becoming more 
common. 
The local business in Altamira is very different than it was before Belo Monte’s estab-
lishment in the region. Large chains were installed in the region and public appreciation 
of these retailers affect small local businesses drastically, as they cannot compete with 
the prices of large chains. Chains set the prices of goods. As a counterpoint, the black 
market brings uncontrolled counterfeit cheap goods, offering basic-needs goods at a lower 
price. Consumers strive for low prices, and pay for low quality products, from clothing 
to children’s toys, imported food and even medication. Black-market goods pose a threat 
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to the health of its consumers, as they do not meet quality standards. Nevertheless, access 
to Altamira continues to be limited due to its remote geographic location, retailers often 
run out of products. As supply and demand is unbalanced, the prices of goods vary con-
stantly. The prices of food, clothing, medication and other basic-needs goods are signifi-
cantly higher than those in other parts of Brazil. 
Creative and agile small businesses still survive in the region regardless of the presence 
of large chain stores. 
Perhaps the social groups most affected in Volta Grande do Xingu are the riverine 
people and small-scale agriculture workers. These two groups are less resilient to the so-
cio-environmental changes that Belo Monte has caused, as they are highly vulnerable and 
are not sufficiently adaptive. As the course of the Xingu River changed, so did the natural 
environment. As a large amount of water is deviated to the dam’s canal, the Volta Grande 
do Xingu becomes drier, and the region suffers from desertification of soil. While large-
scale farmers own appropriate irrigation infrastructure, small-scale farmers suffer from 
drought, forest fires and water pollution. As a result, small-scale traditional farming un-
dergoes a reduction of produce compared to two decades before, which leads agriculture 
workers to abandon this ‘way of life’ and the rural areas experience an exodus. Moreover, 
as large chains of supermarkets bring food from elsewhere at a cheaper price; small-scale 
farmers have difficulties to sell their produce in the market at a competitive price.  
Moacir is the leader of the last recognised indigenous community in the region. He has 
travelled to the city to file yet another incident report at the police station. The complaint 
is once again about invasions on the indigenous reserve. Moacir has to be very careful 
when he visits the city, because drug lords are hunting for his head. He has recently called 
the authorities when members of the cartel used the indigenous reserve as a hiding place. 
The road from the indigenous community to the city is dark at night, and often used for 
illegal transport. Indigenous women wandering alone are target of violence, even within 
the indigenous territory. The road was constructed at first to facilitate transportation of 
indigenous men and women to the city. The waterways transportation became non-navi-
gable. The river is very dry and only small vessels are able to navigate. Moreover, the 
marine travel-lift provided by Norte Energia is often out of order. 
The interchanges between indigenous and the urban population are routine. While Belo 
Monte brought a range of positive services to the indigenous communities such as 
healthcare and education, it also brought negative influences, such as the introduction of 
sugar in their diets, alcohol and drugs. As part of the impact mitigation measures, Norte 
Energia built new houses for the indigenous communities, provided them with motor 
boats, cars, trucks and machinery for agricultural work. These machines are now 10 year 
old, many of them are broken or need repairing. As the indigenous communities cannot 
afford to buy spare parts, machines run in unsafe condition. Because of the influences of 
industrialised technology, the indigenous community has lost many of its traditional cus-
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toms and, on the surface, they seem no different from other rural communities. The in-
digenous men and women of Moacir’s community go to school, have jobs, pay taxes. The 
clothes they wear are exactly the same as clothes worn by the urban population, they 
speak Portuguese as a first language. 
As younger generations were uninterested in learning the indigenous languages, these 
languages died out. The younger generation’s disinterest in the indigenous traditions is 
understandable. The indigenous cultures are seen by the majority of the Brazilian popu-
lation as inferior. Indigenous children learn that their ancestors were illiterate and igno-
rant, and traditional customs are devalued. The communities’ traditions of agriculture and 
fishery are indeed unfeasible in the current conditions. The Xingu River is polluted and 
the few fish species that survive are contaminated and improper for human consumption.  
One of the reasons that the Xingu River is so polluted is that the sewage of Altamira 
continues to be spilled into the river. Although Altamira has a modern sewage system 
which was built by Norte Energia, most houses are not connected to the system. The 
system has been shut down for several years as it is economically inviable to keep it 
operational when houses are not connected to the system. Moreover, several houses have 
done irregular connections to the system causing technical problems and leakage. The 
other reason for the pollution of the river is the improper waste dump from the mining 
industry. Due to inadequate management, the mining industry has spilled mercury into 
the Xingu waters contaminating the fish and all life in the riverbank.  
The few indigenous and riverine peoples that remain in the Xingu suffer from lack of 
clean water and food, and endure severe health problems due to the contamination of the 
river. As the impacts have become larger, the communities’ resilience deteriorated. As a 
result, many communities have dissolved completely. The indigenous culture of the Volta 
Grande do Xingu today is history, and the indigenous goods are now artefacts on the 
indigenous museum downtown. 
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5.3 Lucidity Scenario 
A future where decision-making is evidence-based, and facts prevail over political 
power. The scientific community is more present on the decision-making process, 
by giving guidance and consultancy, and FPIC procedures are conducted de 
facto. 
It is 2020 and the fight against corruption has intensified in Brazil as it has never been 
before. Corruption investigations commenced little over a decade ago culminated in a 
political and economic crisis. The heads of a corrupt representative democracy were ex-
posed, convicted corrupt politicians could not run for office due to the Ficha Limpa66 law, 
and innovative tools to help voters find a suitable candidate to represent them were intro-
duced. The current administration is strongly engaged to sustainable development and 
democratic participation. As corruption is more difficult to occur, so is deviation of public 
expenditure. A large budget was allocated to transparency policies and training for public 
institutions personnel.  
The State invested on strengthening environmental organs, allowing these institutions 
to hire specialised professionals, and to improve their equipment and processes. Several 
projects and measures to develop the country towards a sustainable economy are now 
being promoted. One of these measures is to heavily fight corruption at all levels of soci-
ety. As part of the fight against corruption, all ongoing major infrastructure projects im-
plicated in the Lava Jato money laundering scheme -among them Belo Monte- were care-
fully revised. Belo Monte’s security suspension was cancelled, and the actions opened 
were re-opened and taken to court. Norte Energia was fined for the existing irregularities 
and new impact mitigation measures were established. 
The legislator agencies have updated the environmental licencing laws, and EIA re-
quirements were made into a law to meet the new agenda of sustainability. The new law 
was produced democratically, as it involved representatives of various interest groups in 
the writing process of the law itself. Initially the State promoted interdisciplinary projects 
at universities, where law scholars would cooperate with specialists of other disciplines 
such as economy, business, social sciences, history, biology, etc. to produce proposals for 
the new code of law. These proposals produced by the universities were then analysed 
and combined, and government officials produced a law proposal published in an online 
platform where the civil society had the opportunity to write opinions and suggestions. 
Public hearings were also conducted and traditional peoples were consulted. The process 
                                                 
66 Ficha Limpa, or ’clean state’ is the name given to the supplementary law 135/2010 that prevents candi-
dates convicted of crimes, or who have been impeached, to run for office 
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of renewing the legislation is a time-consuming process, especially when public partici-
pation in the law-making process is so heavily promoted. The process has received both 
heavy criticisms by the opposition, as well as praise from human rights organisations. 
The focus of the environmental licensing shifted to a balance between economic gain 
and the resilience of the environment and society affected by a given project. EIAs must 
present analysis of risk scenarios, and publish not only the results, but also the data and 
methodology used. The data collected is published, it is also verifiable, and results are 
therefore contestable by actors. The new licensing procedure conspire with the new gov-
ernment agenda, which is focused on evidence and transparency. The civil society has 
access to the data produced by proponents of projects, they are able to denounce evidence-
based irregularities (even anonymously, when needed), and these irregularities may be 
inspected and confirmed by government agencies.  
The current administration struggles to explain why in their administration Brazil has 
not significantly grown economically. Economist experts differ on opinions whether the 
current administration is responsible for the recent economic depression or not, and ex-
perts offer various solutions to the problems. The current administration reminds that they 
have been elected for a four year term, but that the administration has started several long-
term projects that are not necessarily economically profitable in their early stages. The 
Brazilian conservative parties argue that the private sector has weakened and international 
investment has suffered a depression due to an unstable economy. The administration’s 
counterargument is that sustainable development has a long-term approach, and that elec-
torates should take into consideration the long-term benefits that the current administra-
tion is providing not only for this trimester, but for a lifetime, and for future generations. 
The involvement of the scientific community on political decision making has become 
more common since the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. Since 
then, cooperation between states has advanced, as there is a common understanding that 
cooperation is intrinsic for the development of the human species. World leaders now 
understand that scientists can be important assets to this development. Since the confer-
ence, countries around the globe have been pushing one another to comply with the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change treaty. Stricter environmental 
laws are being enforced globally and countries cooperate to preserve various natural en-
vironments. The preservation of Amazonia, as well as other delicate natural environments 
around the world became crucial in international politics. The Mercosur67 countries now 
                                                 
67 Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosul, or Mercosur) is a sub-regional bloc combined of Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela that promotes free trade, political cooperation, fluid movement of goods, 
people and currency (Mercosur 2015) 
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have a strong cooperation with the European Union and the ASEAN68, and together they 
have created innovative methods of forest preservation and management.  
Brazil has turned its focus to the North of the country. The development of the region 
has created many jobs, and there is a heavy investment in infrastructure. The creation of 
jobs affects the local economy positively, and taxable income is reverted as resource to 
cities, which become better equipped to invest in different areas.  
Thanks to international cooperation in science, technology, and education, Amazonia 
is a pole of innovative sustainable infrastructure technology. Universities cooperate with 
traditional peoples, who have a unique knowledge and perception of the forest and forest 
goods. Traditional peoples in Amazonia have managed the environment sustainably for 
centuries, and the use of their ecological knowledge is crucial to being able to comply 
with the UN treaty. The global society is slowly understanding the importance of indige-
nous knowledge. By consulting traditional peoples around the globe, societies are becom-
ing more resilient to disasters, and infrastructure technologies are more sustainable.  
There is a growing interest in the indigenous populations. Indigenous communities 
from different parts of Latin America have been organising exchanges between each 
other, so they can learn the customs of their relatives. Communities that historically have 
competed for land areas and resources, now cooperate and exchange traditional 
knowledge. There is a growing interest for learning dying indigenous languages. The 
University of São Paulo –USP has had a centre of indigenous studies since 1990. (USP 
2015) This centre of studies has grown and expanded to several other universities in Bra-
zil. The centre has publications in the areas of history, anthropology and language studies. 
They have recently started research projects also in the areas of law, engineering, biology, 
biochemistry, medicine, and futures studies. 
In 2020, USP has a strong cooperation with UFPA – the University of Pará. UFPA is 
the Brazilian university with most indigenous professors and students, and they act in 
various areas and faculties. Indigenous professors are scarce, and are often away from 
their home universities for participating in conferences or going back to their communi-
ties of origin for retreats.  
Moacir69, from Volta Grande do Xingu, is a law professor at UFPA. He got interested 
in law as a young adult when Belo Monte started to be implemented in the Xingu River. 
Moacir was driven to attend law school to gain knowledge of the Brazilian laws, so he 
                                                 
68 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organisation combined of Brunei, Cam-
bodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam. 
The bloc’s purpose is to promote cooperation among governments, as well as economic integration. The 
bloc aims at regional acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development (ASEAN 
2012) 
69 Fictional character 
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could have the means to fight for the rights of his community. Moacir’s passion for in-
digenous rights, combined with his background and life experiences, provided the uni-
versity with research publications from a unique perspective. The lectures that Moacir 
gives are a combination of environmental and human rights. His research team provides 
consulting services for the Ministry of Justice, for the Ministry of Environment, and for 
Ibama. 
Belo Monte’s revised PBA has recently been published. Services for the affected pop-
ulation expand in quality and quantity. The city of Altamira is constantly developing and 
urbanisation projects are ongoing. The resettled population are provided with opportuni-
ties to renovate their houses, new neighbourhoods are being built, and they receive bus 
lines, improved healthcare centres, schools, leisure areas, etc.  
The new impact mitigation measures require Norte Energia to cooperate with the local 
administrations of the affected cities de facto. This public-private collaboration is com-
plex and time-consuming due to its high levels of conflicts of interest. Professional me-
diators facilitate negotiations to promote productivity and to prevent delayed timetables. 
The scientific community is also included in the process acting as expert consultants and 
proposing resolutions for the various problems that emerge. Public participation is en-
dorsed. 
As Belo Monte’s constructions have concluded, a large amount of its workers have 
been reassigned to other regions. This reassignment of work has caused a slight outflow 
migration of the population, which in effect caused an alleviation of the pressures im-
posed by Belo Monte during its construction phase. As urbanisation projects continue, 
roads, schools, and other basic infrastructure are constantly being renovated, hospitals 
and healthcare centres are improving their conditions, and the unemployed have oppor-
tunities to pursue adult education and vocational training according to their needs and 
interests. 
Volta Grande do Xingu promotes the growth of small business and sustainable small-
scale farming. Citizens value goods that are produced locally, and prefer consuming them 
over imported goods. Along with the valorisation of local production, there is a growing 
trend of valorisation of workers too. Vocational training on various fields is offered to the 
local population, allowing formalisation of work and a significant improvement on the 
quality of services provided Formal, regulated work has grown in the region. In general 
terms, work conditions have improved from the point of view of safety, working hours, 
remuneration, etc. Nevertheless, informal work is still present in the society, mainly in 
the form of freelance work to complement families’ income. 
Ecotourism is rapidly growing in the region. National and international tourists travel 
to Altamira to get to know the infamous Belo Monte Dam, the Xingu River, its rapids, its 
beautiful islands and beaches. As tourism generates income to the region, there are more 
reasons to guarantee the preservation of the river and its ecosystem. 
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The traditional populations of Volta Grande do Xingu have suffered from drastic 
changes to their local environments. While some received aid to develop their family 
farms, others had to find creative solutions to adapt to the new environment. Riverine 
communities that had an income exclusively dependent on fishing for example, had to 
adapt their forms of living. Many of these families are now involved with ecotourism: 
they present to tourists their cultural heritage, traditions, promote water and energy 
preservation. When ecotourists visit the Volta Grande do Xingu, they have the oppor-
tunity to stay overnight in riverine people’s homes, they eat fresh produce from their fam-
ily farms, and they see the Belo Monte Dam from the impacted population’ perspectives. 
Promoting this kind of tourism is an effective way to promote sustainable development 
and raise awareness of the socio-ecological impacts of mega dams and large infrastructure 
projects like Belo Monte.  
Altamira does not receive only visitors interested in ecotourism. Visitors also travel to 
the region to enjoy the sweet-water beaches of the Xingu bay, religious festivities, and 
the region’s eccentric nightlife. Moreover, the City of Altamira and Norte Energia also 
promote guided tours to the dam sites, where tourists may appreciate the impressive en-
gineering. Naturally, guided tours to Belo Monte are better organized and have a better 
infrastructure than the rustic ecotourism organized by the local population. The dichot-
omy of the local tourism reflects the Belo Monte’s controversy. 
5.4 Black Swan Scenario 
An unlikely future where Belo Monte is stopped. 
In the past decade, cases of money laundering by high-level politicians. Between 2016 
and 2017 two consecutive impeachments, of the same administration culminated in a po-
litical and economic crisis an instability in Brazil. It is now 2020 and the current admin-
istration’s main goals are to fight corruption at all levels, working towards a more trans-
parent and just society. Major infrastructure projects implicated in the money laundering 
scheme have been revised, and some had their security suspension annulled. The issues 
about Belo Monte gained momentum when a documentary exposing its absurdities won 
an international prize, and the Brazilian Government received pressure from various in-
ternational organisations to annul Belo Monte’s security suspension and proceed with the 
cases that were filed against the mega dam. Belo Monte’s cases were taken to court, and 
due to the numerous irregularities (and public pressure), the judicial system decided to 
terminate Belo Monte’s operation licence and to begin a project to revitalise the Xingu 
River and its biodiversity. Dam removal is also being discussed, and now proponents of 
this idea are conducting studies on alternative solutions how the Belo Monte Dam should 
be removed.  
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The urban population of Altamira and surrounding cities are, in general, discontent 
with the termination of work in Belo Monte. A large proportion of the population was 
employed either directly (by Norte Energia) or indirectly (by contracting companies). All 
of these jobs are now history. As a result, the region experiences an exodus. Specialised 
workers who had moved to Altamira due to the Belo Monte constructions move in search 
for better opportunities elsewhere. Construction workers migrate to other parts of the 
country. Nonetheless, some of Belo Monte’s workforce have stayed in Altamira, as the 
city has become home to their families. 
When the operation licence of Belo Monte was terminated, Norte Energia declared 
bankruptcy and all the ongoing programmes being conducted by the company were inter-
rupted abruptly. Many of these programmes were being carried out by contracted compa-
nies specialised in different areas: construction work, healthcare services, mental health 
services, vocational training, environment preservation, wild species preservation and re-
search, etc. The lack of funding from Norte Energia, culminated into the paralysation of 
these activities. 
The interruption of Belo Monte’s operation caused a significant change to Altamira 
and the surrounding municipalities. The region suffers from high unemployment, and a 
large portion of the population depend on social benefits. As the number of taxpayers 
diminishes, the budget of the city is suppressed. Municipalities plead to the Brazilian 
higher court to review their decision to terminate Belo Monte’s operation licence. The 
situation is complex and uncertain.  
The local population is increasingly under stress due to this uncertainty. The workers 
who lived in the construction sites of Belo Monte and did not migrate elsewhere, have 
now moved to city centres. The processes of formalisation of land tenure continue to be 
a problem in the region, and the region faces a new wave of unplanned urbanisation. 
Palafitte houses are once again emerging by the river banks.  
Indigenous communities also suffer from the abrupt interruption of services from 
Norte Energia. Despite the inconveniences that the company have caused, indigenous 
communities received goods and services that became part of their routine, and the abrupt 
termination of these services cause stress and uncertainty also to the indigenous commu-
nities.  
NGOs, organized social movements, and independent institutions that have been pre-
sent in the region since the beginning of the Belo Monte constructions, report invasions 
in indigenous lands. Illegal logging and mining is growing in the region, and reports de-
nounce that the local government is increasingly indulgent. There is a deliberate omission 
of inspections for illegal deforestation and mining in the region. These activities grow, 
and so does informal work.  
It is 2020, and Belo Monte’s political momentum is over. Once the operation licence 
was terminated, the issue lost public interest, and once again, the region suffers from 
abandonment. Although the local government is lenient to the growing illegal mining, 
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logging, and emerging informal jobs, they also try to find solutions to unemployment and 
their new situation of a much lower budget. The local government suffers from lack of 
resources and trained personnel; they have to deal with an abrupt end of funding in many 
outsourced social projects previously ran by Norte Energia. Many of these services are 
necessary for the population, and the local government has to stretch their budget in order 
to provide the continuation to at least some of these projects. 
However, all is not lost for the population of Volta Grande do Xingu. Another hearing 
regarding Belo Monte’s future is due a few months from now. It is being decided if the 
dam will be removed from the Xingu River or not. If the decision is negative, there is still 
a chance that the Operation Licence will be reinstated. Will the Brazilian government 
cover the costs in the name of economic growth? Is there any private company interested 
in investing, considering the risks?  
If the court makes a decision against the dam, and for the river restoration, the region 
may once again be focus of public interest and media, as it would be the first time in 
history of Brazil that such a large construction would be dismantled. Dam removal EIA 
is being produced, and this EIA base some of its predictions on lessons learned from dam 
removals in USA, for example the Glines Canyon Dam dismantled on the Elwha River 
in Washington, and the Glen Canyon Dam in the Colorado River, in Arizona. The river 
restoration project consists of a multi-staged scheme to dismantle the dam in a way that 
turbines and other expensive components of the structure are removed so that they can be 
sold and reused in other locations. Aquatic species which are now living in controlled, 
constrained environments will gradually be reintroduced to the wild, and the local riverine 
population will receive training to safeguard the survival of these species. The process is 
to take several years and impact mitigation measures for the affected population are under 
ongoing discussion. 
As part of the EIA requirements, proponents of the river restoration project also have 
to present a budget and a list of responsible funders for these expenses. Proponents of the 
project search for investors, but the budget needed for the activities proposed is massive. 
Representatives of the traditional communities of the region have been part of the pro-
duction of the dam removal EIA. FPIC has been done in the form of a citizens-initiative 
where registered voters sign petitions in favour or against different issues. Informative 
public hearings are organized, and petitions are circulated in these meetings. 
Although public hearings have the support of NGOs, scholars, and the federal prose-
cutor, the military police is often present to reassure order. Indigenous men and women 





5.5 Scenario Probability Assessment 
When looking at the four scenarios, it is possible to argue that the first two are more 
probable than the other two. This argument comes from the fact that no fundamental 
changes are considered in the first two scenarios, while the other two require major 
changes in the political decision making processes, especially when regarding social and 
environmental policies.  
The first scenario, the “Continuation Amplification Scenario” has positive and nega-
tive issues to consider. While the local population still struggles from inadequate social 
services, overall, the city has improved with new infrastructure such as roads, harbour, 
schools, new hospitals and healthcare centres. Although the environment has suffered 
drastic changes, the region is not abandoned, and environmental projects to mitigate the 
impacts remain ongoing. I personally believe this is the most probable future, but I must 
admit that I am certain that some aspects of the other three scenarios ought to be incorpo-
rated to the first in the future that will truly come to be. This remains to be seen. Also, of 
course, issues that have not been taken into consideration in this research, the “known 
unknowns” might play an important role. 
The second scenario describes a future where additional dams are built upstream the 
Xingu River. This is a popular future depicted by scholars who argue that additional dams 
will regulate the water flow and increase the average energy production of the power 
plant. (see my arguments in chapter 3.2). Sousa Júnior. et.al. (2006:76) go so far as to say 
that the low capacity of Belo Monte on the current format represents a “planned crisis”, 
and the temptation to build additional dams are inevitable. The second scenario depicts a 
social and environmental disaster, but as bad as it may seem, this scenario is not all that 
improbable. The current circumstances in Brazil are susceptible to this future, as the coun-
try faces a political and economic crisis. These issues are very fresh in Brazilian politics 
and important events happened during the course of this research, after the field work and 
after most of the data was collected. The current economic and political crisis relates to 
the Lava Jato money laundering investigations as well as the questionable impeachment 
of president Dilma Rousseff. During the past year, the interim government ruled by 
Michel Temer have passed harsh new social policies that have direct effect on the rights 
of traditional populations. As I write this paragraph, Temer faces the electoral court facing 
charges of abuse of power. These are pressing issues that are not been dealt in detail in 
this master’s thesis. Perhaps in the future I could do further research on the topic and deal 
with these issues more deeply. Legal manoeuvres are under ongoing discussion in the 
senate. I emphasize that the law amendments PEC 65/2012, the PLS 654/2015 and the 
PL 3.729/2004, discussed in chapter 3.4.3 have unprecedented consequences, and if 
passed, will leave the entire country vulnerable to ecological catastrophes. Furthermore, 
even though environmental licencing is project-specific, environmental damage usually 
affects a much larger region than the project itself. In the worst of cases, environmental 
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disasters have no geopolitical borders, and negative impacts may cover surprisingly large 
areas. Moreover, it is possible that Belo Sun will eventually gain their operation licence. 
I argue that unless adequate impact mitigation measures are conducted more responsibly, 
the combined impacts of Belo Monte and Belo Sun will be catastrophic to the local envi-
ronment.  
The third scenario was created based on my interpretation of the preferred futures of 
the interviewees. It was a challenge to combine preferred futures of different actors and 
interest groups. The solution was to think of the impacts that Belo Monte has already 
caused, and how to move from there. Although this particular scenario may seem like 
very improbable and even utopian, the scenario is based on the idea of cooperation and 
understanding. In a figurative way, most of the seeds for this future have already been 
sowed. Brazil has already signed several international treaties that, if followed with good 
will, could culminate in a more lucid future as I suggest. There is a lot of research being 
conducted on impacts of hydroelectric power plants around the globe, and never before 
have we had so much information available on Amazonia and its ecosystems. The scien-
tific community has produced valuable information that could be used in decision making 
processes. What we lack now, is political will for a de facto cooperation. I strongly believe 
that if decision-making would be more evidence-based, taking suggestions made by the 
scientific community more seriously, and if governments would be more transparent and 
participatory, the future could really move towards this third scenario. 
The last scenario takes into the consideration the unlikely event that Belo Monte’s 
operation licence is terminated. Although the premises for this decision seem unrealistic, 
taking into consideration the current state of instability in Brazilian politics, it is not im-
possible that decisions that today seem final are reconsidered. This scenario was tailor-
made to some of my interviewees, who asked me what I thought could happen if Belo 
Monte would actually stop. This question, from interviewee to interviewer was asked 
often enough that the Black Swan scenario had to be considered. The issue on dam re-
moval and river restoration was a topic of discussion of the participants of the expedition 
through the Xingu River I have participated as part of my field work, and while I was 
there, I could contribute to the discussion with information I had collected about the dam 
removals in USA, more specifically the cases of the Glines Canyon Dam the Glen Canyon 
Dam, also mentioned in the fourth scenario. The idea of dam removal in this case is very 
improbable, at least in a near future like 2020, but nevertheless not impossible. Although 
the dam removal seems unrealistic, the idea of the local government becoming increas-
ingly indulgent as public interest moves their eyes to other issues, as described in that 
scenario, is not that farfetched. Even if there is a deliberate omission of inspections from 
local governments, the civil society may publish findings that expose these omissions. If 
the region suffers from omissions from the administration as well as lack of public inter-





The scenarios presented above are the result of an extensive qualitative analysis on the 
Belo Monte controversy. These alternative futures suggest that the environmental licenc-
ing process, as well as the development of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 
are key drivers of change. EIAs are prepared in the initial phase of the decision-making 
process of infrastructure projects. At that point, decision makers are still able to reject the 
commencement of unviable projects. 
As presented, the current licencing procedure is at risk due to bills and law amend-
ments currently under discussion in the Senate. These aim at speeding the licensing pro-
cedure, consequently diminishing the importance of EIAs and ripping the current envi-
ronmental laws. The perfect storm scenario shows how these rapid licenses enhance the 
danger of environmental disasters. How can we move forward to evident-based decision 
making, as suggested in the lucidity scenario? Is this the common preferred future of our 
society? 
My suggestion is that instead of weakening EIAs, we should instead strengthen them, 
and develop a model how to prepare EIAs in a way that could give decision-makers tools 
for making informed decisions that are empirically based. I restate that EIAs should not 
be prepared only by proponents of a given project. They should involve an interdiscipli-
nary committee composed of different interest groups that affect and are affected by the 
project. This committee should include members of the scientific community as well as 
the civil society. EIAs should be rigorous in methodology, and the inclusion of futures 
thinking can only develop EIAs positively. I believe that enhancing futures literacy in 
decision making is already overdue. This “model” to prepare EIAs, as I suggest, could 
include futures research methods in a way to present possible, probable, and desirable 
futures.  
Other scholars have also proposed alternatives to improve decision-making for hydro-
electric power plant projects. Ansar et al. (2014: 43-56), for example, propose a quanti-
tative method called outside view, or reference class forecasting (RCF). This methodol-
ogy has been used in the areas of psychology, economics and development of infrastruc-
ture projects to improve decision-making under uncertainty (Ansar et al. 2014: 44). The 
developer of RCF is Daniel Kahneman, he won a Nobel Prize in Economics linked to this 
methodology. RCF is based on the idea that we can look at similar past projects and make 
statistical analysis comparing initial forecasts and actual outcomes in order to compare 
them. The reference class may include cost and cost overrun, schedules and schedule 
overrun (as Ansar et al. included in their analysis). Other variables can also be included, 
such as deforestation, geological risk, GHG emissions, number of people to be resettled, 
etc. Ansar et al. (2014:55) suggest that by using RCF, risk profiles could be more trans-
parent, and various energy alternatives could be compared, making decision-making less 
biased. However, in order to have a reliable reference class, it is necessary to create a 
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comprehensive global dataset that would include data of similar, previously completed 
cases. Moreover, the sample size have to be large to be statistically significant, but narrow 
enough to be comparable. Thus far, such dataset do not yet exist. 
Assuming we could have a well-developed and broad dataset that includes data from 
hydropower projects, as well as solar energy, wind, wave, nuclear, etc, from projects 
world-wide, we could be able to compare different energy sources more effectively. This 
technique would allow us to weigh risks, costs, environmental impacts, and other issues. 
In this case, the statistical analysis done in RCF could be an important risk management 
technique. Reference class forecasting exposes evidence of systematic inaccuracies be-
tween actual outcomes versus planned forecasts. Using RCF in early decision-making can 
be a powerful tool to opt for more viable projects.  
However, even if the dataset is rich in data and variables, statistical analysis can only 
account for quantifiable and comparable data, excluding the so-called “externalities”, as 
discussed earlier in my research (see chapter 3.8.2). The externalities previously men-
tioned (as described by Sousa Júnior and Reid 2010:250-258) are the value of non-com-
mercial fauna and flora, the value of recreation, loss of commercial and aquatic species, 
archaeological and cultural sites associated with the traditional communities, etc. In order 
to bring these “externalities” into the table of decision-makers, we need to achieve a 
higher socio-ecological consciousness. 
Futures thinking is deeply connected with socio-ecological consciousness. Heinonen 
et al. (2005), for example, deal with finding new sustainable solutions for Finland's well-
being in the future. Although that research does not deal with hydropower in particular, 
it does discuss alternative energy futures. Heinonen et al. (2005:24) propose a scenario 
called “New Consciousness” where the concepts of “growth” and “progress” have been 
redefined, where society is more altruistic and sustainable, and energy production is de-
centralized. This “New Consciousness” scenario was later analysed by Breyer et al., 
whose study concluded that taking into account the limited resources on Planet Earth, it 
is urgent that we “overcome current political barriers to reach a long-term sustainable 
energy system for rebalancing the energetic requirements of future humankind.” (Breyer 
et al. 2017: 7-15). Although the new consciousness scenario proposed by Heinonen et al. 
(2005:24) is far-fetched and utopian, it somehow dialogues with the lucidity scenario pre-
sented in this research. Both scenarios deal with revolutionary futures based on an envi-
ronmentally conscious society who base their decisions on evidence. The new conscious-
ness scenario does not mention fight on corruption as I so strongly emphasize, but it does 
mention a more altruistic society where people have “loosened their individual egos”. 
These two can easily be linked to one another.  
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7. SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
When this thesis was first thought of, it was planned to include futures workshops with 
various members of the urban and rural communities in Altamira. I was interested in 
learning how the local population saw Belo Monte, and what kind of images they had for 
their own futures. My plan was to collaborate with NGOs to help individuals to take ac-
tion for their own futures. As much as running these futures workshop would have been 
interesting, gaining access to the local population beforehand to organize the meetings 
was a challenge, both due to the lack of permits to conduct research as explained earlier, 
and because of the lack of contacts in the research area prior to the field work. 
As the literature review gained substance and expanded further, I got to understand the 
macro processes on national level, and so my focus of interest shifted from personal fu-
tures images to environmental licencing procedures and social policies. When I refined 
the topic of research, I understood that as for the traditional populations living in the Volta 
Grande, individuals have very little power over their own futures: in this context, the 
government and the private sector strained the population to accept alternatives that are 
not much different from one another.  
The Belo Monte Dam is a case of systematic bending of (if not breaking) the rules. In 
the beginning of the research process I thought the chapter about political processes lead-
ing to the operation licence would have been a minor section that would present basic 
issues concerning bureaucracy. At the end of the research process, I now realise that the 
political aspect chapter should have been the largest, and most thought of, as it has so 
significant influence on all the other aspects. I had no idea how much a broken environ-
mental licencing procedure could influence the society, the economy, the environment. 
Everything in the Belo Monte controversy has a link to the licences. After learning all 
this, I believe that had the licencing process, including the development of the EIA and 
the PBA, been done more robustly, a very different story would have been told in the 
previous chapters.  
As it was discussed, the licencing procedure itself is being challenged by current deci-
sion-makers. It was intriguing to read legal documents and to notice that conditions that 
are set in one file can be changed substantially after a few months. Official decisions are 
never final, and the actions taken do not always coincide with these decisions.  
I was especially surprised to learn that the environmental impact assessement, as well 
as the reports on impact mitigation measures are done by the same parties that are in-
stalling and operating the construction works, and therefore the ones who are creating 
these impacts. Surprisingly, this is a practice not only in Brazil, but also in other countries. 
It is arguable that the validity of these studies and reports are jeopardized due to conflicts 




I was disappointed to recognise how small the influence of the scientific community 
is towards high-level-decision making in the Brazilian political process. So many scholars 
have presented evidence-based material against the dam. Specialists of various fields 
gathered to write the Experts Panel Report. The report (Magalhães and Hernandez, 2009) 
was sent to the authorities, but resulted in no impact on the decision making. Thirst for 
power and economic growth seems to lead decision makers to overlook the evidence pre-
sented to them.  
While in fieldwork, during the canoe expedition on the Xingu River organized by In-
stituto Socioambiental, when we passed by the Belo Monte Dam construction site, some 
of the members of the expedition laid a banner on the shore that said “Development, yes. 
But not in any which way”.70 The phrase in that banner summarizes very well the overall 
feeling I got in the field. In general, people that I talked to who were opponents of the 
dam, are not really opponents of the dam itself, but of the way things were being con-
ducted. These people were distressed due to the inadequate impact mitigation measures. 
It is not enough to simply build hospitals, schools and houses, if the quality standard of 
these buildings are poor and not long lasting. Organized social movements like MAB 
exposed the poor conditions of the houses built in the resettlement area, which a few 
months after their inauguration already presented mould and water damage. Indigenous 
people marched against the dam, they made very clear that they did not give consent to 
the construction. As it has been presented within the cultural aspect, the indigenous peo-
ple were bribed and silenced. The Emergency Plan, monthly allowances that provided 
indigenous peoples with material goods that, according to federal prosecutor Thais Santi, 
lead to an indigenous ethnocide. When discussing impact mitigation measures, it is im-
portant to remember that not everything is the responsibility of the private enterprise. The 
local and national governments also have responsibility towards their citizens, and as it 
has been shown, residents of Altamira have historically been neglected of their rights for 
social services and basic infrastructure. This is partially due to corruption of various lev-
els.  
In several instances, I have made comments on evidence of diversion of resources. 
From ghost lunch vouchers to high-level money laundering, these are serious allegations 
that must be investigated by the authorities.  
Furthermore, I was provoked by the fact that most texts on the Belo Monte Dam were 
so opinionated. As this is a highly controversial topic, it is hard to write about it without 
taking a stance. As I went through the material, I learned to triple check my sources. When 
dealing with newspaper articles that would report a new decision taken by Funai, for ex-
ample, before writing about it, I would also check Funai’s website, the original source, 
and look for the original document that the newspaper article would be mentioning. De-
pending on the complexity of the issue, I would also investigate further searching for 
                                                 
70 “Desenvolvimento sim, de qualquer jeito não.” 
118 
 
academic articles written on similar issues, I would go through Instituto Socioambiental 
article database, read about the same topic on the Norte Energia’s website, search for 
news media articles in different sources, in all the languages I can read, and sometimes I 
would go further to having a Skype meeting with some of my informants to understand 
the issue further. While often considered unreliable sources for academic work, bloggers 
and independent media are very critical towards the situation in the Xingu region. In order 
to test the reliability of these media sources, every time a blogger would quote a scholar, 
an NGO, a document, I would try to find the original text where this phrase came from. 
This was a challenging task, as most blog posts quote only the person, without giving 
clear references as done in academic citation and documentation. When searching for the 
blogger’s original source, I found that on occasion the information was misinterpreted. 
However, most of the time finding the original source enabled me to deepen my 
knowledge about the subject. This investigative work of reading and listening to different 
sides of the same story in order to understand the complexity of issues at hand was time-
consuming. Nevertheless, the most time-consuming process was to digest all this infor-
mation and to put it into academic writing. 
As the Belo Monte controversy unfolded, it was difficult to limit which issues to dis-
cuss, and which to omit for the sake of submitting a final version of the thesis. My original 
goals of providing a holistic understanding of the Belo Monte controversy within the page 
limits of a master’s thesis proved to be unrealistic. Keeping the PESTEC dimensions used 







This master’s thesis addressed the Belo Monte Dam as a controversial construction which 
although was chosen to be built as a way to promote sustainability, provoked enormous 
socio-environmental impacts to the region. This paper analysed the Belo Monte contro-
versy in various aspects: political, economic, social, ecological, and cultural. Also legal 
implications have been discussed within the political aspect. It was found that even 
though Belo Monte is now operational, many (but not all) of the impact mitigation 
measures proposed during the licencing procedure have not been completed yet, and sev-
eral were completed, but inadequately. It has become evident that the problems faced in 
Belo Monte are not unique to this project, but more of a norm within hydropower projects: 
other hydropower projects were also negligent towards the ecosystems and societies af-
fected by the implementation of power plants, other regions have also suffered from sig-
nificant negative impacts, the budged and the schedule of several other dams were also 
underestimated, or miscalculated. 
This paper aimed at answering the following research questions:  
 What will become of the Belo Monte region after the construction of the dam com-
plex?  
o How did Belo Monte come to be? What are the justifications for building 
the dam, and why are these justifications being questioned? 
o What are the most important issues that proponents and opponents of the 
dam argue about? 
o What are the most significant impacts (positive or negative) that Belo 
Monte has already brought to the region? 
The second question, “how did Belo Monte come to be” and its justifications, are an-
swered mainly in chapters 3.1, in 3.4. and in 3.6. The rationale behind the decision to 
build Belo Monte is presented, as well as a problematic licensing procedure. The legiti-
macy of Belo Monte’s licences is questioned: this paper presents legal manoeuvres asso-
ciated to issuing the licences, lack of informed consent from the local populations, and a 
complex environmental impact assessment, allegedly inaccurate in some instances, incor-
rect in others, and possibly also fraudulent. 
The last two research questions, related to the most important issues that proponents 
and opponents of the dam argue about, and most significant impacts that Belo Monte has 
already brought to the region are answered throughout chapter 3. 
Opponents of the dam criticize Belo Monte for being destructive towards the environ-
ment. As discussed, impacts of the construction work are permanent in most cases. Long-
term impacts include illegal logging, disappearance of animal species, greenhouse gas 
emissions, resettlement of populations, an indigenous ethnocide, etc. The swelling of the 
urban population, the crowded hospitals and rise on criminality may be considered tem-
porary impacts for the society, although these influenced the lives of some individuals 
120 
 
permanently. Due to the sensitivity of the region, both in social and ecological terms, the 
region suffers from a low resilience. Endangered species, as well as human populations 
living traditional cultures, are especially sensitive to the changes caused by the dam. I 
emphasize that environmental impacts go beyond geopolitical borders, and it is possible 
that the area of influence of Belo Monte may be much larger than expected beforehand. 
Proponents of the dam argue that Belo Monte is to cause minimal harm, that the impact 
over the vegetation is not significant, and that Norte Energia, the company building the 
dam, not only protects, but also develops the environment further. Norte Energia has in-
vested in reforestation programmes, they monitor forest areas, and have established sev-
eral programmes to study and to preserve animal and plant species, all of which are de-
scribed in Belo Monte’s basic environmental project (PBA). The same document also 
includes positive developments for the city of Altamira and region. The formalisation of 
land tenure, which historically have been problematic in the region, is now an undergoing 
process. The city has also gained in infrastructure such as new hospitals, schools, roads, 
bridges, ports, sewage system, landfill, etc. As it was discussed, all this investment in the 
city’s infrastructure probably would not have happened if Belo Monte would not have 
been built, at least not in the pace it is going now. 
Although the impact mitigation measures are numerous, this paper shows that they are 
not only insufficient but also inadequate. I suggest that the environmental programmes 
ran are a means of greenwashing, giving Norte Energia a positive public image to prac-
tices that are environmentally unsound. I argue that the current Brazilian administration 
deliberately disregards environmental issues. However, is this because the administration 
is oblivious to them, or is there a delusion that things are done adequately? Or is there a 
deliberate deception due to misplaced political incentives? The close links between Belo 
Monte and the Lava Jato corruption scandal currently being revealed by the Brazilian 
Federal Police, suggest the latter. 
The main research question made in the introduction chapter of this paper “What will 
become of the Belo Monte region after the construction of the dam complex?” was an-
swered in chapter 5, where four scenarios of alternative futures were distinguished. Alt-
hough this main research question is formulated in singular form, as it was explained 
already in the introduction and further clarified in chapter 2.1, there is no single future 
ahead of us. “The future” is plural and uncertain, and recognizing that, the scenarios pre-
sented in the previous chapter are an attempt to envision some of the many possibilities 
for futures of the region. The scenarios suggest that the environmental licensing proce-
dure is a key driver of change, and its first precondition, the EIA, should be more futures 
oriented, in a way to improve the decision-making process. As EIAs are presented in the 
initial phase of the licensing procedure, at this point decision makers are still able to reject 
the commencement of unviable projects. 
Despite the growing international efforts to strengthen environmental laws in order to 
move forward with sustainable development, it seems that in Brazil, this effort is being 
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driven on the reverse gear. Law amendments are being proposed to simplify the environ-
mental licencing, which may prove to be risky for the environment and the society. This 
master’s thesis suggest that instead of simplifying the licencing procedure, it should be 
an even more rigorous process than it is today. Environmental licencing should be 
strengthened by improving social participation, reinforcing the conditions and resources 
of the environmental institutions, and improving the quality of the EIA. 
EIAs have been here introduced as documents that provide information on the changes 
that may occur on the environment and on the society affected by specific projects. It has 
been discussed that for all intents and purposes, EIAs are an exercise in futuring. But do 
authors of these EIAs have appropriate understanding of Futures Studies methodologies, 
or have suitable directives to produce such material? Can the environmental impact as-
sessments be a true evaluation of possible futures conditions, when it does not consider 
alternative futures? I propose that a model for preparing EIAs should be further devel-
oped, that EIAs should be more inclusive, should be prepared by an interdisciplinary 
committee composed of different interest groups. I argue that EIAs should be prepared in 
a way that could give decision-makers tools making informed decisions that are evidence 
based. I restate that EIAs should be rigorous in methodology, and the inclusion of futures 
thinking can only develop EIAs positively. I strongly recommend that EIA directives 
should include Futures Studies methodologies in order to access alternative futures, and 
that EIAs should present scenarios that illustrate key decisions, events, and consequences. 
These scenarios ought to benefit the decision-making process, and moreover, as the future 
unfolds, decision makers know what to do next. 
Futures Studies methodologies should be included in the decision making process, not 
only in environmental licencing, but in other decision making processes too. I believe it 
is important to raise awareness of the methodologies available and to promote futures 
thinking to achieve sustainability.  
As a futurist, I intend to contribute to raising awareness of the importance of futuring 
in decision making by publishing this study not only at the University of Turku, but also 
through other channels of communication. I intend to distribute electronic and printed 
copies of this thesis to my interviewees as a form of feedback and as a symbol of gratitude 
for their valuable time. I also intend to send copies of this research to several of Belo 
Monte’s stakeholders, from the Ministry of Mines and Energy and Norte Energia’s head-
quarters to NGOs, indigenous leaders and riverine peoples. It is also possible that a shorter 
version of this paper will be sent to Futures Studies academic journals, and applications 
for conference presentations have already been sent. Moreover, I have received proposals 
to publish this material in Brazil as well, given that the material would be translated into 
Portuguese. I hope that by pursuing these projects and by promoting futures thinking, I 
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2. UNDRIP Articles Referring To FPIC Procedures 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) articles 10, 
19, 29, and 32 (UN General Assembly 2007). These articles refer to the ‘Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent’ (FPIC) procedures.  
Article 10 
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relo-
cation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous 
peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, 
with the option of return. 
Article 19 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and in-
formed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect them. 
Article 29 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the environment 
and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. States shall estab-
lish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such conservation 
and protection, without discrimination.  
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous 
materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their 
free, prior and informed consent.  
3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that programmes for 
monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as developed and 
implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented. 
Article 32 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for 
the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.  
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilisation or exploitation of 
mineral, water or other resources.  
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activi-
ties, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, eco-
nomic, social, cultural or spiritual impact. 
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3. ILO C169 Articles Referring To FPIC Procedures 
Article 6 
1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall: 
(a) Consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular 
through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legis-
lative or administrative measures which may affect them directly; (b) Establish means by 
which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of 
the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative 
and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them; (c) Es-
tablish means for the full development of these peoples' own institutions and initiatives, 
and in appropriate cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose. 
2. The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in 
good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving 
agreement or consent to the proposed measures. 
Article 16 
1. Subject to the following paragraphs of this Article, the peoples concerned shall not be 
removed from the lands which they occupy. 
2. Where the relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional meas-
ure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent. Where 
their consent cannot be obtained, such relocation shall take place only following appro-
priate procedures established by national laws and regulations, including public inquiries 
where appropriate, which provide the opportunity for effective representation of the peo-
ples concerned. 
3. Whenever possible, these peoples shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, 
as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. 
4. When such return is not possible, as determined by agreement or, in the absence of 
such agreement, through appropriate procedures, these peoples shall be provided in all 
possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands 
previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future devel-
opment. Where the peoples concerned express a preference for compensation in money 
or in kind, they shall be so compensated under appropriate guarantees. 




4. Informed Consent Form Used In Field Work 
Termo de consentimento livre e esclarecido 
Declaro, por meio desse termo, que concordei em ser entrevistado(a) e/ou participar 
na pesquisa de campo referente a pesquisa intitulada “Possible Futures for the Peoples of 
the Xingu” desenvolvida por Marianna Birmoser Ferreira-Aulu, orientada por Jarmo 
Vehmas e Matti Salo, da Universidade de Turku, Finlândia, com assistência de Sergio 
Andrade. Poderei contatar a pesquisadora a qualquer momento que julgar necessário 
através do e-mail mbfeau@utu.fi . 
Afirmo que aceitei participar da pesquisa por minha própria vontade, sem receber 
qualquer incentivo financeiro, com a finalidade exclusiva de colaborar para o sucesso da 
pesquisa.  
Fui informado(a) que os objetivos desse estudo são estritamente acadêmicos e que, em 
linhas gerais, trata-se dos impactos socioambientais de Belo Monte sobre a população de 
Altamira e região. 
Nível de exposição por entrevista semi-estruturada: 
 A minha participação será anônima (sem nome ou instituição) 
 A minha participação será semi-anônima (instituição pode ser publicada, mas 
não o meu nome) 
 Meu nome e instituição podem ser publicados. 
 
Apenas a pesquisadora, seus orientadores, e o assistente de pesquisa terão acesso aos 
dados e correspondente análise. 
Fui informado(a) que posso me retirar dessa pesquisa a qualquer momento antes de 
sua publicação, sem sofrer quaisquer sanções ou constrangimentos. Recebi uma cópia 
deste termo de consentimento livre e esclarecido. 
 
Data e local 
 
Assinatura do(s) participante (s) 
 




5. Translation Of The Informed Consent Form Used 
Free, informed consent 
 
I declare, by this term, that I have agreed to be interviewed to the research entitled 
"Possible Futures for the Peoples of the Xingu" developed by Marianna Birmoser Fer-
reira-Aulu, supervised by Jarmo Vehmas and Matti Salo, University of Turku, Finland, 
with Sergio Andrade as a research assistant. I have the right to contact the researcher at 
any time it deems necessary through email mbfeau@utu.fi. 
I declare that I have taken part in the research on my own will, without receiving any 
financial incentive, and with the sole purpose of working for the success of the research. 
I was informed that the objectives of this study are strictly academic and that the re-
search topic deals with the social and environmental impacts of the Belo Monte Dam. 
In the publication of the research I would hope to be treated as: 
 Completely anonymous (no name or occupation may be revealed) 
 Semi-anonymous (my occupation can be published, but not my name) 
 Public (my name, occupation and work institution can be published) 
Only the researcher, the supervisors, and the research assistant may have access to data 
related to my identity. 
I was informed that at any time before the publication of this research, I can ask that 
my input may be removed, no questions asked. 
I received a copy of the free and informed consent. 
 
Date and place 
 
Signature (s) of interviewee (s) 
 
Signature of the researcher 
